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Abstract 
Moral codes of conducts are a hallmark of human civilization: moral norms have been 
developed by every known human society to regulate social interactions. The emergence and 
maintenance of these norms has been proposed to reflect the evolution in the human brain of 
neurocognitive processes beneficial for cohabiting in large social groups, a perspective fully 
captured by the Social Brain Hypothesis. To date, however, there is still little knowledge of 
what these processes are and how they interact with other-purposes processes, such as those 
involved in (non-moral) value-based decisions.  
In the present thesis I propose to close this gap by asking: are there neurocognitive processes 
that specifically represent moral values (rather than universally moral and material values)? 
How and where are moral and material value representations integrated to inform decisions? 
To address these questions, I conducted three studies where I combined behavioral measures 
of moral choice and preferences with neuroimaging (i.e., functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, fMRI) and brain-stimulation techniques (i.e., transcranial direct current stimulation, 
tDCS) to investigate the neural mechanisms involved in a) estimating the right course of 
action in morally ambiguous situations (i.e., where morally right and wrong behaviors depend 
on the agent’s moral preferences), and b) implementing behavioral control functions that 
instantiate the behaviors prescribed by a moral norm shared by a group.  
In a first fMRI study, I developed a novel experimental paradigm where I concurrently 
elicited subjective values in different choice contexts, a moral context and a financial context, 
in order to disclose a) if moral subjective values could be reliably estimated and used to 
explain individual moral preferences, b) if and where these subjective values are represented 
in the brain, and c) if subjective moral values are estimated by domain-general valuation 
processes or if these rely (to some extent) on moral-specific valuation processes. My results 
revealed that moral subjective values could be solidly estimated adopting traditional 
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computational models of choice processes. However, I found no evidence for a common 
neuro-computational process that estimated both moral and financial subjective values. 
Instead, the evidence suggested that computations of moral subjective values rely on domain-
specific neural functions performed predominantly in the right temporo-parietal junction 
(rTPJ). 
The second study used tDCS to alter the excitability of the right dorso-lateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC) during acquisition of several behavioral measures, which allowed me to 
directly test a causal role for this brain area in arbitrating between self-interested motives and 
moral motives – in this specific case honesty. The data obtained in this context revealed that 
increasing excitability of the right dlPFC lead to a significant increase of honest behavior. No 
effect of tDCS was observed in a variety of other control tasks, suggesting a specific 
involvement of this brain region in regulating internal conflicts between selfish and moral 
motives.  
Finally, the third study of the present thesis combined online tDCS and fMRI to examine at 
the neural-network level the causal brain activity responsible for implementing fairness, the 
moral norm that regulates how resources should be shared among members of a society. 
Intriguingly this approach allows me investigate how one brain area – the right DLPFC – 
may change how it influences whole networks in a context-dependent manner. Replicating a 
previous own study, behaviorally I showed that increasing/decreasing the excitability of 
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) lead to an increase/decrease of compliance with the fairness 
norm in the presence of a credible punishment threat and to decreased/increased compliance 
in the absence of such punishment threat. These behavioral effects were mirrored by changes 
at the neural level. My fMRI results revealed that anodal stimulation of the right LPFC 
resulted in increased amygdala activity and increased connectivity between the stimulated 
area and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In contrast, cathodal tDCS to the right LPFC induced 
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changes in functional activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), left LPFC, and bilateral 
inferior parietal lobules (IPL). Jointly, these findings support the hypothesis that the LPFC 
drives fairness-norm compliance by regulating the salience of inputs from neural areas 
processing social emotions – responsive to the threat of sanctions for norm violations – and 
cognition – strategically arbitrating when it is potentially safe to violate the fairness norm. 
In my thesis I used morality, one of the most important tools regulating social interactions, to 
add evidence in support of the Social Brain Hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that the 
cortical enlargement of the human brain mainly reflected the evolution of neuro-cognitive 
processes beneficial for co-habiting in large social groups. Taken together, my findings 
revealed some of these social-specific processes: study one identified neural activity 
specifically involved in the estimation of subjective moral values, compared to subjective 
financial material values; study two revealed evidence demonstrating a causal role for the 
right LPFC in arbitrating conflicts between competing moral and material values to determine 
moral behavior; finally, study three revealed that the LPFC controls moral behavior by 
selectively modulating the behavioral relevance of social emotions and cognition depending 
on the context in which moral decisions are taken. 
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1. Introduction 
A hallmark of humanity is the extent to which we rely on elaborated social codes of conduct - 
such as moral and social norms (Bicchieri 2005; Elster 1989; Axelrod 1984) - to regulate 
behavior in a social environment and peacefully resolve frictions generated by having to 
compete for resources with other members of a society (Tomasello 2011; Dunbar & Shultz 
2007; Barton & Dunbar 1997). All known human societies, from simple hunter-gatherer 
groups to complex modern nations, use social norms to regulate intergroup interactions. 
Importantly, the need to develop emotional and cognitive skills that allow control of 
spontaneous behavior as well as the maintenance and development of such regulatory 
systems are thought to be a major force driving the evolution of the human brain, an 
assumption often referred to as the “Social Brain Hypothesis” (Dunbar 1998; Dávid-Barrett 
& Dunbar 2013).  
Within the scope of this hypothesis, previous research has highlighted the relevance of 
three components for social behavior: social emotions (Reeck et al. 2016), i.e., emotions that 
are experienced vicariously (such as empathy or compassion) or emotions that result from 
imposing externalities on others (such as guilt or shame); social cognition (Apperly 2008; 
Samson & Apperly 2010; Hamilton 2005; Gordon 1996), mainly the ability to take the 
perspective of others or to attribute intentionality to the consequences of others’ actions -- 
often jointly referred to as theory of mind, ToM (Saxe 2009); and social behavior control 
mechanisms that are at least partially independent of basic emotions and cognitions, for 
instance the control of selfish impulses or compliance with social norms (Montague & 
Lohrenz 2007).  
These three aspects (emotions, cognition and behavior control) of social behavior 
have been proposed to play a fundamental role also for a sub-domain of social behavior, 
namely moral decision-making, the topic at the core of the present thesis. The next sections 
2 
 
review the literature describing some of the important facets of the moral decision making 
processes, illustrating what is known to date and, more importantly, what issues seem to still 
be unresolved and will be addressed by the three studies (see appendices to Studies 1-3) 
constituting the experimental part of this thesis. 
1.1. Moral Decision Making 
The origins of modern moral psychology can be traced back to Hume’s Treatise on Human 
Nature (Hume 2000), where he proposed that moral decisions closely follow the emotional 
reactions that humans have in order to evaluate the moral appropriateness of an event. In the 
past century psychologists (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1971) proposed a more sophisticated 
developmental theory describing the different components of moral decision making and 
their stages of development in humans, from childhood to adulthood. One of these theories 
(Kohlberg 1976) proposed six moral development stages divided in three levels: pre-
conventional, conventional and post-conventional. In the pre-conventional stages, moral 
reasoning is merely determined by self-interest (e.g., how can I avoid punishment), while in 
the conventional stages moral reasoning is motivated by interpersonal interests (e.g., how can 
I contribute to maintain social order). Finally in the post-conventional stage, moral reasoning 
takes a more metaphysical stance being concerned with universal ethical principles. 
Importantly, these scholars gave origin to two school of thoughts that disagreed on whether 
morality was primarily of emotional nature (Hume 2000) or of reason (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 
1971). 
More recently morality has become the object of study of researchers from several 
disciplines including psychology, neuroscience, biology, psychiatry, and economics (Haidt 
2001; Haidt 2012; Prinz 2006; Greene & Haidt 2002; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001; 
Mikhail 2009; Shenhav & Greene 2010; Hauser 2007; Cima et al. 2010; Huebner et al. 2008; 
Harlé & Sanfey 2010; Sanfey 2007). The cumulative body of evidence from these disciplines 
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has demonstrated that morality is constituted by both affective and cognitive processes (Patil 
& Silani 2014; Majdandžić et al. 2012; Ugazio et al. 2012; Moll et al. 2008; Moll & de 
Oliveira-Souza 2007; Moll et al. 2005; Moll et al. 2002; Schnall, et al. 2008; Valdesolo & 
Desteno 2006; Wheatley & Haidt 2005; Greene et al. 2001; Shenhav & Greene 2010; 
Kliemann et al. 2008; Young & Saxe 2008; Cushman et al. 2006; Greene 2015; Young et al. 
2007; Greene 2007; Greene et al. 2004; Cushman et al. 2010; Greene & Haidt 2002; 
Cushman & Young 2011). 
Based on this body of evidence, several diverging models of moral decision making 
have been proposed. The main source of disagreement between these models is the relevance 
attributed to emotional and cognitive processes: some predict a more predominant role of 
emotions (Schnall, et al. 2008; Haidt 2001; Prinz 2006; Wheatley & Haidt 2005) while others 
propose that cognition and reasoning have a pivotal role in steering moral decisions (Mikhail 
2009; Hauser 2007; Kohlberg 1971; Kohlberg 1976; Piaget 1932). To date, the most favored 
theory in this field is the dual-process theory proposed by Greene and colleagues (Greene 
2015; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001), which suggests that cognitive and emotional 
mechanisms compete in determining our moral judgment.  
Some recent theories and studies in the moral domain have started stressing the 
importance of approaching moral decision-making from a value-based perspective (Crockett 
2016; Crockett 2013; Ayars 2016; Cushman 2013; Shenhav & Greene 2010; Hutcherson et 
al. 2015), an approach already successfully used to explain choices and understand 
preferences in other decision-making fields such as economics (Clithero & Rangel 2014; 
Schultz 2006). To date, the few studies investigating moral decisions through the lens of 
value-computations proposed that these are related to both emotional and cognitive processes 
(Hutcherson et al. 2015; Shenhav & Greene 2010). However, how exactly these processes 
participate in the computation of moral values is still unclear. Similarly, there is still no solid 
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evidence that allows to determine whether moral decisions are represented in the brain by 
moral-specific neural processes or  by domain-general mechanisms as one study proposes 
(Shenhav & Greene 2010). This proposal contrast with the possibility that the human brain 
may have evolved processes specifically dedicated to moral decisions, a view consistent with 
the Social Brain Hypothesis(Dunbar 1998; Dávid-Barrett & Dunbar 2013). More in detail, the 
Social Brain Hypothesis posits that humans have evolved neural processes that are 
particularly sensitive to social information: These processes thought to be selectively engaged 
in supporting and driving social behaviors and decisions, and are either not involved or 
involved to a lesser extent in implementing behaviors and decisions that lack this social 
component. For example  (Spitzer et al. 2007; Ruff et al. 2013) demonstrated that the right 
DLPFC is selectively responsive to and causally engaged by compliance with social fairness 
norms. Crucially, in a decision situation closely resembling fairness norm compliance but 
lacking the social component, these region were significantly less engaged and was not found 
to causally determine non-social behavior. In this vein, study 1 compares the neural 
representations of social and non-social value computations demonstrating that there are also 
neural processes specifically responsible for performing moral value computations. 
In the following chapters I discuss the available evidence indicating the existence of 
moral specific emotional, cognitive, and social behavioral control mechanisms. 
1.2. Emotions and Moral Decisions 
The idea that emotions have an important role in moral judgments was championed in 
Hume’s works (Hume 2000). Building on these thoughts, psychologists and philosophers 
have more recently developed a series of studies testing the role of emotions in guiding moral 
decisions (Haidt 2012; Ugazio et al. 2012; Crockett et al. 2010; Harlé & Sanfey 2010; 
Schnall, et al. 2008; Valdesolo & Desteno 2006; Wheatley & Haidt 2005; Prinz 2006). 
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The first studies in this domain tested the hypothesis that emotions, by means of “gut 
feelings”, inform a person about the moral correctness/wrongness of an action, by causing a 
given emotional reaction in the person experiencing a moral situation: a positive/pleasant 
emotion results from observing a morally praiseworthy event or a negative/unpleasant 
emotion emerges if such event is morally condemnable (Haidt 2012; Prinz 2006). This 
emotional reaction to a given moral event is then translated into a person’s moral judgment: if 
this person is in a pleasant emotional state she will judge the event to be morally correct, 
whereas if she finds herself in a negative emotional state, she will judge the event to be 
morally inappropriate  
To test this prediction, Haidt and colleagues (Schnall, et al. 2008; Schnall, et al. 2008; 
Wheatley & Haidt 2005; Haidt 2001; Haidt 2007; Haidt & Joseph 2004) developed a series of 
moral vignettes describing violations of moral norms that are suggested to be strongly 
connected to feelings of disgust, while at the same time controlling for some of the possible 
non-moral reasons that may be used to determine the appropriateness. For instance, one of the 
most representative scenarios describes two siblings who decide to have sexual intercourse 
but take measures to avoid pregnancy (Haidt 2001). 
The results gathered in a series of studies seem to support the view that moral 
judgments in these situations are driven by emotions: the author reported (Haidt 2001) that 
participants expressing moral judgments in these vignettes did so by following their gut 
reactions rather than a reason-based moral principles. More precisely, participants reported 
that their moral judgments resulted from a disgust feeling evoked by the actions described in 
the vignettes. The link between disgust and moral judgment was further confirmed by several 
other studies (Schnall, et al. 2008; Wheatley & Haidt 2005)  using different techniques to 
induce disgust including disgusting smells (Schnall, et al. 2008) and hypnosis (Wheatley & 
Haidt 2005). These studies reported that as a result of inducing disgust, participants’ moral 
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judgments of these moral vignettes became harsher compared to the judgments of participants 
in a neutral emotional state.  
Furthermore, this effect seems to be specific to disgust since no effect on moral 
judgments was found following the induction of sadness (Schnall, et al. 2008). Such 
specificity for disgust was further confirmed by a study (Schnall, et al. 2008) where purity, 
the opposite of disgust according to the authors, was primed in participants. In this case, 
purity-primed participants reported less harsh moral judgments on these vignettes compared 
to participants in a neutral emotional state. 
While these studies used an experimental paradigm designed to specifically test the 
role of disgust for moral judgments, emotions have been shown to have an important role also 
in other less emotionally-salient moral situations, such as the trolley dilemma (Foot 1967) or 
the ultimatum game, an economic game used to test fairness-related preferences (Güth et al. 
1982, for a review see (Güth 1995). The first of these relates to a scenario where one has to 
decide whether it is morally required to sacrifice the life of a person in order to save a large 
group of people, or vice-versa whether such action should be considered morally forbidden.  
Using a version of this scenario known as the footbridge trolley dilemma (Thomson 
2008; Thomson 1976), a novel study (Valdesolo & Desteno 2006) found that inducing 
happiness led participants to report more utilitarian moral judgments, i.e. considering it 
morally permissible to sacrifice one person to save a larger group. Further, another study 
(Ugazio et al. 2012) investigated the role of emotions for moral judgments taking into 
account not only the valence of the induced emotion – i.e. whether the induced emotion is a 
negative or a positive one – but also the motivational tendencies of the induced emotion – i.e. 
whether the induced emotion is an approach emotion or a withdrawal emotion (Berkowitz 
2003). This study showed that inducing disgust or anger, two negative emotions of opposite 
motivational tendencies, resulted in opposing effects on participants’ moral judgments: a 
7 
 
disgust induction resulted in a decrease of utilitarian decisions, while an anger induction 
resulted in an increase of utilitarian judgments pointing to a strong role for the motivational 
tendencies of emotions in shaping moral decisions. 
The hypothesis that emotions affect certain types of moral decisions depending on 
their motivational tendencies was further corroborated by a study testing the role of emotions 
in fairness-based decisions (Harlé & Sanfey 2010). This study found that approach emotions, 
such as anger or amusement, lead participants to accept more often unfair offers compared to 
participants who were primed on withdrawal emotions such as disgust and serenity.  
While the studies discussed so far focused on the relation between basic emotions and 
moral judgment, a more complex social emotion has also been shown to be an important 
factor influencing moral decision making: empathy (Yoder & Decety 2014; Patil & Silani 
2014; Majdandžić et al. 2012; Ugazio et al. 2014; Crockett et al. 2010; Batson 2011; 
Gleichgerrcht & Young 2013). While it is still unclear how exactly empathy affects moral 
decisions, a proposed mechanism is that it decreases the willingness to endorse harmful 
actions. In line with this view, (Gleichgerrcht & Young 2013) found a negative correlation 
between the endorsement of utilitarian judgments in moral decisions similar to the trolley-
dilemma and empathic concern: individuals with low empathic concern were more likely to 
indicate that the required moral course of action in these situations was harming one in order 
to save more. 
A similar finding was reported by (Patil & Silani 2014) in a study on alexithymia 
patients. Furthermore, empathic concern was found to be an important modulator of the effect 
of serotonine-depletion in affecting moral judgments (Crockett et al. 2010). Consistent with 
the view that empathy affects moral decisions by increasing an aversion to harm, 
(Majdandžić et al. 2012) found that increasing empathic concern in participants led these to 
not endorse utilitarian moral judgments in trolley-type moral decisions. 
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The role of emotions for moral judgments was also studied at the neural level 
(Heekeren et al. 2005; Moll et al. 2002). In these two studies, the authors test neural activity 
elicited by stimuli presenting violations of moral principles as well as other emotionally 
charged stimuli of non-moral nature. The second study (Moll et al. 2002) revealed that 
attending to both moral and non-moral stimuli increased brain activity in the amygdala, the 
right thalamus, and the right insula/inferior frontal gyrus, brain areas associated with negative 
emotion processing. Importantly, contrasting the brain activity elicited by morally salient 
stimuli to the one elicited by stimuli without moral relevance the authors (Moll et al. 2002) 
found increased brain activity elicited by the morally charged pictures in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the medial frontal gyrus. These results 
suggest that moral aversive stimuli are processed by partially domain-specific neural 
functions.  
Similar findings have been proposed in a study (Heekeren et al. 2005)  measuring 
brain activity of participants while they read texts either describing moral norms violations 
(e.g., A gives B a bloody nose) or containing a violation of a grammatical norm (e.g., A 
dresses a very bloody wound). In this study the authors found that moral violations alone 
activated a network of brain regions which included the posterior STS, as well as the 
VMPFC, and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Taken together, these studies revealed a 
dedicated functional network responsible for processing emotional reactions to aversive 
stimuli and stressed an important role of these neural processes in the integration of 
emotional reactions to moral evaluations. 
Further neural evidence linking emotions to moral judgments can be found in 
Greene’s works where he studied moral decision making in the context of the trolley-
dilemma (Greene 2015; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001). These studies analyzed the 
neural correlates of moral decisions by dividing moral scenarios into two classes: 1) personal 
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moral dilemmas, where sacrificing the life of a person is a direct consequence of the action 
judged and thus may elicit strong affective responses, and 2) impersonal moral dilemmas, 
where the loss of a life would result as a side effect of the action and thus presumably is 
associated with less affect (Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001). 
The authors found that judgments in personal moral dilemmas that it is morally 
forbidden to sacrifice a life in order to save a larger amount of people relied on neural activity 
in brain areas associated with processing of emotions such as the Amygdala (Blair 2007)  and 
in areas integrating emotional information into decision-making such as the LPFC or the 
vmPFC (Greene & Haidt 2002). 
Based on the discussed studies, there is now ample evidence that establishes a strong 
role for emotions in moral decision making. More importantly, in line with the Social Brain 
Hypothesis, the discussed research gives strong indications that moral emotions are 
instantiated by domain-specific processes, represented at the neural level by brain activity in 
the OFC and STS among other areas (Moll et al. 2002; Heekeren et al. 2005). None of these 
studies, however, has investigated if and how these moral emotional processes participate in 
the more deliberative processes that underlie the intrinsic value of moral choice options, for 
instance the value of a human life. Consider one example of a common task used to measure 
moral judgments, the “footbridge dilemma” (Thomson 1976): A runaway trolley threatens to 
kill five people. The only way to save the five people is to push a stranger off a bridge, onto 
the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching 
the others. Is it morally permissible to push this stranger off the bridge in front of the trolley?  
Existing studies suggest that, on average, approximately seven people out of ten judge killing 
the stranger morally inappropriate (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), even if this would lead to 
saving five people. This frequently observed refusal to endorse the harmful action has been 
suggested to result from a negative emotional reaction towards this action (Greene et al., 
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2001, 2004, 2009). This in turn, suggests that emotions can modulate the value one assigns to 
the choice options considered. To date, however, despite over a decade of research 
investigating moral judgments in this dilemma context, very little is known about specific 
neuro-cognitive mechanisms that can explain individual differences in moral preferences, or 
their relation to emotional processes (for a review see Young & Koenigs, 2007). One study 
approached this issue analyzing the neural activity sensitive to the emotional attributes of a 
moral decision (Hutcherson et al. 2015). Here it was shown that, among other areas, the 
insula, and superior temporal gyrus correlated with emotional appraisals and that these 
representations were then integrated in an overall moral value judgment in the vmPFC. 
Importantly, this study also showed that emotional appraisals of moral decisions are only one 
of the components that concur in determining the value that a person assigns to moral choice 
options: in this study it was shown that other cognitive processes are involved in tracking  
other attributes of the moral decision, such as the objective utility of each of the choice 
options. For instance if we consider the moral dilemma above the number of lives that one 
could save/harm has been shown to be represented by different neural activity than the one 
underlying emotional appraisals, specifically in the right TPJ (Hutcherson et al. 2015). 
Relying on the literature discussed in the present section, one of the aims of Study 1 
of the present thesis is to generate new evidence that could clarify how moral emotions 
participate in moral value computations, and if individual differences in sensitivity to 
emotions could be used to explain differences in moral preferences among people. 
1.3. Cognition and Moral Decisions 
Several studies in moral psychology have recently stressed the importance of cognitive 
mechanisms in shaping our moral decision-making. Of particular relevance is the ability to 
infer and attribute intentionality to the actions of other people and of taking the perspective of 
others, a social cognitive mechanism often referred to as Theory of Mind (Saxe et al. 2004). 
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 Testing the role of Theory of Mind in moral intuitions and decision making, Young 
and colleagues (Young et al. 2007) developed a new set of moral scenarios in which one had 
to determine whether a fictitious agent was morally culpable for his actions. These actions 
were described as resulting in consequences that were either negative (the agent harming the 
peer) or neutral (the peer was unharmed by the agent’s actions). Furthermore, the intentions 
of the agents were also manipulated, being described as either negative (e.g., intending to do 
harm) or neutral.  
Combining these two factors, moral judgments were analyzed in four different 
contexts: 1) where the intentions were neutral and the outcome neutral, i.e., no harm intended 
and no harm caused; 2) where the intentions were neutral but the outcome negative, yielding 
a situation where harm was caused unintentionally; 3) where the intentions were negative but 
the outcome neutral, yielding a situation where a person attempted to cause harm but failed; 
and 4) where the intentions were negative and the consequences negative, i.e., a situation 
where harm was intended and successfully caused. 
The behavioral results reported in this study (Young et al. 2007) highlighted the 
importance of intentionality in moral judgments. As expected, participants considered actions 
leading to harmful consequences more morally wrong compared to actions that resulted in 
neutral outcomes. Importantly, intentions modulated these moral judgments of condemnation: 
unintended harmful actions were considered less morally wrong than actions that 
intentionally caused harm; similarly, actions attempting to commit harm were judged to be 
more morally wrong compared to actions that did not intend any harm. 
Furthermore, measuring participants’ brain activity while reporting their moral 
judgments in these moral scenarios, (Young et al. 2007) found that the modulatory effect of 
intentionality on moral judgments was predominantly represented in neural activity in the 
right TPJ, a brain area considered to play an important role in implementing Theory of Mind 
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(Saxe et al. 2004). In a subsequent study (Young et al. 2010), the authors used this moral 
decision-making task while disrupting right TPJ neural activity in participants using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to test if the right TPJ had a causal role in 
interpreting the intentions behind other people’s actions and incorporating this understanding 
in moral evaluation of the observed actions.  
This study found that when the TPJ was disrupted with repetitive TMS, participants 
based their moral judgments more on the consequences of the agent’s actions rather than on 
his intentions, in particular for scenarios in situations with attempted harm. Taken together, 
these results revealed an important role of Theory of Mind in shaping human moral 
judgments, and provided evidence for a causal link between this ability and neural activity in 
the right TPJ. 
Another cognitive process important for moral decisions is the one that enables us to 
compare magnitudes and estimating values. While in the previous section, I discussed the 
role of affective processes in personal trolley-dilemmas, the same studies highlighted an 
important role of cognitive mechanisms for driving moral judgments in impersonal moral 
dilemmas (i.e., where harm to a person would result as a side effect of the action). In this 
specific context, considering it morally permissible to sacrifice the life of a person to save 
more people was found to activate brain areas implicated with cognitive processes (e.g., 
working memory, (Cohen et al. 1997; Smith & Jonides 1998; Smith & Jonides 1997)), such 
as the parietal lobes (Greene et al. 2001; Greene & Haidt 2002; Greene et al. 2004), and 
value-based decision making (Shenhav & Greene 2010; Hare et al. 2008; Schultz 2006) such 
as the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), and the ventral striatum (VS). 
Notably, one recent study (Shenhav & Greene 2010) investigated if computations of 
expected values in moral decision making elicited the same neural mechanisms typically 
found to represent economic expected values. The evidence reported in this study suggests 
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that moral decision making is largely supported by domain-general mechanisms involved in 
computing expected values: the authors found that expected-values computations in the 
context of moral decisions elicited neural activity, among other areas, in the mOFC and the 
vmPFC (Shenhav & Greene 2010). 
Since these brain areas are the very same ones previously identified in a number of 
non-moral tasks as important for computing the expected values of given decision options 
(Platt & Huettel 2008; Knutson et al. 2005; Knutson & Peterson 2005), the authors propose 
that moral decisions rely on domain-general decision mechanisms rather than on moral-
specific ones. In line with this view, recent works (Ayars 2016; Crockett 2013; Cushman 
2013) have proposed to adopt social-learning mechanisms from the economic literature 
(Clithero & Rangel 2014) in order to explain how moral intuitions – i.e. the intuitions that 
constitute the foundations of our moral preferences – result from domain-general learning 
mechanisms and are shaped by social interactions.  
Critically, however, the proposed domain-generality view relies only on reverse 
inference, since no existing study has directly compared the neurocognitive processes 
involved in the estimation of moral values to those involved in estimating other types of 
values. Study1 of the present thesis addresses exactly this issue, by directly comparing moral 
and financial value computations. Only through such a direct comparison it is possible to 
clarify whether moral value computations rely on domain-specific mechanisms, as one would 
predict from the perspective of the Social Brain Hypothesis, or on domain-general 
mechanisms. 
The literature discussed in this and the previous sections has highlighted the existence 
of two different types of processes involved in driving moral choice, one relying more on 
affective components, the other on cognitive processes. Crucially, it is yet to be clarified to 
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which extent these affective and cognitive processes contribute to moral decisions through 
domain-general or moral-specific mechanisms.  
As mentioned, the dominant view in the moral psychological literature (Greene 2015) 
proposes that these two mechanisms are at the basis for different moral judgments (e.g. 
utilitarian or deontological judgments). For instance, (Greene 2015) suggests that utilitarian 
moral judgments are mostly driven by cognitive processes, calculating and comparing the 
value of saving five people to the value of saving one person. However, deontological moral 
decisions are mainly influenced by a strong aversive emotional reaction towards the act of 
directly killing someone. Moral judgments therefore seem to be the outcome of a competition 
between the cognitive information that maximizing utility may be more desirable versus the 
emotional aversive reaction against violating a human right, such as the right to physical 
integrity, thus supporting the view to consider such action undesirable. Which of the two 
mechanisms prevails is proposed to be arbitrated by mechanisms of behavior control (Greene 
2015; Greene et al. 2004; Greene & Paxton 2009) as discussed in the next section. It is 
important to note that recent studies approaching moral decision-making from a value-based 
perspective (Crockett 2016; Crockett 2013; Ayars 2016; Cushman 2013; Hutcherson et al. 
2015) are casting doubts on this dual-process competitive inhibition account, generating 
evidence that instead supports the view that moral decision making resembles the architecture 
of  other value-based decisions, e.g. economic choices. In this case, distinct regions represent 
emotional and cognitive decision variables independently, and are integrated into an overall 
value signal. In this case, therefore, conflict between decision variables does not necessarily 
imply dual systems competing for control, but may instead indicate competition in the 
processes computing the various decision variables. 
Due to a substantial lack of evidence, it is unclear whether moral value-based decision 
making closely resembles other types of value based decisions. In this thesis, in particular in 
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Study 1, I propose to fill this gap with a study in which I can accurately characterize the 
moral value computation processes. With this approach I can therefore be in an ideal position 
to examine the neural correlates of the subjective values of moral choices, and then to 
contrast them with the neural correlates of subjective values of financial choices. 
1.4. Behavioral Control and Moral Decisions 
In order to perform several different types of tasks, the human brain relies on multiple neuro-
psychological mechanisms. Each of these mechanisms is specialized to process different 
pieces of information. For instance, the fusiform face area (FFA) is specialized in processing 
inputs related to facial characteristics (Kanwisher & Yovel 2006; Kanwisher 2006), area V4 
(possibly in combination with other parts of the visual cortex) of the visual system processes 
colors (Knoblauch 2002; Gazzaniga 2002), while Broca’s area is specialized in elaborating 
language-related content (Fadiga et al. 2010; Fadiga et al. 2009).  
In many cases, these different mechanisms operate in synchrony, allowing us to 
efficiently and accurately perform many types of tasks. In other situations, however, the 
inputs from these mechanisms yield contrasting responses, resulting in a conflict that hinders 
the accuracy and efficacy of our behavioral ability to solve a given task. One of the most 
famous examples of these situations is captured by the Stroop task (Botvinick et al. 2001; 
Stroop 1935; MacLeod 1991). This task entails reading out loud the color in which a word is 
printed. Importantly the semantic meaning of this word is itself a color. The performance in 
this task varies if the semantic meaning of a word and the color this word is printed in are 
matched (e.g. red printed in red ink) or are different (e.g. red printed in green ink).  
In the first case, most people can perform the task accurately and rapidly, suggesting 
that the different neural mechanisms coding for the different properties of the stimuli are 
attuned in priming the same response (e.g. responding red in the given example). In the 
second case, however, not only the accuracy of the responses is lower than in the previous 
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case, but also giving a response takes much longer (van Maanen et al. 2009; Jensen & 
Rohwer 1966; MacLeod 1991). 
The behavioral differences between the two tasks, known as Stroop Effect, have been 
shown to result from conflicts between systems processing information relevant to 
performing this task in the case where semantic meaning and printing color are incongruent. 
In this case, in fact, the task of naming the printed color receives competing information from 
the visual system carrying the color information (e.g. red) while it receives different 
information from the mechanisms processing the semantic meaning of the word (e.g. green).  
In order to give a response, this conflict needs to be solved by behavioral-control 
mechanisms (Botvinick et al. 2001; Cohen et al. 1990). These mechanisms are responsible for 
mediating between the systems in conflict, downregulating one of the two systems so that a 
decision can be taken. The response will then rely on the information provided by one of the 
two (or more) systems triggered by the given task. In the example mentioned here, if the 
visual system prevails then the response will be ‘red’, while if the semantic information is 
carried on to the decision the response will be ‘green’. 
Behavioral control mechanisms have been proposed to be at play in resolving 
conflicts between several types of processes: from the basic cognitive conflicts described 
above to basic emotional conflicts (Dresler et al. 2009; Ochsner & Gross 2005; McKenna & 
Sharma 2004; McKenna & Sharma 1995; Williams et al. 1996), and more importantly in 
social-emotional (Silani et al. 2013) and social-cognition conflicts (Baumgartner et al. 2011; 
Knoch et al. 2008; Knoch et al. 2006; Knoch et al. 2009; Knoch et al. 2010; Knoch & Fehr 
2007; Greene 2007). These studies have highlighted an important role of different neural 
structures and functions implementing behavioral control in these different situations, 
including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the LPFC for basic and social cognitive 
conflict resolution  (Ruff et al., 2013; Knoch et al., 2009; Greene et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 
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2001), while the rTPJ has been linked to social emotional behavioral control (Silani et al. 
2013). 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the role assigned to the right LPFC in 
behavioral control during various moral decision making tasks. As mentioned above, Greene 
and colleagues (Greene 2015; Greene 2007; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001) have 
proposed that moral decisions in personal trolley dilemmas rely on conflicting decision 
systems. Evidence for the existence of multiple mechanisms competing for action control was 
revealed by increased reaction times required for a person to report their moral judgment in 
these situations - especially for judgments considering it morally permissible to sacrifice a 
person to save more - compared to the time it took to make moral judgments in impersonal 
moral dilemmas. This view was further supported by fMRI data revealing stronger activation 
in the ACC (Greene et al. 2004), one of the brain areas associated with decision-conflict 
resolution of the type described above (Botvinick et al. 2001; Shenhav et al. 2013). 
While in the case of the trolley-type moral decisions the source of the conflict is 
suggested to be between affective, harm-aversion related processes and more cognitive 
processes coding the number of lives at stake (Greene, 2015), the need for behavioral control 
mechanisms has also been identified for choice-situations where participants have to choose 
between behaving selfishly (e.g. earning larger amounts of money) or behaving in adherence 
with the moral prescriptions applying to a given choice-situation (e.g. reciprocating trust or 
sharing monetary rewards with others fairly). Several studies (Baumgartner et al. 2011; 
Knoch et al. 2008; Knoch et al. 2006; Knoch et al. 2009; Knoch et al. 2010; Knoch & Fehr 
2007; Greene 2007) have attributed a critical role for implementing behavioral control in 
these situations to the right LPFC. 
For instance, (Spitzer et al. 2007) reported that this brain area responded strongly to 
the presence of sanction threats during exchanges in a modified dictator/ultimatum game. In 
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particular, its activity was increased when the participants had to choose how much money to 
transfer to opponents who could punish for norm transgressions, compared to opponents who 
could not react to the transfer. According to the authors, the neural activity in this brain area 
corresponds to increased behavioral control necessary to resist the temptation of behaving 
selfishly in order to avoid being punished by their counterparts.  
In a subsequent study, (Ruff et al. 2013) used anodal/cathodal tDCS to 
increase/decrease the neural excitability of the right LPFC to test whether it indeed controls 
behavioral reactions to such punishment threats. To this end, they measured both voluntary 
norm compliance (transfers in a dictator game where the opponent cannot punish) and 
sanction-induced norm compliance (changes in transfers from the voluntary compliance when 
sanction threats are present, i.e., when the opponent can punish). The results revealed that 
both types of norm compliance could be modified with tDCS in opposite ways: sanction-
induced norm compliance was increased by anodal tDCS and decreased by cathodal tDCS, 
whereas voluntary compliance was reduced by anodal tDCS and enhanced by cathodal tDCS. 
This pattern of results suggests that anodal/cathodal tDCS rendered participants more/less 
sensitive to the presence of sanction threats, causing larger/smaller adjustments of behavior to 
the external incentives.  
Several other studies using brain stimulation to disrupt neural activity in this brain 
region (Baumgartner et al. 2011; Knoch et al. 2009; Knoch et al. 2006) reported results 
consistent with the view that the right DLPFC plays a critical role in social behavior control: 
following such disruption, participants were less able to build a positive reputation in a 
repeated interaction trust game (Knoch et al. 2009) or to reinforce fairness in ultimatum 
games (i.e. not punishing norm-violators, Baumgartner et al., 2011; Daria Knoch et al., 
2006), when these choices required behavioral control of selfish impulses (e.g. monetary 
rewards). 
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Furthermore, some of the previously described studies suggest that the right LPFC is 
particularly involved in control of behavior in social contexts. The previously mentioned 
fMRI study by (Spitzer et al. 2007), for instance, identified socially-specific neural correlates 
of social norm compliance by comparing neural activity when participants interacted with 
another person versus when they performed the exact same task, but now against a computer 
algorithm. Importantly, the right LPFC that was later targeted with tDCS by (Ruff et al. 2013) 
was more strongly activated by the presence of sanction-threats when participants interacted 
with human opponents than with the computer algorithms.  
Using a similar approach, (Ruff et al. 2013) also investigated the effects of LPFC 
tDCS in social vs. non-social contexts, finding that the strength of the tDCS effects were 
significantly more pronounced in the social condition. These findings indicate that the neural 
activity in the right LPFC is indeed causally necessary for behavioral control only during 
social interactions with other humans, rather than reflecting other aspects of the choice 
situation that may be similar for non-social choices (such as risk assessment, response 
selection, etc.). A similarly social-specific causal role of the right LPFC was also identified 
by (Knoch et al. 2006), where it was shown that TMS only increased acceptance of unfair 
offers from a human opponent but not from a computer. 
In sum, this section reviewed studies that highlighted the importance of behavioral 
control mechanisms for moral decision-making. Specifically, the identified mechanisms 
regulate the relevance of emotional and cognitive elements for determining moral decisions. 
Critically, the studies discussed in the previous paragraph provide solid evidence for the 
existence of social behavioral control mechanisms in the right LPFC that determine moral 
decisions. Based on a growing body of evidence (Duncan 2001; Miller & Cohen 2001; 
Buckholtz et al. 2015) suggesting that the right LPFC has the function of integrating 
information from several interconnected neural networks, one possible mechanisms through 
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which this behavioral control function is exerted is through of the integration and modulation 
of information across different brain regions depending on different behavioral contexts. 
Study 3 tests exactly this hypothesis with the aim of clarifying how the neural function in the 
right LPFC relates to neural activity in other brain areas in order to regulate behavior.  
Further, the evidence presented in this section adds to the data discussed in the section 
on emotions and morality (Section 1.2), in strengthening the view that the human brain 
recruits domain-specific mechanisms to implement moral decisions. The proposed hypothesis 
that the human brain evolved moral-specific decision mechanisms, which I support with fresh 
evidence in Study 1, opens a further intriguing question: how and where does the brain 
integrate inputs from moral-specific and domain-general processes? I will answer this 
question in study 2 assigning an important role for this function to the right DLPFC. 
Moreover, despite the evidence discussed in this section, it is still unclear how the brain 
activity in the right DLPFC changes its relation with other brain functions ultimately causing 
changes in moral behavior. This question is addressed in Study 3. 
2. Summary of the Experimental Strategy 
As illustrated by the extensive literature review above, research in moral psychology has 
yielded a sophisticated understanding of the latent principles that guide moral decisions 
(Haidt & Joseph 2004; Cushman et al. 2006; Gray & Wegner 2009; Mikhail 2009; Malle et 
al. 2014) as well as detailed maps of the neural substrates supporting these decisions (Greene 
et al. 2004; Young & Dungan 2012). To date, what is still lacking is a mechanistic 
understanding of how all the identified processes involved in moral decisions lead to 
differences in moral value computations, preferences, judgments, and behaviors. Achieving 
this mechanistic understanding could further contribute to disclose whether moral values are 
supported by domain-specific neurocognitive processes. 
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In the present thesis, I propose to generate such a mechanistic understanding using 
various psychological and economic measures in combination with correlative (i.e., fMRI) 
and causal (i.e., tDCS) neuroscientific methods. More precisely, I first use the literature on 
value-guided decision making to specify a computationally precise model to measure if a) 
moral preferences relate to neural activity in specific brain areas, and b) whether there is an 
overlap in the neural representations of moral preferences and other types of preferences, e.g. 
in the financial domain. Second, I use the literature on brain stimulation and social 
neuroscience to establish the causal role of the right LPFC in arbitrating between moral and 
material motives in determining behaviors. Third, relying on insights from all of the above 
literatures, I combine behavioral, neuroimaging, and brain-stimulation methods to investigate 
how (exogenously induced) changes in the right LPFC excitability affect moral behavior via 
the modulation of different processes in several brain regions. 
In study 1, I built on the literature on moral dilemmas mentioned above (Shenhav & 
Greene 2010; Greene et al. 2004; Thomson 1976) as the inspiration for my task design.  By 
definition, moral dilemmas do not have an objectively right or wrong answer, since any 
solution depends substantially on the meta-ethical principles a person believes in. These 
dilemmas thus provide an ideal theoretical framework to study how subjective moral 
preferences relate to subjective moral value computations, as well as the neural substrates 
underpinning such computations. 
Studies 2 and 3 employed experimental strategies where the morally prescribed 
behavior is governed by a salient moral norm. Combining these experimental paradigms with 
tDCS, I could therefore study the causal involvement of brain activity in the right LPFC in 
determining behavior when the morally prescribed actions are challenged by competing 
selfish opportunities (e.g. increased monetary earnings). Study 2 relied on previous 
correlative evidence (Greene & Paxton 2009) implicating right-DLPFC neural activity in the 
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ability to resist the temptation of lying when doing so would result in increased monetary 
gains. Increasing or decreasing neural excitability in this brain area with anodal or cathodal 
tDCS, while participants performed a task measuring their compliance with honesty, it was 
possible to investigate if this brain area has a causal role in arbitrating between the conflicting 
(moral vs. material) motives. 
Finally, study 3 combined behavioral measures of fairness with concurrent brain 
imaging and stimulation to determine the causal neural networks underlying fairness norm 
compliance. Building on a previous study where it was shown that modulating neural 
excitability of the right LPFC resulted in changes of fairness norm compliance (see above, 
(Ruff et al. 2013) I investigated if such behavioral changes were reflected by a tDCS-induced 
reorganization of the neural functions necessary to determine norm compliant behavior, as 
one would expect based on evidence suggesting that the behavioral regulatory function of this 
region operates via the modulation of interconnected brain networks activity (Duncan 2001; 
Miller & Cohen 2001; Buckholtz et al. 2015).  
The results obtained in these three studies concur in answering some of the most 
pressing questions in moral psychology and have important implications more broadly for 
behavioral sciences such as social psychology, behavioral and neuro-economics, as well as 
philosophy. Specifically, I provide crucial evidence for the Social Brain Hypothesis, by 
demonstrating the existence of domain-specific moral value representations, by identifying a 
region in the right LPFC that is causally relevant for arbitrating between moral values and 
material rewards, and by generating a more fine-grained mechanistic explanation of how the 
right LPFC functionally interacts with other brain regions in order to drive moral behavior. 
 
2.1. Study 1: The Neural Computations of Subjective Moral Value 
Background 
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The neural mechanisms underlying moral decision-making have been extensively 
investigated with moral dilemmas (Greene 2015; Pascual et al. 2013) that require judgments 
about whether it is morally permissible to harm a smaller number of people in order to save a 
greater one (Thomson 1976). However, little is known about specific neuro-cognitive 
mechanisms that can explain why certain individuals judge harming the smaller group 
morally wrong while others judge it to be appropriate or even mandatory.  
In the present project, I approach this issue from the perspective of the value that participants 
place on each of the lives under consideration. Computations of values for choice options 
play a crucial role in many other forms of decision-making (e.g., economic), and recent 
studies have proposed that comparable neural value representations may also underlie moral 
decisions (Shenhav & Greene 2010). Here I use fMRI and two closely matched decision tasks 
(a moral task and a financial task) to identify and directly compare the neural computations of 
subjective moral vs monetary values. 
Methods 
The moral task required participants to solve a dilemma similar to the classic footbridge 
dilemma: Should they sacrifice the life of one person in order to save several other people? In 
order to calculate subjective moral values, I manipulated two factors in the dilemma from 
trial to trial: The number of people (min =1, max = 10) that could be saved and the moral 
deservingness (criminal record; from none to mass murder) of the person that would need to 
be sacrificed. This latter factor allowed me to identify how much each participant 
“discounted” the moral value of a person’s life based on his criminal record, in close 
resemblance to the well-known temporal discounting of monetary values. In the matched 
economic paradigm, I estimated participants’ subjective monetary value in a standard 
temporal discounting task (McClure et al. 2007; Luhmann 2009; Green et al. 2004) entailing 
choices between 20 Swiss Francs immediately or variable larger amounts (min = 22, max = 
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120 Swiss Francs) at a later date (min= 1, max = 180 days later). The same standard 
hyperbolic discounting model was fit to each participant’s behavior in both tasks, to derive 
subject-specific predictions for the moral and monetary values computed on every trial. 
Formally, behavior in the moral task was modeled with the following hyperbolic function: 
SVm = 1 / (1 + Km * Deservingness), where SVm is the subjective moral value of saving the 
lives of the larger group by sacrificing the life of one person. The 1 in the numerator reflects 
the person one needs to sacrifice in order to save the larger group; Km corresponds to a 
subject-specific moral discounting constant, and Deservingness models moral deservingness 
(i.e. criminal prior records) of a given person. Similarly, behavior in the financial task was 
modeled with the following hyperbolic function: SVf = 20 / (1 + Kf * Delay), where SVf is 
the subjective financial value of the delayed option estimated as fraction of the immediate 
reward, 20 represents the immediately available option (i.e. 20 CHF), and Kf corresponds to a 
subject-specific financial discounting constant, and Delay models the time (in days) that 
people had to wait in order to receive the reward. 
Results 
Consistent with previous findings (Kable & Glimcher 2007), my participants’ discounting 
curves were well modeled by a hyperbolic-discounting function (R2 = 0.98±0.015), revealing 
the expected variance of financial discounting factors Kf, and hence of the Subjective 
financial values (SVf) across participants (min Kf = 3.78*10-5; max Kf = 0.43404). Further, 
in line with previous evidence, SVf correlated with neural activity in the VS (small-volume 
correction, P < 0.05), as well as all in the vmPFC and PCC (threshold at P < 0.001). 
Subjective moral values, SVm, were estimated using a structurally identical 
hyperbolic function. My participants’ discounting curves were well modeled by the 
hyperbolic model implemented (R2 = 0.96±0.03) and the corrsponding moral discounting 
factors (Km) also varied across participants (min Km = 9.3*10-2; max Km = 7.083825). At 
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the neural level, I identified neural correlates of SVm in the bilateral Anterior Insula, the left 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), suggesting that 
stronger activity in these brain areas is associated with utilitarian moral judgments. In 
addition, this data also revealed that an increase in the likelihood of expressing non-
consequential moral judgments (i.e., considering it morally forbidden to harm one person) 
correlated with BOLD activity in the rTPJ, the PCC and the right DLPFC, areas that I 
expected to be involved in moral valuation based on previous related studies (Kliemann et al. 
2008; Young et al. 2007; Greene et al. 2001).  
Comparing SVf and SVm, I could directly test if moral and financial value 
representations are implemented by similar psychological processes and represented in neural 
activity in overlapping brain structures. Importantly, while the two types of choices were 
comparable in terms of their computational requirements, they obviously differed 
qualitatively in terms of choice options and their consequences: On one hand, participants 
made decisions about whether or not to harm a human to save other lives, while on the other, 
they decided between different financial payoffs. It may therefore be expected that the two 
types of choices may differ in terms of response difficulty. However, response times (RTs) 
for the two types of decisions – a standard proxy to measure task difficulty – did not differ 
significantly (average RTs moral 1228.78ms +/- 257 (s.e.m.), financial 1226.25ms +/- 164 
(s.e.m.), t(21) = 0.04, p = 0.967). Thus, the two types of decisions did not differ in the 
associated choice difficulty, making it possible to compare the underlying neural mechanisms 
without any possible confound due to differences in task difficulty. 
At the behavioral level, I could not find a significant correlation (r = 0.11, p = 0.59) 
between the two types of discounting factors (Kf and Km). Taken with the due caution, an 
absence of correlation favors the view of distinct, rather than overlapping, processes 
implementing the two types of SV computations. More importantly, by directly comparing 
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the neural activity sub-serving the neural computations of SVm vs. SVf, I found that neural 
activity in the rTPJ and the PCC was more strongly involved in the computations of SVm 
than of SVf (P < 0.001). Critically, this provides for the first time evidence that moral values 
are represented by domain-specific neural activity in line with the predictions of the Social 
Brain Hypothesis, and contrasts the reverse-inference driven hypotheses proposed by 
previous studies. 
Conclusion 
This study provides critical evidence that advances our understanding of morality, by 
showing that subjective moral preferences (as captured by subjective values of moral options) 
are explicitly represented by neural activity in the brain. Crucially, the neuro-imaging results 
proposed in this study revealed that differences in moral preferences can be explained by 
differences in the neural functions elicited by the task: participants who had a more 
deontological moral preferences displayed stronger activity in brain areas associated with 
harm-aversion, emotional processing, and theory of mind. In contrast, participants with more 
utilitarian preferences displayed stronger activity in brain areas involved in conflict resolution 
such as the ACC or the left IPL. Furthermore, these moral values computations are clearly 
domain-specific, as they are spatially dissociated from computations of monetary values 
under comparable choice situations. This suggests that moral and purely monetary value 
computations may occur in parallel to drive human choices.  
 
2.2. Study 2: Enhancing Honesty with Brain Stimulation 
Introduction 
Honesty plays a key role in virtually all human interactions and is of paramount importance 
for efficient social, economic and political institutions. Not much is known about the neural 
processes that enable humans to remain honest when tempted to lie. This is because lying or 
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cheating are inherently private acts coined by concealing the truth from others without their 
knowledge, in order to secretly increase one’s own benefit. This contrasts starkly with 
previous neuroimaging studies on deception (Abe et al. 2014; Sip et al. 2008) that explicitly 
instructed participants to give wrong statements with the experimenter’s knowledge and 
without any personal consequences emerging from such deceptive acts. Thus, it remains 
largely unknown which brain processes enable humans to stick to the truth when faced with 
the option to cheat in a truly concealed fashion. Here I show that honest behavior has a 
neurobiological basis in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and can be 
increased by transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of this brain structure. It has to be 
noted, however, that since tDCS does not allow achieving highly focal stimulation effects it is 
impossible to make precise inferences on a clear localization of the neural processes 
governing honest behavior within this brain region. 
Methods 
I measured dishonesty with an innovative paradigm in which participants faced the 
temptation to cheat in order to increase their earnings without any danger of being detected 
and, eventually, sanctioned. Participants self-reported the outcome of a series of dice throws 
that had different financial consequences. Due to the truly concealed nature of the 
participants’ behavior in my paradigm, dishonest behavior could be statistically detected at 
only at the aggregate group level, and not at the subject level.  
One previous neuroimaging study (Greene & Paxton 2009) employing a related 
approach had identified a specific part of the right DLPFC that showed increased BOLD 
activity when participants successfully refrained from cheating. This finding provided 
correlational evidence that the right DLPFC is involved in decisions that require a moral 
trade-off between honesty and financial gain. Based on this finding, I exogenously increased 
neural excitability in this specific brain area with anodal transcranial direct current 
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stimulation (tDCS, 1.5 mA for 20 minutes, 49 participants) while participants performed a 
test battery containing the crucial task measuring dishonest behavior. This test battery 
contained also tests for various other choice processes such as risk and ambiguity 
preferences, impulsivity, or altruism that allowed me to examine if the behavioral control 
function I hypothesized for this region is specific to honesty, or is more broadly involved in 
regulating other types of choices putatively requiring some sort of behavioral control. I 
controlled for unspecific stimulation effects by also running two control groups in which 
DLPFC excitability was left unchanged (sham, 47 participants) or decreased (cathodal, 49 
participants) by tDCS. 
 
Results 
Consistent with previous findings, participants in all three stimulation groups were dishonest, 
misreporting their results on an estimated 37% of trials. More importantly, however, I found 
that increasing right DLPFC excitability by means of anodal stimulation  significantly 
reduced the percentage of successful dice rolls to a 15% rate of misreporting (z=2.811, p= 
0.005, Mann-Whitney), corresponding to an approximately 60% lower cheating rate than in 
the sham and cathodal conditions. Note that these two latter conditions did not statistically 
differ (z=-0.475, p= 0.6348, Mann-Whitney). Importantly, comparing the distributions of 
winning rates across stimulation groups, I found that the reduction in cheating rates resulting 
from anodal tDCS was most pronounced in participants who experienced a high degree of 
conflict between moral and selfish motives, i.e., those who lied only on occasion (incomplete 
cheaters) and not always (complete cheaters): while the number of incomplete cheaters was 
drastically reduced in the anodal stimulation group, complete cheaters remained roughly the 
same irrespective of the experimental condition. These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the rDLPFC is arbitrating between conflicting motives. To further test this 
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hypothesis I separately analyzed cheating rates in participants who reported low or high 
moral conflict associated with cheating. This analysis revealed a significant difference in 
cheating rates between the anodal and sham groups only for high-conflict participants (p = 
0.014, rank-sum test, n=54) and not for low-conflict participants (p = 0.327, rank-sum test, n 
= 42). Finally, I also did not find any tDCS-induced changes in behavior for measures of 
altruism, impulsivity, risk and ambiguity aversion, and of civic cooperation, suggesting that 
the effect of anodal tDCS was specific for increasing honesty. Taken together, these findings 
allow me to identify a specific function of the right DLPFC, namely that of resolving a 
decision-conflict resulting specifically between a moral motive and a material one. 
 
Conclusion 
My results support the conclusion that honesty has a biological basis in neural activity 
patterns in the right DLPFC. In particular, the identified patterns seem to play an important 
role in mediating between two conflicting motives, i.e. a self-interest motive to maximize 
earnings and a moral motive to conform to the behavior prescribed by the honesty norm. 
Further, given the selectivity of tDCS effects for the honesty task, it seems that these neural 
processes do not functionally overlap with other mechanisms for behavioral control related to 
risk (Kuhnen & Knutson 2005), timing of rewards (Kable & Glimcher 2007), or altruism 
(Quervain et al. 2004). 
 
 
2.3. Study 3: Causal neural networks underlying social norm compliance 
Introduction 
Several studies have highlighted the vital importance of institutionalized sanction threats for 
the maintenance of social order across most human societies. Previous research proposed that 
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the human brain has developed distinct neural mechanisms that mediate norm-compliant 
social behavior in response to such punishment threats (Fehr & Gächter 2002). In particular, 
fMRI studies (Spitzer et al. 2007) identified the neural networks activated during voluntary 
social norm compliance as well as those responding to the introduction of credible 
punishment threats for potential norm violators (i.e. sanction-induced norm compliance). 
Moreover, a recent tDCS study (Ruff et al. 2013) demonstrated a causal functional role of 
one of the regions central to this identified network, i.e. the right lateral prefrontal cortex 
(LPFC), in driving norm compliant behavior for both sanction-induced and voluntary norm 
compliance. This study showed that norm compliance was affected in opposite ways 
depending on the type of stimulation (anodal vs. cathodal) and on the presence or absence of 
sanction threats. Notably, the effects on norm-compliance induced by cathodal tDCS were 
replicated in an independent study that used a different brain-stimulation method, i.e. TMS, 
to disrupt brain activity in the same brain region (Strang et al. 2015). 
To date, however, no study has investigated at the level of neural networks which 
neural mechanisms may be modulated by right LPFC activity in order to implement 
voluntary and punishment-induced norm-compliance respectively. At present it is unclear 
whether only local rLPFC neural processes may be responsible for generate the norm-
compliant decisions or whether rLPFC is coordinating the activity in other interconnected 
brain networks that are jointly responsible for the change of norm-compliant behavior. 
Answering this question is fundamental for achieving a more detailed mechanistic 
understating of how social emotional and cognitive mechanisms interact in order to determine 
moral behavior. Here I aim to generate the missing evidence using the concurrent 
combination of online tDCS and fMRI to investigate the dynamic changes in functional 
interplay between the stimulated right LPFC and interconnected brain areas underlying 
voluntary as well as sanction-induced social norm compliance.  The prefrontal cortex, and the 
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right LPFC in particular, has been suggested to have a critical role not only in regulating 
activity in interconnected brain regions, but also in receiving and integrating inputs from 
numerous connected regions such as the amygdala, the mPFC or the parietal cortex in order 
to instantiate behavioral control and action selection of complex processes (Duncan 2001; 
Miller & Cohen 2001; Buckholtz et al. 2015). One can therefore expect that modulation of 
the right LPFC leads to changes in brain regions such as the ACC or the STS responsible for 
detecting when violating social norms is relatively safe and dynamically adapting behavior 
where the possibility to be punished is absent. Furthermore, it is also plausible to expect that 
tDCS induced changes in this region’s excitability could result in different level of neural 
activity in regions that are responsible for processing emotional responses to social 
punishment threats such as the amygdala, the insula or the OFC.  
Comparing this newly obtained data with the existing evidence could disclose if the 
network of regions involved in norm compliance overlaps with regions previously implicated 
in moral-specific processes, such as the OFC activity associated with processing morally 
salient emotions (Heekeren et al. 2005; Moll et al. 2002). It is important to note, however, 
that due to the absence of a direct comparison, the overlaps potentially observed cannot be 
taken as conclusive evidence, but only as insightful hints for domain-specificity that would 
need to be directly tested in future research.  
 
Methods 
Seventy-nine healthy female volunteers (mean age, 21.56 years; SD, 5.05 years) were 
randomly assigned to one of the three stimulation groups: anodal, cathodal, and sham tDCS. 
Participants completed in individual sessions the exact same monetary allocation task used by 
Spitzer et al. (2006) and Ruff et al. (2013) while undergoing fMRI and concurrently receiving 
one of the three types of tDCS. Briefly, the task completed by the participants consisted of 
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anonymously dividing a given monetary amount between themselves and another person: on 
every trial, player A (“the proposer”) randomly interacted with a player B (“the responder”). 
At the beginning of each trial, player A was endowed with 100 money units (MUs) and 
proposed a division of these MUs between himself and player B. Both players also received 
25 MUs extra which could not be transferred. 
In the control condition (no punishment condition), the monetary transfer was 
implemented exactly as proposed by Player A decided, with no intervention allowed for 
Player B. In contrast, in the punishment condition, player B could use any amount of the 
extra 25 MUs to punish player A with the following costs scheme: for every MU spent by 
player B for punishment lead to a reduction of player A’s gain by 5 MUs. Inside the scanner, 
all participants played the role of player A, “the proposer”. In total, each player A underwent 
90 trials, 45 under the threat of punishment and 45 control trials. 
Brain stimulation was delivered using two 5x7 cm MR-compatible stimulation 
electrodes, the active one placed over the right LPFC (active electrode at: x = 52, y = 28, z = 
14 MNI coordinates; note these are the same coordinates used in the previously mentioned 
tDCS study (Ruff et al. 2013)), and the reference electrode placed over the vertex. 
Importantly the brain stimulation protocol mirrored closely the protocol used by (Ruff et al. 
2013) with respect to electrode montage and stimulation intensity (1 mA). The only change 
was in the duration of the active stimulation, lasting for 30 minutes for anodal and cathodal 
stimulations (for the sham condition the stimulation lasted 30 seconds). This change was 
necessary due to the extended duration of the task, which entailed more trials than in the 
previous behavioral tDCS study (Ruff et al. 2013) to ensure sufficient statistical power for the 
fMRI analyses.  
Results 
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Critically, at the behavioral level, the results of the present study replicated previous findings 
obtained in a tDCS study employing the very same task (Ruff et al. 2013): anodal and 
cathodal tDCS changed sanction-induced norm compliance in opposite ways relative to sham 
tDCS. Specifically anodal tDCS increased the monetary transfer difference between 
punishment and control trials (LME analysis, p < 0.001), whereas cathodal tDCS decreased 
this monetary transfer difference (LME analysis, p = 0.001). 
At the neural level, I identified the brain network sub-serving social-norm-compliant 
behavior with a contrast comparing decision-making in trials entailing a social punishment 
threat and the decisions in the control trials in the baseline group (i.e. receiving sham 
stimulation). In line with previous neuroimaging evidence, (Spitzer et al. 2007), I found 
increased brain activity in response to punishment threats in the so-called executive network, 
including the bilateral DLPFC, left VLPFC, and ACC. 
More importantly, the central analysis of this paper aimed at identifying at the neural-
network level the changes induced by tDCS of the right dlPFC. Critically, this analysis can 
reveal if there are differences in the neural networks affected by different modulations of 
dlPFC excitability. Our hypothesis was that the modulation of the sanction-induced norm-
compliant behavior by rLPFC-tDCS would be reflected by activity changes in two distinct 
networks. Here we can test if increasing rLPFC excitability with anodal tDCS or decreasing it 
via cathodal tDCS would have effects on similar neural networks or instead if either 
stimulation would selectively induce changes in different networks. 
To test for these potential differential effects of upregulating and downregulating rLPFC 
excitability, I performed a two-sample t-tests revealing that tDCS led to differential cortical 
sensitivity changes in response to the punishment threat in several brain regions. In detail, the 
increase of monetary transfers in the presence of sanction threats following anodal 
stimulation was reflected at the neural level by an increase in amygdala response to the 
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sanction threats following the increase in neural excitability of the right dlPFC induced by 
anodal tDCS (p < 0.05) I further found functional connectivity changes, revealed by a 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, revealing that anodal tDCS lead to an increase 
in coupling between the right dlPFC and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Importantly, these 
results offer a perspective of the neural network responding to punishment threats at the 
moment of determining the decision to comply with the fairness social norm.  
Conversely, the opposite behavioral pattern observed following cathodal tDCS 
disrupting neural excitability of the right LPFC was reflected in a decrease in functional 
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral LPFC, and left parietal cortex. These 
results suggest that a decrease in right LPFC excitability lead to a reduction of ability of 
strategically switching strategies depending on the presence of punishment threats, since 
these brain areas have been previously associated with central executive network functions 
responsible for dynamically regulating behavior (Spreng et al. 2013; Bressler & Menon 
2010). 
Conclusion 
The present study aimed at elucidating, at the level of neural networks, the changes induced 
by tDCS stimulation of the right LPFC that are responsible for changes in fairness 
compliance behavior (measured via monetary allocations). Such changes have been shown to 
be causally inked to neural excitability of this region by two independent studies using 
different brain stimulation methods: a previous study (Ruff et al. 2013) used tDCS to both 
increase and decrease right dlPFC excitability, while the second one used TMS (Strang et al. 
2015) to decrease dlPFC activity. In the present study I critically replicated the behavioral 
effects of these studies, thereby consolidating the view that the right LPFC is causally 
involved in both voluntary norm compliance as well as enforced norm-compliance.  
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At the neural level, I could identify the changes in neural activity and connectivity 
that reflected the reorganization of the neural processes driving behavior, as a result of the 
neuromodulation induced by tDCS. More in detail, anodal stimulation enhanced neural 
sensitivity to punishment threats in the amygdala and triggered stronger punishment-related 
connectivity between the stimulated LPFC and the OFC, suggesting that the tDCS may have 
increased affective responses to punishment threats. In contrast, cathodal stimulation affected 
brain regions within a central executive network, consistent with the view that stimulation 
may have modulated strategic behavior triggered by the consequences of the punishment 
threats. 
Crucially, these results demonstrated that increasing or decreasing LPFC excitability 
had drastically different effects on the neural processes regulating social norm compliance in 
the presence of punishment threats. Intriguingly, increasing LPFC excitability with anodal 
tDCS enhanced the affective responses to the presence of a punishment threat. In contrast 
decreasing rLPFC excitability with cathodal tDCS triggered changes in strategic responses to 
the presence of a punishment threat, by modulating changes in regions within the executive 
network.  
It is plausible that following anodal tDCS the LPFC increases its receptivity to the 
inputs from the affective network, an interpretation in line with the proposed the integration-
and-selection role of this area in the service of norm-compliant behavior (Buckholtz and 
Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015): higher LPFC involvement in the decision to comply 
with the fairness social norm resulted in an increased awareness of the potential negative 
consequences of being punished for violating the fairness norm. This is consistent with other 
research (Pripfl et al., 2013) reporting that increased LPFC excitability lead to reduced 
willingness of incurring risks but only when these choices were affectively charged. 
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Similarly, decreasing the LPFC excitability with cathodal tDCS could have disrupted 
its integration-and-selection role, ultimately resulting in an inability of updating one’s 
behavior between different choice situations – i.e. updating the monetary transfers from trials 
where the punishment threat was absent to the ones where it was present. Consequently, this 
diminished integration ability resulted in a weaker representation of the punishment threat 
signal in the executive control regions devoted to regulate social norm-compliant behavior. 
This interpretation is consistent with previous findings demonstrating that disrupting LPFC 
activity with TMS resulted in an inability of selectively updating one’s behavior in an iterated 
prisoners dilemma task (Soutschek et al., 2015). These conclusions should be taken with a 
grain of salt since they are they rely on reverse inference speculation and should be directly 
tested in future experiments. Nonetheless these results are an important step forward in the 
understanding of how the LPFC orchestrates social norm compliance modulating the activity 
of specific neural networks depending of the context in which the decisions are taken. 
Taken together, my findings show that the causal role of the stimulated LPFC region 
in regulating social norm compliance may result from a dynamic modulation of brain regions 
involved in affective and strategic responses to sanction threats. Finally, these findings have 
important behavioral implications for understanding norm-compliance and designing 
institutions that promote fairness. On the one hand, these results show that strategic thinking 
decreases the compliance with fairness norms in situations where norms are not enforced by 
punishment threats. On the other hand, the possibility of being punished triggers norm 
compliance by acting on our sensitivity to the threat of receiving social punishment. 
Intriguingly, I found that the same brain region regulates both our sensitivity to punishment 
threats as well as our ability of strategic thinking, therefore implying that one may inevitably 
also affect the other. 
3. General Discussion 
37 
 
This thesis aimed to obtain evidence that the human brain evolved mechanisms that are 
specifically dedicated to favor the emergence and persistence of fundamental moral norms 
(Dunbar 2009). From an evolutionary perspective, moral-specific mechanism are 
theoretically plausible, since they may ultimately favor groups that possessed such 
mechanisms to regulate inter-group conflicts, probably thanks to better within-group 
cooperation (Henrich 2016). The three studies outlined here contributed to furthering the 
understanding of the neuro-psychological architecture of moral decision-making by a) linking 
subjective differences in moral decisions to neural representations of moral subjective values, 
providing a first glance at the potential neural origins of moral preferences, b) identifying 
neural processes that encode specifically moral value representations, c) providing a causal 
understanding of the role of the dlPFC in implementing moral behavior (e.g. being honest) in 
the presence of conflicting alternative material opportunities, e.g. behaving selfishly to 
maximize earnings, and d) identifying different neural-network decision mechanisms that 
underlie either fairness norm-compliant choices or unfair (selfish) decisions. 
 
 
3.1. Neural Representations of Subjective Moral Values 
In study 1, I approached moral decisions from a value-based perspective, investigating if I 
could explain moral decisions from the subjective value people assign to the different choice 
options. I further tested whether the common intuition that moral values – in the case of the 
present study the value of human lives – are evaluated in a similar currency as other objects. I 
did so by testing for differences in the neural valuation processes involved in these two 
qualitatively different domains.  
The results of this study show that, similarly to economic choices, moral decisions about 
who should be saved/harmed can be well characterized by estimating the subjective value 
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that people assign to the proposed choice alternatives. Further, I found evidence that 
computations of moral subjective values, although partially relying on domain-general choice 
mechanisms, are largely represented in the brain by moral domain-specific decision 
processes.  
More in detail, I found that moral decisions to not kill the one person were supported by 
neural activations in the right TPJ, the PCC and the right dlPFC. These results are in line with 
previous research (Majdandžić et al. 2012; Kahane et al. 2012), showing that judgements that 
it is morally impermissible to harm others in trolley-dilemma types of situations elicited 
patterns of activation that extensively overlapped with those identified in my study. These 
brain areas have been repeatedly associated with processing empathy (Bzdok et al. 2012) as 
well as harm aversion (Crockett et al. 2010) in decision-situations similar to the ones 
employed by my study. In the value-based framework proposed by my study, activity in these 
brain areas may thus encode the aversion to harming a person and feeding this negative-value 
into the moral-valuation process, thereby supporting the moral decisions that it is 
impermissible to harm a person in order to save more. This view is further supported by my 
evidence that neural activity in the rTPJ was specifically involved in the representation of 
moral subjective values compared to financial values. 
On the other hand, the value of the larger group of people was identified to be coded by 
neural activity in the left IPL and bilateral Anterior Insula. Such a pattern of activity is in 
accordance with previous data that associated neural activity in these areas with moral 
judgments that it is morally appropriate to sacrifice the life of one in order to save the lives of 
more people (Kahane et al. 2012; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001).  
Further, activity in these brain areas was previously shown (Shenhav & Greene 2010) to 
positively correlate with an increase of expected value in moral decisions with probabilistic 
outcomes. Interestingly, in the present study I found that both left IPL and the right Anterior 
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Insula were involved in the computation of subjective values in both the moral and the 
financial domain, supporting the view that domain-general processes contribute to moral 
decisions. Taken together, these results support the view (Greene 2015) that moral 
preferences for saving a larger number of people are predominantly relying on cognitive 
neural mechanisms. My evidence seems to further suggest that these mechanisms are 
partially overlapping with those involved in value-calculations in non-moral decision making, 
as for instance in financial decisions. 
3.2. LPFC and moral decision making 
Having established that moral values are represented by domain-specific neural mechanisms 
in Study 1, the two following studies aimed at characterizing the function of a brain region 
thought to be responsible for negotiating conflicts between moral and non-moral (e.g. 
material/monetary) values. Based on a large body of literature, I hypothesized that a plausible 
candidate region for this function could be the right LPFC. Thus, in the present thesis I 
discuss two studies that targeted different portions of this brain region with tDCS, in order to 
establish a causal link between neural activity in these brain regions and different types of 
moral behavior: honesty and fairness. The two studies not only provided convergent evidence 
for a crucial causal role of the LPFC in influencing moral behavior, but also provided 
evidence that this region is specifically important for regulating behavior in moral contexts. 
In Study 2, I found that increasing LPFC excitability by means of anodal tDCS lead to an 
increase of honest behavior, further showing that the role of the LPFC in this context is to 
arbitrate between conflicting motives – a moral motive and a selfish-one – by down-tuning 
the latter and hence increasing people’s ability to resist the temptation of lying.  
My findings align with previous evidence that right LPFC activity is elicited in 
decision situations where people face conflict, such as intertemporal choices where one has to 
arbitrate between the impulse of taking a smaller immediate reward or decide to wait in order 
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to receive a larger reward in the future (Kable & Glimcher 2007). Simlarly, Hare and 
colleagues (2009) found that neural activity in this brain area correlates with the ability to 
exert self-control in dietary decisions, a function that is suggested to be implemented by 
modulating neural activity in value-related systems, particularly in the vmPFC. 
Furthermore, recent studies have highlighted the causal nature of right LPFC activity 
in these types of cognitive control. For instance, a decrease in the ability of delaying 
gratification was observed following TMS-induced disruption of LPFC activity (Figner et al. 
2010); Using tDCS, a previous study (Loftus et al. 2015) showed that exertion of self-control 
could be enhanced by upregulating the excitability of the LPFC by means of anodal 
stimulation. While these studies support the hypothesis that the LPFC is involved in 
behavioral control, my study proposes that there may be neural populations within this area 
recruited selectively for different types of conflict. Critically, the results of my study revealed 
that the stimulated portion of the LPFC was selectively involved in arbitrating conflicts 
between moral vs. selfish motives, since I found no stimulation effects on inter-temporal 
choices or risk and ambiguity aversion. The functional specificity of this brain region for 
conflicts involving moral values aligns with the hypothesis that the human brain evolved 
moral-specific mechanisms to regulate social interactions.  
My results further strengthen the view that modulating neural activity in the LPFC 
does not influence the beliefs, or preferences, held by a person. As in other studies (Ruff et al. 
2013; Knoch & Fehr 2007)  where it was shown that stimulation of the right LPFC left 
fairness-related beliefs unaltered, I found no group differences with respect to the beliefs on 
the moral wrongness of lying that participants held. Interestingly, in Study 2 I did not find an 
effect of brain stimulation on a dictator game used to measure the value that participants 
assigned to money. This result further suggests that the functional role of the portion of LPFC 
modulated by tDCS is distinct from the more dorsal portion targeted in Study 3, where 
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behavior in a structurally similar task was in fact affected by both anodal and cathodal 
stimulation. 
Study 3 replicated previous behavioral results (Ruff et al. 2013; Strang et al. 2015) 
implicating the LPFC in regulating fairness norm-compliant behavior, both when fairness 
was enforced by the presence of a punishment threat and when compliance with the norm 
was voluntary: Sanction-induced norm compliance was increased by anodal tDCS and 
decreased by cathodal tDCS, whereas voluntary compliance was reduced by anodal tDCS and 
enhanced by cathodal tDCS. This pattern of results suggests that anodal/cathodal tDCS 
rendered participants more/less sensitive to the presence of sanction threats, causing 
larger/smaller adjustments of behavior to the external incentives. 
The neuroimaging data obtained in study 3 found a pattern of results consistent with 
this view: increasing dlPFC excitability lead to a stronger involvement of a neural network 
believed to process threats as well as moral emotions, mainly in the OFC, which at the 
behavioral level resulted in an increased compliance with the fairness norm when a 
punishment threat was present. Conversely, decreasing dlPFC excitability resulted in a 
decrease in neural functioning in neural regions involved in strategic behavioral planning in 
response to the absence/presence of punishment threats, including the ACC, the IPL, left 
dlPFC, cuneus and precuneuns. These neural changes where reflected at the behavioral level 
in participants’ transfer decisions: receiving cathodal stimulation over the right LPFC lead 
participants to behave less strategically, systematically transferring more when punishment 
threats were absent and less when these were present. This behavior in the latter condition 
was particularly sub-optimal since it increased the amount of punishment received by their 
counterparts. 
Jointly, studies 2 and 3 revealed an important causal role of the right LPFC in 
different types of behavior. The evidence obtained in these two studies suggests that the 
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LPFC seems to be exerting a regulatory role, increasing or decreasing the involvement of 
other brain areas in the mechanisms underpinning moral behaviors. 
3.3. Future Directions 
The studies discussed above build on research that has yielded a sophisticated understanding 
of the latent principles that guide moral behaviors (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, Cushman et al., 
2006, Gray & Wegner, 2011, Mikhail, 2011, Malle et al., 2014) as well as detailed maps of 
the neural substrates supporting these behaviors (Greene et al. 2004; Young & Dungan 2012). 
However, given this extraordinary literature on the psychological mechanisms supporting 
moral intuition, it is remarkable how little we understand about their origins. Future studies 
should aim to close this gap, for instance by providing evidence answering a simple and 
crucial question: Where do moral intuitions come from?  
Recently, two influential papers (Crockett 2013; Cushman 2013) proposed that the 
origins of moral intuitions may be related to social learning, a mechanism that is crucial for 
the evolvement of preferences in value-based decision making (Clithero & Rangel 2014) and 
for the evolution of social norms, both in laboratory settings (Peysakhovich & Rand 2016) 
and in field studies in small-scale societies around the world (Henrich et al. 2001). Future 
studies should aim to increase understanding of how personal moral values can change in the 
process of learning about others’ moral preferences, hence disclosing the neural and cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the social learning of moral values. Some important questions which 
could guide this research include: 1) What cognitive processes best characterize how others’ 
moral values influence our own moral values? 2) What personal characteristics of others 
determine whether and the extent to which we learn their moral values? 3) What brain 
structures show neural activity that correlates with the evolvement of moral values? 4) Which 
of these brain regions and processes are causally necessary for learning moral values and 
integrating them into previously held moral values? The research discussed in the present 
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thesis provides crucial evidence illustrating how moral value computations are implemented 
in the brain. This represents a first crucial step that allows developing future research on how 
moral value computations evolve and are affected by the social context. 
Evidence answering these questions would provide crucial first insights into the 
learning mechanisms responsible for the evolution of moral values. Combining behavioral 
and neuroscientific measurements in particular would allow me to focus on neural plasticity 
and its relation to changeability of moral preferences. Moreover, such knowledge has the 
potential to further the understanding of the dynamics of moral values within societies and of 
the design of policies and institutions that may favor dialogue between people with different 
moral preferences.  
From a more methodological perspective, while brain stimulation studies provide a 
promising starting point for a more mechanistic causal understanding of the neural 
mechanisms steering our social behavior, these have not yet addressed a whole range of 
fundamental questions that may guide research in the coming years. For instance, many 
models of the processes contributing to social behavior have been specified at a purely 
conceptual level, without a quantitative formalization, making it difficult to investigate how 
brain stimulation affects these processes. Promising avenues in this direction therefore 
include combining brain stimulation methods with computational models of social learning 
and choice processes which more explicitly formulate distinct neural computations that may 
be mediated by the stimulated brain area. In the studies discussed in this thesis, I have 
proposed a novel paradigm to estimate subjective moral values in a mathematically precise 
way, and I have successfully modulated behavior with tDCS. These studies therefore provide 
some fundamental methods that can guide future research aiming to combine them in more 
complex designs. 
4. General Conclusions 
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Moral behavior is critical for the orderly maintenance of human societies, and by increasing 
within group cooperation has been fundamental for surviving inter-group wars (Henrich 
2016). The emergence and maintenance of moral norms has been proposed to have been 
favored by the evolution of emotional and cognitive neural processes dedicated specifically to 
regulating social interactions. In the present thesis, I investigated if we can identify some of 
these moral-specific processes from different perspectives. I studied the existence of 
mechanisms a) supporting the moral intuitions at the basis of subjective moral values, which 
can explain individual differences in moral preferences, b) regulating the salience of moral 
motives influencing behaviors when facing situations presenting selfish temptations, and c) 
orchestrating behavioral responses in the presence of social norms that prescribe actions. 
In order to better understand the origins of moral intuitions, I relied on the literatures 
on value-based decision-making and on moral intuitions to investigate the hypothesis that 
moral preferences can be captured by mathematical models that characterize the individual 
subjective value representations of human lives. I found behavioral evidence supporting this 
hypothesis, being able to reliably estimate subjective moral values with a model traditionally 
used to capture financial subjective values. Having mathematically characterized the 
participants’ moral value functions, I could further detect neural signals underlying different 
moral preferences, linking more utilitarian individuals to neural activity in brain areas linked 
to cognitive reasoning, such as the left IPL (Shenhav & Greene 2010; Greene et al. 2004), 
while individuals with more non-consequential moral preferences revealed stronger 
activations in a network of regions related to empathy and harm aversion, such as the right 
TPJ and anterior insula (Crockett et al. 2014; Majdandžić et al. 2012; Bzdok et al. 2012). 
Further, I used tDCS to address the question of whether the right LPFC plays a crucial 
causal role in modulating moral behavior. To this end, I combined this brain stimulation 
method with both behavioral measures of moral choice and neuroimaging, providing several 
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pieces of evidence for a direct causal involvement of this region in regulating moral behavior. 
Moreover, in Study 3, I could further show that the modulation by tDCS of the neural 
networks involved in social norms compliance. Taken together, the evidence discussed in the 
present thesis supports the hypothesis that the LPFC has a regulatory role that determines the 
extent to which different neural mechanisms (which respond to different aspects of a given 
decision situation) regulate behavior.  
My results revealed that increasing LPFC brain activity resulted in increased capacity 
of resisting the temptation of lying in order to achieve a selfish reward, in order to instead 
follow a moral motive of being honest. Further, LPFC activity regulates behavior by 
modulating neural functioning in the neural network underpinning norm compliance. I indeed 
found that increased LPFC activity resulted in increasing responsiveness to punishment threats 
in order to avoid punishment while decreased excitability in the LPFC resulted in decreased 
activity in the central executive network, which at the behavioral level was reflected by a 
putative reduction in the ability to strategically decisions to the different choice situations. 
In conclusion, in the present thesis I gathered evidence collectively supporting the 
Social Brain Hypothesis, and in the process helped shedding light on the neuro-psychological 
mechanisms involved in moral behavior. More generally, these findings may contribute to 
society by informing policy making and institutional design aimed at preventing antisocial and 
criminal behavior, as well as diagnosis and treatment of pathologies related to impaired moral 
decision-making, such as psychopathy (Cima et al. 2010; Moll et al. 2002). 
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RUNNING TITLE 
Neural representations of subjective moral values 
 
SUMMARY 
Moral preferences pervade many aspects of our lives, dictating how we behave, 
whom we can marry, and even what we eat. Despite their relevance, one 
fundamental question remains unanswered: Where do individual moral preferences 
come from and how are they represented in the brain? It is often thought that all 
types of preferences reflect properties of domain-general neural decision 
mechanisms that employ a common “neural currency” to value choice options in 
many different contexts. This assumption, however, appears at odds with the 
observation that many humans consider it intuitively wrong to employ the same scale 
to compare moral value (e.g., of a human life) with material value (e.g., of money). In 
this paper, we directly challenge the common-currency hypothesis by comparing the 
neural mechanisms that represent moral and financial subjective values. In a study 
combining fMRI with a novel behavioral paradigm, we identify neural representations 
of the subjective values of human lives or financial payoffs by means of structurally 
identical computational models. Fitting isomorphic model variables from both 
domains to brain activity reveals specific patterns of neural activity that selectively 
represent values in the moral (in the rTPJ) or financial (in the vmPFC) domain. Thus, 
our findings show that human lives and money are not valued in a common neural 
currency, supporting theoretical proposals that human moral behavior can differ from 
behavior that is driven by personal material benefit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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Moral preferences play a crucial role in determining how a person perceives the 
world, how she acts, and what she likes. Differences in moral preferences lie at the 
heart of conflicts that can ultimately lead to confrontations between individuals or 
even wars between nations (Berns & Atran 2012; Barnett & Pears 1997). Given their 
relevance, it is remarkable how little we understand about the neural and cognitive 
mechanisms that determine our moral preferences and that thereby underlie 
individual differences in our moral behavior. 
In other choice domains, for example economic decisions, individual preferences 
have been intensely studied in terms of neural processes that assign values to 
choice options (Schultz 2006). Importantly, several studies have demonstrated that a 
person’s economic preferences are reflected in subjective values encoded by activity 
of the ventral-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), Ventral Striatum (VS), and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC, Grueschow et al. 2015; Kable & Glimcher 2007; Hare et al. 
2008; Clithero & Rangel 2014; Ruff & Fehr 2014; McNamee et al. 2013; Chib et al. 
2009). Based on these findings, the predominant view of human value-based 
decision-making posits that the brain values choice-options on a common scale that 
may allow us to compare and choose efficiently across many different types of 
goods. This has been proposed to hold not only for material goods (e.g., art, food or 
money) but also for non-material values (e.g., beauty, praise, or status, Levy & 
Glimcher 2012; Izuma et al. 2008; Zink et al. 2008). As for moral choices, recent 
studies (C. A. Hutcherson et al. 2015; Shenhav & Greene 2010; Crockett et al. 2017) 
proposed that even the value of human lives or of human pain may be computed by 
the same neural mechanisms that are involved in computing value of non-moral 
goods. However, these studies have not provided a direct link between individually 
determined moral preferences and neural mechanisms of value-based decision-
making.  
For instance, one study (Shenhav & Greene 2010) investigated neural 
representations of expected values associated with possible losses of lives (i.e., 
calculated in an objective fashion as the probability of death multiplied by the number 
of possible deaths). Such pre-defined expected-value computation is identical across 
different agents and therefore cannot reveal a given individual´s subjective valuation 
of the different choice options. Another study showed differences in the neural 
correlates of emotional and utilitarian appraisals during moral decisions (C. A. 
Hutcherson et al. 2015), but these findings do not reveal if differences in moral 
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values result from different sensitivity to these attributes, nor if individuals assigning 
different weights to these attributes would take different moral decisions. Finally, 
recent studies (Crockett et al. 2017; Crockett et al. 2014) showed that neural value 
responses were differentially modulated during choices about financial rewards that 
were coupled with painful shocks to either others or oneself. However, in this context 
it is impossible to know whether these neural activations indeed reflect moral 
concerns rather than differences in the representation of others’ versus one’s own 
affective states during pain (Silani et al. 2013; Lamm et al. 2007). Moreover, since 
the decisions always entailed trade-offs between pain and monetary profit, the 
observed neural responses in the value system still reflected the valuation of 
material goods. The neural processes underlying subjective valuation of purely moral 
considerations are therefore unknown, and it remains unclear whether these differ 
from those involved in the neural valuation of material goods.  
Differences in these sets of processes are suggested by theoretical accounts 
emphasizing that moral preferences may originate from specific value-computation 
mechanisms. These accounts rest on the observation that many people perceive 
human lives as having an intrinsic (sacred) value (Sandel 2012; Dogan et al. 2016) 
that cannot, and should not, be measured on the same scale as the value of material 
objects (Kleinig 1991). For example, widespread outrage is usually observed when 
people realize that the value of human lives is explicitly quantified in terms of money, 
for instance during choices between health policies  (Kmietowicz 2001), in the 
context of a company’s decision on whether to re-call a dangerous car model (Dowie 
1977), or when people are traded for money (Chuang 2006). Based on these 
observations, it has been proposed that assigning a financial value to a human life 
appears intuitively wrong for many people (Sandel 2012), suggesting that moral 
valuation may be implemented by processes that are distinct from those involved in 
the valuation of material goods. 
In the present work, we test this alternative hypothesis by explicitly comparing the 
neural instantiation of moral and financial value-computations. We measured these 
with structurally equivalent choice tasks that differed only in the content of the 
choice-options: Human lives for moral decisions and monetary rewards for financial 
decisions. We decided to focus on human lives since subjective moral values are 
essential for the difficult decisions whether some lives are more valuable than others. 
One example are decisions about recipients of an organ transplant, for which it is 
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often required to implement a policy ranking among the potential recipients to decide 
who is most deserving to receive the organ (Courtney & Maxwell 2009). We adapted 
this decision situation to study the neural representations of subjective moral values, 
which we derived by fitting standard computational models of value-based decision 
making to the observed choices (Chung & Herrnstein 1967; Green et al. 2004; 
Rubinstein 2003) and correlating the estimated values with neural activity as 
measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
In order to fully capture individual behavioral variability during both decision types, 
we varied the decision-relevant characteristics of the choice options along two 
dimensions. For the financial decisions, participants chose between options that 
differed in terms of both the monetary amount and the temporal delay at which the 
amounts would be paid out. The subjective value of the choice options therefore 
depends inherently on individual time preferences (Green & Myerson 2004; Kable & 
Glimcher 2007; McClure 2004), which determine how the reward magnitude (i.e., the 
amount of money one can receive) is discounted by the delay (i.e., the number of 
days) one has to wait until receiving the reward. The moral decisions were 
constructed to match exactly this structure: They consisted of a customized moral 
scenario similar to the trolley moral dilemma (Foot 1967) that parametrically varied a 
choice-relevant magnitude (i.e., the number of lives one could save) that was 
discounted by a second factor which modulated the value of the lives at stake. This 
factor was the moral deservingness of the person that would have to be sacrificed in 
order to save the others (as indicated by different prior criminal records of this 
person). Both of these factors have been previously shown to play important roles in 
moral judgments (Shenhav & Greene 2010; Kliemann et al. 2008), but have never 
been combined in a choice setting as here. 
We directly compared the neural value representations underlying both types of 
choices in the same participants using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). We ensured that the perceptual and sensorimotor demands required by both 
types of choices were kept similar, as the choice screens in both contexts were 
similarly arranged (Fig. 1a & b) and as responses were given with the same motor 
actions. Based on the existing value-based literature, we estimated subjective values 
underlying the financial choices by means of computational modeling (Frederick 
2003; Rubinstein 2003) and expected to confirm their neural representations in brain 
activity in the vmPFC, the VS, and the PCC (Figner et al. 2010; Kable & Glimcher 
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2007; McClure 2004). We estimated moral subjective values with structurally 
isomorphic computational models; this allowed us to test whether moral subjective 
values would be represented by similar structures as financial values (e.g., the 
vmPFC, Shenhav & Greene 2010).  Alternatively, moral values could engage 
specific representations (e.g., in the right TPJ, Kliemann et al. 2008; Young et al. 
2007), thereby disproving the common currency hypothesis.  
RESULTS  
Behavioral Results 
In both types of decisions, participants selected between two choice alternatives on 
each trial: For financial decisions (Fig. 1a), participants chose between 20 Swiss 
Francs (CHF) to be received today or an equal or larger financial reward (min = 20 
CHF, max = 120 CHF) paid out after one of six different time delays (min = 1 day, 
max = 180 days). For moral decisions (Fig. 1b), participants chose between saving 
the lives of a larger number of people (min = 1, max = 10) at the expenses of 
sacrificing the life of one person, or not harming the one person and letting the group 
die. Moreover, closely mirroring the financial task, participants had to consider an 
associated feature that may discount the choice option´s value: the moral 
deservingness of the lives at stake, a property known to play an important role in 
modulating moral decisions (Kliemann et al. 2008). We implemented this by 
assigning one of six different prior criminal records (ranging from no criminal record 
to serial killer) to the single person that could be saved or harmed for the benefit of 
the group. Critically, our moral task did not require participants to read lengthy and 
complex moral vignettes before reporting decisions, but instead presented simple 
binary decisions where the only varying elements influencing the decisions were the 
two experimental variables magnitude and deservingness. 
Subjective financial and moral values were estimated based on the 
participants’ financial or moral choices respectively. In the reward domain, previous 
studies have repeatedly shown (Green & Myerson 2004; McClure 2004) that 
discount rates are typically well captured by hyperbolic functions, both in humans 
and other animals (Frederick et al. 2002; Green et al. 2004). In order to estimate 
participants’ subjective financial values, we modeled the behavioral data with a 
standard hyperbolic function: 
         SVf = LL / (1 + Kf * T)        
     (1) 
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Where SVf is the subjective financial value of the delayed option estimated as 
fraction of the immediate reward, LL is the larger later amount offered, Kf 
corresponds to a subject-specific financial discounting constant, and T represents 
the time (in days) people had to wait to receive the reward. Consistent with previous 
findings (Kable & Glimcher, 2007), our participants’ discounting curves were well 
modeled by this function (Fig. 1e; R2 = 0.98±0.015). Moreover, the financial discount 
factors (Kf), and hence the SVf, varied substantially across participants (ranging from 
Kf = 3.78*10
-5 to Kf = 0.43, fig. 1c).  
Behavior in the moral task was modeled with a structurally equivalent model 
to the one used in the financial domain. This allows us to compare the estimated SV 
for each task both at the level of behavior (e.g., testing for a correlation between the 
two SV types) and brain activity. Specifically, behavior in the moral task was 
modeled with the following hyperbolic function: 
SVm = HL / (1 + Km * D)                        (2) 
Where SVm is the subjective moral value of saving the lives of the larger group 
by sacrificing the life of one person. The HL reflects the number of human lives one 
can save in the larger group; Km corresponds to a subject-specific moral discount 
factor, and D represents the moral deservingness (i.e., criminal record) of the person 
one could sacrifice. As a first important result, we found that individual discount 
curves for moral choices (Fig. 1d) were well fit using equation 2 (R2 = 0.96±0.03, Fig. 
1f). This finding suggests that the moral subjective values estimated here indeed 
play an important role in moral decision making. Furthermore, like in the financial 
domain, moral subjective values and the moral discounting factors (Km) varied 
substantially across participants (ranging from Km = 9.3*10
-2 to Km = 7.08). 
While the two types of choices were comparable in terms of their 
computational requirements, they obviously differed qualitatively in terms of choice 
options and their consequences: On one hand, participants made decisions about 
whether or not to harm a human to save other lives, while on the other, they decided 
between different financial payoffs. It may therefore be expected that the two types 
of choices may differ in terms of response difficulty. However, the response times 
(RTs) for the two types of decisions – a standard proxy to measure task difficulty – 
were similar, as revealed by a t-test comparing RTs across the two tasks (average 
RTs moral 1214ms +/- 28 (s.e.m.), financial 1235ms +/- 24 (s.e.m.), t(24) = 0.39, p = 
0.7). Moreover, we found no differences between the two tasks in how RTs varied as 
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a function of changes in the discounted values of the choice options (t(24) = 0.09, p 
= 0.92). Thus, the two types of decisions did not differ in terms of choice difficulty, 
which allows an unbiased comparison between the underlying neural mechanisms. 
Interestingly, although financial and moral choices were on average well fitted by 
identical functions and did not differ with respect to task-difficulty/RTs, we could not 
find behavioral evidence suggesting that moral and financial valuation processes rely 
on shared psychological mechanisms. When testing for a relationship between each 
individual’s discounting in the financial and moral domain, we found no correlation 
between both discounting factors Km and Kf (r = - 0.195, p = 0.35, Fig. 1g). This 
absence of a correlation already seems to suggest that moral and financial value 
estimations may be performed by independent neural decision mechanisms. 
Functional Imaging Results 
As an initial imaging analysis step, we confirmed the well-known neural correlates of 
subjective financial values. As expected based on the literature (Levy & Glimcher 
2011; Bartra et al. 2013; Kable & Glimcher 2007), we found a significant correlation 
between subjective financial values of the delayed monetary option with blood 
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity in brain areas associated with subjective 
financial value-processing (Grueschow et al. 2015; Clithero & Rangel 2014). In 
particular, we found the hypothesized financial subjective value representations in 
the vmPFC, dmPFC, and PCC (Fig. 2a), as well as in the VS (small-volume-
corrected P < 0.05, see Fig. 2a and Table 1).  
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More importantly, our fMRI analysis also revealed a set of brain regions — 
comprising the bilateral TPJ, the PCC, the right DLPFC, the anterior insula, the left 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) — where BOLD 
signal represented subjective moral values (see figure 2b and 2c, and Table 1).  
TABLE 1 
Figure 1: Paradigm and 
Behavioral Results: Participants 
made financial (a) and moral (b) 
choices. In the financial task, 
they decided whether or not to 
give up a sooner smaller 
financial reward for a later larger 
financial reward. Similarly, in the 
moral task, they decided 
whether or not to sacrifice one 
coma-patient to save a larger 
group of accident victims 
requiring organ transplants. (c) 
The probability of giving up the 
sooner smaller reward 
increased as the amount of the 
delayed reward increased. The 
increase was modulated by the 
delay participants had to wait to 
receive the larger option. (d) 
Similarly, the probability of 
killing the one person in order to 
save the larger group of people 
increased with the number of 
people that could be saved; in 
this case the probability of 
choosing to sacrifice the coma-
patient was modulated by 
deservingness. Behavior in both 
tasks was well captured by the 
models used, as revealed by the 
model fits for the financial (e) 
and the moral (f) task. Although 
choice in both types of decision 
tasks was well modelled by 
structurally equivalent models, 
we found no evidence of 
correlation between financial 
and moral discounting (g). 
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Region Peak-Side Cluster Size x y z Z score T score p-value 
Neural Correlates of Subjective Moral Values 
ACC 
 
839 0 29 40 5.14 7.06 <0.001 
AntIns R 164 36 2 10 3.78 4.48 <0.001 
Cuneus R 150 15 
-
88 4 4 4.83 <0.001 
DLPFC R 839 48 23 43 4.86 6.44 <0.001 
IPL L 105 
-
51 
-
37 25 4.62 5.94 <0.001 
IPL R 110 60 
-
16 22 4.28 5.32 <0.001 
PCC 
 
489 0 
-
67 37 5.22 7.23 <0.001 
TPJ R 518 48 
-
58 31 4.59 5.89 <0.001 
Neural Correlates of Subjective Financial Values 
DMPFC L 1831 -9 50 43 6.39 10.57 <0.001 
MTG L 238 
-
57 -7 
-
14 4.44 5.6 <0.001 
PCC 
 
194 0 
-
49 31 4.69 6.08 <0.001 
SMG R 273 63 
-
25 1 4.34 5.42 <0.001 
STS L 597 
-
57 
-
37 25 4.53 5.74 <0.001 
STS R 139 45 
-
28 22 3.64 4.28 <0.001 
Visual Cortex R 1777 12 
-
85 4 5.87 8.92 <0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
These results allowed us to directly relate individual differences in moral preferences 
to differences in neural activity in these brain regions, effectively providing novel 
evidence of a neural signature of subjective moral preferences. More specifically, we 
found that the higher the subjective moral value of a human life, the higher the BOLD 
activity in the rTPJ, the PCC and the right DLPFC (Fig. 2c). Moreover, our results 
show that a decrease in the subjective value of a human life (and therefore an 
increase in the tendency to sacrifice this person to save a larger group) was 
Table 1: Average brain activity explicitly representing subjective moral values (rows 4-
11), related to Figure 2B and 2C, and average brain activity explicitly representing 
subjective financial values (rows 13-19), related to Figure 2A. 
All p-values are FWE-corrected for the whole brain. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; AntIns =  
Anterior Insula; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL = Inferior parietal lobule; PCC = 
posterior cingulate cortex; TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; DMPFC = dorsomedial-prefrontal 
cortex; MTG = medial temporal gyrus ; SMG = supramarginal gyrus ;STS = superior temporal 
sulcus. Coordinates are listed in MNI space 
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represented by increasing neural activity in the bilateral anterior insula, the left 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These results 
are generally consistent with previous reports of activity in these brain areas during 
moral decisions (C. A. Hutcherson et al. 2015; Kliemann et al. 2008; Greene et al. 
2004; Greene et al. 2001), as well as in the representation of expected values in the 
moral domain (Shenhav & Greene 2010). 
 
Figure 2 
Functional Imaging Results. 
(a) Financial subjective 
values were represented by 
neural activity in the mPFC, 
the PCC, and the VS, 
consistent with previous 
findings; Cyan area (right) 
corresponds to the nucleus 
accumbens volume mask 
provided by the FSL-
Harvard-Oxford-atlas. (b, c) 
Moral subjective values 
were represented by neural 
activity in the bilateral 
anterior insula (b) and the 
right TPJ, DLPFC, and 
PCC (c). 
75 
 
Another aim of our fMRI analysis was to establish if moral subjective value 
computations rely on domain-general mechanisms also shared with non-moral 
value-based decisions (Shenhav & Greene 2010) or whether they rely on markedly 
different brain regions. When directly comparing the neural activity related to moral 
subjective value computations versus that related to the matched financial value 
computations, we found that moral subjective values were more strongly related to 
activity in the rTPJ and the PCC (Fig. 3 and Table 2). In contrast, neural activity in 
the dmPFC (Fig. 3 and Table 2) was more strongly involved in representing financial 
than moral values. These findings highlight that the neural representation of 
subjective moral values relies largely on domain-specific mechanisms. We also 
tested for potential functional activity involved in computing both moral and financial 
subjective values. The conjunction analysis testing for such overlap, however, did 
not reveal any significant result. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Domain specific subjective value representations: We found neural representations specific to 
moral subjective value in the rTPJ and the PCC (cyan). In contrast, financial-specific subjective 
value correlates were instead identified in the dmPFC (green). 
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TABLE 2 
Region Peak-Side Cluster Size x y z Z score T score p-value 
Neural Correlates of Subjective Moral Values > Subjective Financial Values 
Cuneus R 1908 15 -88 4 6.35 10.44 <0.001 
PCC 
 
471 0 -55 25 5.25 7.31 <0.001 
TPJ R 283 57 -64 28 5.02 6.78 <0.001 
Neural Correlates of Subjective Financial Values > Subjective Moral Values 
DMPFC L 1303 -15 47 40 5.56 8.07 <0.001 
STS L 347 -36 -61 25 5.16 7.09 <0.001 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The main motivation for this study was to identify neural value representations that 
underlie individual moral preferences, thereby testing if the brain represents moral 
and material preferences on a common neural currency. This hypothesis is 
consistent with widely held views on the domain-generality of neural value 
processes, but contradicts the moral intuition that human lives should not be valued 
in material terms and on the same currency as objects. We tested the hypothesis 
with a novel moral choice paradigm allowing us to a) investigate if the human brain 
explicitly represents estimations of the subjective value of saving/harming the life of 
other persons and b) testing whether these neural representations differ from those 
representing financial subjective value. Our  behavioral models show that, similar to 
financial choices, moral decisions concerning who should be saved/harmed are well 
fit by computational decision models estimating the subjective value that people 
assign to the choice alternatives. Neurally, we not only found that moral subjective 
values are computed according to similar principles as financial values, but more 
importantly we have provided evidence that these computations are instantiated in 
domain-specific brain areas. 
Our data shows that subjective moral values are explicitly represented in a network 
of regions comprising the right TPJ, the PCC, the right DLPFC, the left IPL, and in 
Table 2: Average brain activity specifically representing subjective moral values > 
subjective financial values (rows 4-6), and average brain activity specifically 
representing subjective financial values > subjective moral values (rows 8-9), related 
to Figure 3. 
All p-values are FWE-corrected for the whole brain. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; PCC = 
posterior cingulate cortex; TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; DMPFC = dorsomedial-prefrontal 
cortex; STS = superior temporal sulcus. Coordinates are listed in MNI space. 
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the anterior insula. More importantly, directly comparing the neural activity elicited by 
moral vs. financial subjective values allowed us to demonstrate that the moral 
subjective values of human lives are not represented by the same common neural 
currency representing the value of material types of goods (Levy & Glimcher 2012; 
Izuma et al. 2008; Zink et al. 2008). Instead, we found that neural activity in the rTPJ, 
PCC, and other areas (see Figure 3 and Table 2), was specifically involved in the 
representation of moral compared to financial subjective values, suggesting the 
existence of a moral-specific valuation system eliciting neural activity in brain areas 
previously implicated in representing morally salient components of decisions, such 
as empathy, harm-aversion or, as shown in the present paper, estimations of lives 
saved and harmed. Thus, our findings are at odds with the assumption that moral 
decisions rely on domain-general decision processes (Shenhav & Greene 2010). 
This latter view is mainly supported by an indirect comparison of the neural activity 
elicited by moral and financial expected value computations. In their study, the 
authors (Shenhav & Greene 2010) found that computations of the expected value of 
probabilistic outcomes in moral scenarios elicited neural activity in regions commonly 
associated with computations of the expected value of probabilistic financial rewards, 
such as the striatum (Tobler et al. 2006) and the vmPFC (Hare et al. 2008; Knutson 
& Peterson 2005). However, given the absence of a direct comparison with a 
monetary control task, it was impossible to disentangle if the identified neural activity 
in (Shenhav & Greene 2010) is associated only with calculations of the expected 
value of outcomes – irrespective of the context – or if it is also processing morally 
relevant information.  
Furthermore, studies investigating decisions in contexts that require integrating 
moral and financial values, (e.g., deciding between donating to a charity or keeping 
the money for oneself) found that the subjective value of choice options was mostly 
represented in the vmPFC but modulated by social information from the TPJ (Hare et 
al. 2010; Soutschek et al. 2016; Strombach et al. 2015; Crockett et al. 2014). In this 
decision context, the rTPJ has been thought to estimate socially salient components, 
such as the need to overcome one’s perspective and the deservingness of a charity, 
and to pass this information on to the vmPFC, where the value-computation is 
ultimately implemented. Our results not only complement the existing literature 
isolating the neural representations dedicated specifically to computing moral 
subjective values, but offer also a novel and intriguing perspective on the role of the 
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rTPJ in moral value-computations. For decisions based only on moral values (i.e., 
where there is no trade-off between self-interested financial values and moral 
values), our evidence suggests that subjective moral values can be represented 
directly in the rTPJ, without any vmPFC involvement. 
Relating different moral preferences to neural activity, we found that the subjective 
value of a human life is associated with neural activity in the rTPJ, PCC, and DLPFC 
among other areas (see Table 1 and Figure 1c). In contrast, we found a set of 
regions, including the Anterior Insula and the left IPL, that displayed a negative 
relation to the estimated subjective value of a human life (see Table 1 and Figure 
1c). These findings suggest an intriguing novel mechanistic interpretation of how 
moral preferences are represented in the brain. It is plausible that the subjective 
value of a human life relies on processes that measure the harm inflicted to others, 
consistently with previous studies linking brain activity in the right TPJ, PCC, and 
DLPFC to processing harm aversion and empathy (Ugazio et al. 2014; Majdandžić et 
al. 2012; Crockett et al. 2010; Crockett et al. 2017). Conversely, the moral 
preference that considers required saving a larger number of people relies on neural 
valuation mechanisms responsible for comparing the magnitudes of the moral choice 
options, reflected in brain activity in the left IPL and in the anterior insula. This 
interpretation accommodates and extends the ideas proposed in a previous study 
that identified a positive correlation between these bran areas and an increase of 
expected value in moral decisions with probabilistic outcomes (Shenhav & Greene 
2010). 
The analysis of the monetary control task showed that financial subjective values 
were indeed represented by neural activity in the vmPFC, PCC, and VS, consistent 
with numerous previous findings (Kable & Glimcher 2007). Domain-general value-
computation mechanisms may contribute to moral decisions (C. A. Hutcherson et al. 
2015; Shenhav & Greene 2010), at least to the extent that financial valuation 
mechanisms can corrupt human moral values (Falk & Szech 2013) or that moral 
values related to the aversion of harming others can discount financial values 
(Crockett et al. 2017). However, our data critically revealed a dissociation in the 
neural networks involved in the representations of purely moral subjective values 
and those involved in the representation of financial subjective values. This raises 
the interesting question for future studies what context factors may determine 
whether or not domain-general valuation mechanisms are involved in moral choices. 
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More generally, while trolley-type moral dilemmas have been questioned for their 
ecological validity (Kahane 2015), recent technological developments in robotics and 
artificial intelligence have revitalized the importance of this type of dilemmas 
(Bonnefon et al. 2016). Our results may prove critical for informing future ethical, 
public and scientific debates regarding these technologies. For instance, it is 
increasingly debated how a self-driving car should be pre-programmed for selecting 
whom to harm in potentially critical situations where different lives are at stake -  
should it always protect the people inside the car or should it use some other 
criterion? Our current results identify distinct neural mechanisms by which our brains 
compute tradeoffs between saving and harming human lives, which differ from 
neural valuation processes involved in selecting between material goods. This 
suggests that artificial intelligence would need to account for the properties of these 
mechanisms in order to be perceived as morally appropriate. Last but not least, our 
study illustrates how moral preferences may be assessed in a manner that is 
computationally similar to the assessment of financial preferences, without requiring 
the participants to read and understand complex moral vignettes. This facilitates 
identification of the choice-related brain mechanisms and may prove essential for a 
move towards an integrated perspective of how the brain controls and integrates 
moral and material concerns in the control of actions.  
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Participants 
The participants were twenty-five healthy students from the University of Zurich (age: 
min 19, max 34, mean = 22.08, S.E.M. = 0.74 years old; 13 females) with no 
reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and no current use of 
medication as measured with standard surveys. All the experimental procedures 
were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich. 
fMRI Task 
Participants made financial and moral choices in randomly alternating blocks during 
the event-related fMRI sessions. Visual stimulation was highly similar (cf. Fig 1a and 
1b) while the required motor commands where identical. Both tasks were cued 
visually (a ‘W’ cued financial trials, while moral trial were cued by the letter ‘M’). 
During financial choice trials participants indicated whether they preferred to give up 
a reward of 20 CHF that was paid out immediately after the study in order to receive 
a variable reward (20, 22, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100 or 120 CHF) after waiting 
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different amounts of days (1, 10, 21, 50, 90, or 180 days). One financial trial was 
randomly selected at the end of the study and paid out to the participant as 
described above. If a delayed option was selected, the money was sent via mail to 
the address specified by the participant. 
The moral task required participants to read a moral scenario before starting the 
fMRI session. This moral scenario instructed them to place themselves in the shoes 
of a doctor who is taking care of a different patient in a coma-state every day. The 
moral deservingness of these patients differed as indicated by different criminal 
records (no records of criminal activities, fraud, robbery, manslaughter, killing a 
person, killing multiple persons). While on duty, this doctor is informed about the 
sudden need of organ transplants in variable amounts of victims due to an accident 
(from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 10 victims). These people would die if they 
did not receive the organs soon.  
The participant is then asked what she/he is morally required to do in the shoes of 
the doctor: choice alternative 1) interrupt life-support to the coma patient, resulting in 
his death, and use the organs to save the lives of the accident victims; choice 
alternative 2), leave the coma-patient on life-support and let the victims of the 
accident die. During the moral choice trials, participants reported which course of 
action was the morally required one. Each trial consisted of a unique combination of 
deservingness and number of people the doctor could save by harming the coma-
patient. 
Behavioral analysis 
Reaction times were analyzed with a two-sided paired t-test comparing the individual 
average RTs in the moral compared to the financial task. The relationship of RTs 
with choice was analyzed with a two-sided t-test comparing the standardized slopes 
(β1) of a linear regression (formally, RTs = β0 + β1SV + E) estimating the relation 
between RTs and moral and financial subjective values  for each individual.  
Financial and moral subjective values were estimated using structurally identical 
models. Respectively, financial subjective values were estimated with the model: 
𝑃choice =  
1
1+exp (−(𝐵0+𝐵1×[20−SVf(𝑘𝑓)]
                                                  (3) 
where the function SVf(kf) is the subjective value for the financial choice (defined in 
Eq. 1, see Results section) and the parameter kf corresponds to the discount factor 
of the hyperbolic function; Moral subjective values were estimated with the model:  
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𝑃choice =  
1
1+exp (−(𝐵0+𝐵1×[1−SVm(𝑘𝑚)]
                                                        (4) 
where the function SVm(km) is the subjective value for the moral choice (defined in 
Eq. 2, see Results section) and the parameter km corresponds to the discount factor 
of the hyperbolic function. 
In both cases, the fitting strategy was based on a Bayesian Hierarchical Modeling 
(BHM) approach. This approach constitutes an attractive compromise between the 
extremes of complete pooling and complete independence (Gelman & Hill 2007). As 
in the complete independence approach, BHM estimates parameters for each 
individual participant. However, these estimates avoid the averaging artifacts that 
come with the complete pooling approach as well as the unreliability that comes with 
the estimation of parameters for individual participants. A Bayesian model was fit for 
each choice type (moral and financial) and contained random effects for the three 
subject-specific parameters of interest and assumed flat priors for all parameters at 
the highest hierarchy level. Inference of the parameters in the BHM was performed 
via the Gibbs sampler using the Markov Chain Montecarlo (MCMC) technique 
implemented in JAGS (Polanía et al. 2015; Plummer 2003). A total of 10,000 
samples were drawn from an initial burn-in step and subsequently a total of 10,000 
new samples were drawn with three chains (each chain was derived based on a 
different random number generator engine, and each with a different seed). We 
applied a thinning of 10 to this final sample, thus resulting in a final set of 1,000 
samples for each parameter. This thinning assured that the final samples were 
auto-decorrelated for all of the latent variables of interest. We conducted Gelman–
Rubin tests for each parameter to confirm convergence of the chains. All latent 
variables in our Bayesian models had R̂ < 1.05, which suggests that all three 
chains converged to a target posterior distribution.  
fMRI data-acquisition and pre-processing.  
Subjects performed four choice-task-sessions (each containing 60 financial and 
moral perceptual choices) and one resting-state-session that lasted 6.5 minutes 
each. During each session, we acquired 270 T2*-weighted whole-brain echo planar 
images using a Philips Achieva 3 T whole-body scanner (Philips Medical Systems, 
Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips sensitivity-encoded 
(SENSE) head coil. Imaging parameters were: 2600 ms repetition time (TR); 37 
slices (transversal, ascending acquisition); 2.6 mm slice thickness; 2.5 mm x 2.5 mm 
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in-plane resolution; 0.65 mm gap; 90° flip angle. To measure at fully equilibrated 
magnetic field, five dummy image excitations were performed and discarded before 
functional image acquisition started. To enhance BOLD-contrast sensitivity 
throughout the brain, we used a dual-echo-sequence (TE: 17 ms and 44 ms) in 
combination with a weighted voxel-wise summation technique (Posse et al., 1999; 
Schmiedeskamp et al., 2010) that generates a single functional whole-brain image 
with optimal sensitivity for each TR. For this procedure, the signal-to-noise ratio is 
first computed for each echo image voxel in the resting-state scan. These SNR 
measures are then used to weight each voxel in the two echo images acquired per 
TR of the choice-task sessions according to the formula  
𝑋 =
𝑋𝐸1  ∙  𝑆𝑁𝑅𝐸1  + 𝑋𝐸2  ∙  𝑆𝑁𝑅𝐸2  
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝐸1  + 𝑆𝑁𝑅𝐸2
 
where X is the resulting image for a given TR, XE1 and XE2 are the images acquired 
at that TR for the first echo and second echo, respectively, and SNRE1 and SNRE2 
are the signal-to-noise images (generated as voxel-wise mean divided by the voxel-
wise standard deviation) for the resting-state time-series acquired for the first echo 
and second echo, respectively. A high-resolution T1-weighted whole brain structural 
image used for image registration during post-processing (181 sagittal slices; matrix 
size: 256 x 256; voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm ; TR/TE/TI: 8.3/2.26/181 ms) was also 
acquired for each subject.   
Image preprocessing and analysis were conducted using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging). Functional images were slice-time corrected (to the 
middle slice acquisition time) and realigned (accounting for individual head motion). 
Each participant’s T1-weighted structural image was co-registered with the mean 
functional image and normalized to the standard T1 MNI template using the new-
segment-procedure provided by SPM8 (Ashburner & Friston 2005). The functional 
images were then normalized to the standard MNI template using the same 
transformation, spatially resampled to 3 mm isotropic voxels, and smoothed using a 
Gaussian kernel (FWHM, 8mm). 
fMRI data-analysis 
The general linear model (GLM) we implemented was suited to identify and contrast 
correlations of BOLD signals with financial and moral subjective values during the 
financial and the moral trials respectively. The included regressors were therefore (1) 
an indicator function for financial choices with (2) financial subjective value (z-scored 
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at the individual level) as parametric modulator, (3) an indicator function for moral 
choices with (4) the parametric modulator moral subjective value (z-scored at the 
individual level). Two additional orthogonalized parametric modulators were also 
included: a first one for the objective delays (financial task) and a second one for the 
deservingness levels (moral task). Our regressors of interest were modelled as stick-
functions at the time of stimulus onset convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function; these regressors were regressed against the blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signal in each voxel. In addition to these main regressors, the 
GLM also included several regressors of no interest: two indicator functions for 
financial and moral block cues, and six motion parameters (obtained during the 
realignment procedure). 
First-level summary statistics were obtained by calculating single-subject voxel-wise 
contrasts for each of the two subjective value parametric modulators. Second-level 
random effects group contrast maps were then tested for significance by one-sample 
t tests across single-subject contrast maps. Statistical inference was performed at 
the cluster level, using a whole-brain FWE-corrected statistical threshold of P < 0.05 
(based on a cluster-forming voxel cut-off set to P < 0.001). For the hypothesis-guided 
ROI analysis of the ventral striatum (VS), we corrected for multiple comparisons 
using a small-volume correction (SVC, P < 0.05) within the bilateral nucleus 
accumbens volume mask provided by the FSL-Harvard-Oxford atlas. 
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Honesty plays a key role in social and economic interactions and is crucial for societal 
functioning. However, breaches of honesty are pervasive and cause significant societal 
and economic problems that can affect entire nations. Despite its importance, 
remarkably little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms supporting honest 
behavior. We demonstrate that honesty can be increased in humans with transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(rDLPFC). Participants (N=145) completed a die-rolling task where they could 
misreport their outcomes to increase their earnings, thereby pitting honest behavior 
against personal financial gain. Cheating was substantial in a control condition, but 
decreased dramatically when neural excitability was enhanced with tDCS. This increase 
in honesty could not be explained by changes in material self-interest or moral beliefs 
and was dissociated from participants’ financial risk-taking, impulsivity, and mood. A 
follow-up experiment (N=156) showed that tDCS only reduced cheating when dishonest 
behavior benefited the participants themselves rather than another person, suggesting 
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that the stimulated neural process specifically resolves conflicts between honesty and 
material self-interest. Our results demonstrate that honesty can be strengthened by non-
invasive interventions and concur with theories proposing that the human brain has 
evolved mechanisms dedicated to control complex social behaviors. 
Keywords: honesty | cheating | experiment | transcranial direct current stimulation | 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
 
Significance:  
Honesty affects almost every aspect of social and economic life. We conducted experiments 
in which participants could earn considerable amounts of money by cheating on a die-rolling 
task. Cheating was substantial but decreased by more than half during transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC). This 
stimulation-induced increase in honesty was functionally specific: It did not affect other types 
of behavioral control related to self-interest, risk-taking and impulsivity. Moreover, cheating 
was only reduced when it benefitted the participants themselves rather than another person. 
Thus, the human brain implements specialized processes that enable us to remain honest 
when faced with opportunities to cheat for personal material gain. Importantly, these 
processes can be strengthened by external interventions.  
 
Main Text:  
Dishonest behavior is pervasive and carries important economic and societal consequences 
(1–6). For example, illegal tax evasion is thought to account for over 5% of the world’s GDP 
(7) and total bribes to public officials are estimated at over US $1 trillion annually (8). 
Furthermore, recent business scandals such as the Volkswagen emission fabrications and 
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several exchange rate manipulations in the financial industry have eroded trust in the integrity 
of the corporate world (5). Formal laws and regulations are often designed to enforce honest 
behavior, but in many situations honest behavior is difficult or impossible to monitor and 
individuals therefore face a trade-off between honesty personal material gain.  
The conflict between honesty and material self-interest is a central feature of human social 
life, and honesty is exalted in virtually all world religions and moral value systems. Despite 
substantial interest in the origins and determinants of honest behavior in biology (9), 
behavioral sciences (2, 10), and economics (4, 11), little is known about the neural processes 
that enable humans to resolve conflicts between honesty and personal financial gain. 
Understanding the neural processes involved in these “costly” displays of honesty could offer 
important new perspectives on the evolutionary origins and development (9, 12) of honest 
behavior and may also aid in designing interventions for enhancing lie detection, enforcement 
of honesty (13), and the treatment of pathological cheating (14).  
The neural basis of honesty remains largely unexplored in humans because previous studies 
have almost exclusively relied on instructed-lying paradigms, which examine deception 
ability rather than dishonest behavior (15). Participants in these studies are explicitly 
instructed by an experimenter to make untruthful statements and also do not benefit 
materially from lying. Thus, participants neither genuinely decide to be honest nor face a 
trade-off between honest behavior and material gain. Other recent studies have used signaling 
games to study the neural basis of deception (16, 17), but such tasks potentially confound 
honesty with strategic motives (e.g., if senders believe opponents will do the opposite of what 
they recommend, then a sender will actually “deceive” the opponent by telling the truth (18)). 
Only one neuroimaging study has investigated cheating in a setting that involved a moral 
trade-off between honesty and financial gains (19). In that study, honest behavior correlated 
with brain activity in a network comprising areas of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
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(rDLPFC). However, these correlational findings cannot determine whether heightened 
neural activity genuinely causes honest behavior or simply reflects a functionally irrelevant 
by-product of honest behavior.  
Here we present direct causal evidence for a neural mechanism that increases honesty by 
applying transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in 145 subjects confronting a real 
trade-off between honesty and personal material gain. tDCS is a non-invasive method to 
modulate neural excitability in healthy humans by applying weak electric currents to the 
scalp (see (20) and (21)). To exogenously enhance neural excitability, we applied anodal 
tDCS (N=49) over the rDLPFC region previously identified with neuroimaging (Fig. S1B in 
(19); Fig. S1). We also measured behavior in two additional groups where we applied tDCS 
to either decrease neural excitability (cathodal, N=49) or leave it unchanged (sham, N=47). 
Random assignment to conditions generated three groups that were matched in socio-
economic status, cognitive ability, and personality. Moreover, the three stimulation 
conditions were conducted double-blind, were perceived similarly by the participants, and did 
not differ reliably in terms of participants’ mood, alertness, and calmness. Thus, any effects 
of the three tDCS interventions on honest behavior cannot be explained in terms of pre-
existing group differences or changes in beliefs and emotions (21). 
During stimulation, we measured cheating using an incentivized and unobtrusive die-rolling 
task (10, 11) that has been shown to reliably predict rule violating behavior in real-world 
settings (22). Subjects were instructed to report the outcomes of ten die rolls using a 
computer interface. Each roll could result with 50% probability in either a gain of 9 Swiss 
francs or no change in payoff. Prior to each roll, a computer screen indicated which outcomes 
would yield the monetary payoff. Given that the participants could earn up to 90 Swiss francs 
(about US $90 at the time of testing) in this task, they faced a substantial material incentive to 
over-report the number of successful die rolls. Participants completed the task anonymously 
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(i.e., outside of the experimenter’s view) and thus their outcomes could not be independently 
verified. Although this paradigm cannot identify die rolls for which any individual participant 
displays dishonest behavior, the degree of cheating associated with each tDCS intervention 
can be determined by comparing the mean percentage of reported successful die rolls against 
the 50% benchmark characteristic of completely honest reporting. 
Cheating was substantial in the neurally ineffective sham condition (see Fig. 1A). Compared 
to the honesty benchmark of 50%, participants reported 68% successful die rolls on average 
(95% confidence interval: 63%-74%). This implies that cheating occurred in 37% of all 
responses, assuming that participants never misreported to their disadvantage (21). Figure 1B 
shows the binomial distribution of successful die rolls expected if everyone behaved honestly 
and the empirically observed distribution for sham tDCS. 8.5% of the subjects reported 
successful outcomes for all ten rolls (thereby maximizing their earnings), which is 
significantly higher than the 0.1% expected under the binomial distribution (p<0.001, 
binomial test). Subjects who claimed nine, eight, and seven successful die rolls were also 
significantly over-represented (p<0.001, p=0.001, and p=0.002, binomial tests), suggesting 
that many of them cheated on some but not all possible occasions. Such incomplete cheating 
is commonly observed in similar paradigms (10, 11). 
To test whether enhanced neural excitability promotes honest behavior, we compared the 
distribution of die rolls in anodal and sham tDCS. Anodal stimulation over the rDLPFC 
substantially reduced the average percentage of successful die rolls to 58% (p=0.005, rank-
sum test, see Fig. 1A). This corresponds to an implied cheating rate of 15%, a figure that is 
nearly 60% lower than that observed in the sham condition. We also no longer found 
significant over-reporting of nine, eight, and seven successful die rolls in the anodal condition 
(p=1.000, p=0.168, and p=0.369, binomial tests, see Fig. 2D). However, the fraction of 
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subjects who reported the maximum outcome of ten successful rolls remained essentially 
unchanged at 8.2%. This suggests that anodal tDCS predominantly reduced cheating in 
participants who actually pondered the trade-off between honesty and financial gains, but not 
in those who were committed to maximizing their payoff. 
While anodal tDCS decreased cheating, we did not find opposite behavioral effects of 
cathodal tDCS (Fig. 2D and C). Participants in the cathodal condition reported 67% 
successful die rolls (95% confidence interval: 61%-73%), which was not significantly 
different from the success rate reported in the sham stimulation (p=0.635, rank-sum test) but 
significantly higher than the rate reported for anodal tDCS (p=0.018, rank-sum test). There 
are two plausible explanations for why cathodal tDCS did not increase cheating. First, several 
studies suggest that cathodal tDCS induces less stable cognitive behavioral effects than 
anodal tDCS (23). Second, the high cheating rate in the sham condition (which is similar, for 
example, to the cheating rate in a sample of maximum security prisoners (22)) entails that 
there was little room for tDCS to further increase incomplete cheating. Thus, cathodal 
stimulation may not induce transitions from incomplete cheating to the more extreme form of 
cheating on every possible instance. Regardless, the results of the cathodal condition clearly 
show that any general side effects of electrical stimulation―such as possible discomfort or 
distraction―cannot account for the substantial reduction in cheating observed when 
stimulation polarity was reversed (20).  
We explored possible mechanisms for why anodal tDCS increased honesty. Our task was 
designed such that participants had to trade off financial gain for misreporting against the 
value they assigned to being honest. The stimulated neural process could therefore have 
strengthened honesty by either (i) decreasing material self-interest, i.e., the subjective value 
of money, (ii) enhancing the value placed on honesty, or (iii) perturbing the choice process 
98 
 
that trades off these two conflicting motives. We tested these hypotheses with a series of 
behavioral tasks administered to our participants while they were under the influence of the 
stimulation (21). 
In order to assess whether anodal tDCS reduced cheating by weakening material self-interest, 
we employed a dictator game that required participants to split money between themselves 
and well-known charities. Several studies have documented that participants who behave 
selfish in dictator games cheat more in other tasks (12). This is also evident in our data: Self-
interested behavior in the dictator game (i.e., the amount of money kept) was positively 
correlated with subjects’ earnings from the die-rolling task (Spearman’s rho=0.266, p=0.001). 
However, tDCS did not affect the amount of money kept in the dictator game (p=0.989, 
Kruskal-Wallis test, Table 1) and controlling for dictator game behavior in a regression 
analysis did not change the effect of anodal tDCS on honest reporting (21). This finding 
suggests that the increase in honest behavior caused by anodal tDCS is not due to decreased 
material self-interest.  
To test whether anodal tDCS inhibited cheating by increasing the value placed on honesty, 
we analyzed participants’ moral beliefs under the influence of tDCS. Participants indicated 
the extent to which they considered misreporting in the die-rolling task to be morally 
inappropriate. This measure was negatively correlated with report rates in the die-rolling task 
(Spearman’s rho = -0.448, p<0.001), confirming that participants who highly valued honesty 
cheated less. However, tDCS did not affect this measure of moral values (p=0.507, Kruskal-
Wallis tests). We also did not find that tDCS influenced participants’ beliefs about the 
appropriateness of various forms of dishonest behavior in everyday life situations (p=0.948, 
Kruskal-Wallis test). Moreover, controlling for participants’ ratings on these measures in a 
regression analysis did not alter the effect of anodal tDCS on cheating (21). Thus, the 
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reduction in cheating caused by anodal tDCS does not appear to be due to increased moral 
valuations of honesty. 
We next examined whether tDCS stimulation is involved in resolving the trade-off between 
honesty and material self-gain. If this were the case, then anodal tDCS should primarily 
influence individuals who were genuinely conflicted between honesty and material gain. As 
reported earlier, anodal tDCS indeed reduced incomplete cheating but did not alter the rate of 
complete cheating (Fig. 1B and D). The latter is presumably associated with low conflict due 
to the complete dominance of financial over moral concerns. We corroborated this result by 
further examining the magnitude of the tDCS effect in participants who reported low or high 
moral conflict associated with cheating (see Fig. 2). To this end, we used the median rating 
(corresponding to the point of indifference on the Likert scale) of how ‘morally 
inappropriate’ participants considered cheating in the die-rolling task to divide subjects into a 
low- and high-conflict group. For low-conflict participants (n=42), cheating rates were 
unaffected by anodal compared to sham tDCS (p=0.327, rank-sum test). In contrast, high-
conflict subjects (n=54) cheated significantly less in the anodal tDCS than the sham group 
(p=0.014, rank-sum test, n=54). Remarkably, responses for high-conflict subjects who 
received anodal tDCS were not statistically different from the 50% honesty benchmark 
(p=0.920, t-test, n=30). These findings substantiate that tDCS only affected the trade-off 
between honesty and material self-interest for participants who were in fact conflicted 
between these two motives. 
In light of these findings, the question emerges whether the stimulated neural process is 
specialized for resolving conflicts between material self-interest and honesty, or whether it 
reflects a general-purpose mechanism involved in any choice between conflicting response 
options (24). To answer this question, we examined how tDCS affected behavior in three 
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control tasks that required choices between monetary payoffs associated with different levels 
of risk, ambiguity, and temporal delay, respectively. The stimulation did not affect choices on 
any of these tasks (see columns 2 to 4 in Table 1), and controlling for participants’ behavior 
in these tasks in a regression analysis did not alter the effect of anodal tDCS on cheating (21). 
Thus, the neural mechanism affected by tDCS does not appear to generally affect choices 
involving financial trade-offs but rather specifically resolves conflicts between material self-
interest and the motivation to behave honestly.  
A final question we address is whether anodal tDCS over the rDLPFC also reduces cheating 
when the beneficiary is another person rather than oneself. Testing for such tDCS effect on 
prosocial cheating is crucial, as it establishes whether the affected neural mechanism is 
specific to the conflict between honesty and material self-interest rather than controlling 
cheating in general (regardless of whether the outcomes benefit oneself or others). This test 
also addresses potential concerns that anodal tDCS may reduce cheating by biasing 
participants to opt for a response strategy that is less effortful and complex, as reporting the 
true or default outcome may be easier than generating false responses to earn money (15). In 
our design, self-interested and pro-social cheating are matched for cognitive complexity, as 
both require participants to generate fake responses. To test these accounts, we conducted an 
additional tDCS experiment with 156 participants (anodal N=78, sham N=78) for which we 
modified the die-rolling task so that subjects could not earn any money for themselves; 
instead, their earnings were credited to another anonymous participant. All other aspects of 
the experimental design and procedure were identical to the previous experiment (21).  
In line with previous findings (12, 25), participants undergoing sham tDCS cheated even 
when the associated gains were assigned to an anonymous recipient (Fig. 3A and B). On 
average, they reported 61% successful outcomes (confidence interval: 56%, 66%), which 
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corresponds to an implied cheating rate of 22%. A substantial fraction of subjects therefore 
cheated for purely prosocial reasons, even though the level of cheating was somewhat less 
pronounced (p=0.044, rank-sum test) than in the main experiment where cheating served 
participants’ own interest. However, as illustrated in Fig. 3A and C, anodal tDCS did not 
reduce prosocial cheating: 62% of the die rolls were reported as successful, which does not 
significantly differ from the responses under sham tDCS (p=0.805, rank-sum test). Moreover, 
the negative effect of anodal tDCS on dishonest reporting was significantly stronger in the 
main experiment than in the prosocial die-rolling task (p=0.017, Wald test). This finding 
suggests that the tDCS-induced enhancements of honesty in the main experiment cannot be 
explained by differences in cognitive effort associated with cheating, and it further indicates 
that rDPLFC activity is specifically involved in the resolution of conflicts between honesty 
and self-interest rather than affecting all forms of dishonest behavior. 
Our results demonstrate that neural mechanisms involving the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex play a causal role in modulating honesty when individuals stand to gain from dishonest 
behavior. These neural processes are functionally independent from other forms of behavioral 
trade-offs such as those related to risk (26), ambiguity (27), or delayed rewards (28, 29). Such 
specialization suggests a dedicated neurobiological process that enables humans to resist the 
self-interested temptation to cheat, consistent with proposals that complex social structures in 
primate groups have led to the evolution of neural processes dedicated to the control of social 
behavior (30). This also concurs with evidence from twin studies suggesting that moral 
beliefs about dishonesty are partially inherited (31).  
While the neural process enhanced by tDCS was clearly functionally specific, it is unlikely 
that it is restricted to the DLPFC area targeted with the tDCS. The neural processes 
responsible for the enhanced honesty during anodal tDCS are more likely to reflect functional 
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interactions in a network of brain areas influenced by the stimulation (19, 32). Irrespective of 
these considerations, the current demonstration of a dedicated neurobiological basis for 
honesty may have important implications for jurisdiction and legal systems, in which the 
biological limits on the responsibility for legal transgressions are intensely debated (33). 
Moreover, our findings of a malleable neural process that influences honesty may be 
important for the development of measures to enforce honesty (13). However, our finding 
that tDCS only enhanced honesty in individuals who experienced a conflict when cheating 
may prevent establishing such measures for the treatment of pathologies coined by an 
absence of such conflicts (14). 
(34–42, 28, 43–48) 
103 
 
Figures and Tables: 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Fig. 1. Effects of tDCS on reporting in the die-rolling task. (A) Error bars indicate ±1 
SEM. The self-reported percentage of successful die rolls is significantly reduced for anodal 
(D) compared to sham (B) and cathodal (C) tDCS (p=0.005 and p=0.018, rank-sum tests, 
n=96 and n=98). The empirical distribution for the cathodal and sham group are skewed 
towards higher numbers of successful die rolls compared to the binomial (honest) 
distribution. The distribution for the anodal group more closely resembles the binomial 
distribution. 
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Fig. 2. Effect of anodal tDCS for subjects who experience a low and high moral conflict. (A) 
for subjects who assign a low moral value to honesty (below the median of the group, which 
corresponds to the point of indifference on the Likert scale), the self-reported percentage of 
successful die rolls does not significantly differ between anodal tDCS and sham (p=0.327, rank-
sum test, n=42). (B) For subjects who assign a high moral value to honesty (above or equal to the 
median), the difference in successful die rolls between sham and anodal tDCS is statistically 
significant (p=0.014, rank-sum test, n=54). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. 
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Fig. 3. Effect of anodal tDCS on pro-social cheating. (A) Error bars indicate SEM. The 
self-reported percentage of successful die rolls does not significantly differ between the 
anodal tDCS and sham (p=0.805, rank-sum test, n=156). The distributions for anodal tDCS 
(C) and sham (B) group are similar and both skewed towards higher numbers of successful 
die rolls compared to the binomial (honest) distribution. 
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Table 1. Effect of tDCS on other types of behavioral conflicts. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Self-
interest Risk Ambiguity Impulsivity 
Sham Mean 77.433 40.099 29.220 4.716 
 (N=47) SEM  3.800 3.438 3.060 0.507 
Cathodal  Mean 79.207 44.639 39.864 4.571 
(N=49) SEM  3.295 4.235 3.960 0.553 
Anodal Mean 81.027 38.422 36.435 4.857 
 (N=49) SEM  2.626 3.275 3.462 0.509 
Kruskal-
Wallis p-value 0.989 0.626 0.139 0.826 
 
Self-interest measures the average percentage of the endowment subjects kept for themselves 
in the three dictator games. Risk (Ambiguity) is the percentage of the endowment invested 
into a lottery with known (unknown) outcome probabilities. Impulsivity is the average 
number of impatient choices (0-20) made in three delay discounting tasks. See methods for 
details. The Kruskal-Wallis tests in the last row show that tDCS did not have any significant 
influence on any of these measures of conflict resolution, demonstrating that the stimulated 
neural process specifically resolves conflicts between honesty and material self-interest. SEM 
= standard error of the mean. 
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Materials and Methods 
All testing took place in the group testing room of the Laboratory for Social and Neural 
Systems Research (SNS-Lab) at the University Hospital Zurich. This room contains 14 
identical, interconnected computer workstations that are shielded from sight, thereby 
allowing parallel and anonymous testing of multiple participants. Testing was always 
conducted in groups of 12 participants unless some participants did not show up. The 
participants were recruited with the software “h-root” (34) and the experiments were 
conducted using the computer software z-Tree (35). On average, experimental sessions lasted 
about 1.5 hours and participants earned about 80 Swiss francs (approximately 82 US dollars 
at the time of testing). All testing was conducted with 4 experimenters. Two experimenters 
instructed the participants and mounted the transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
electrodes, one experimenter localized the target sites for tDCS, and one experimenter 
handled all software used for controlling the experimental tasks and tDCS. 
1. Main experiment 
1.1 Participants 
The participants were 145 university students (72 females, mean age 23+/-4, all right-handed) 
from the Zurich area. All of them were neurologically and psychiatrically healthy, as 
ascertained by standardized questionnaires, and did not take any medication at the time of 
testing. All participants gave informed consent and the procedures received ethical approval 
from the Ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich (see section “6. Human Subjects 
Approval”). 
   
1.2 Transcranical direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
In each session, participants were randomly assigned in equal numbers to three tDCS 
conditions (anodal, cathodal, and sham). The participants in all these conditions were 
simultaneously stimulated using a multi-channel stimulator (see below) during the 
experimental tasks. Neither the participants nor the three experimenters interacting with the 
participants knew which seats were given active or sham stimulation, ensuring that 
stimulation was administered in a double-blind fashion.  
We applied bipolar tDCS by means of a commercially available, CE-certified multi-channel 
stimulator (NeuroConn, Ilmenau, Germany). This device allows simultaneous stimulation of 
up to 16 participants with individually-tailored electric currents applied via electrodes 
mounted on the scalp. tDCS does not directly elicit action potentials, but depending on 
electrode polarity (i.e., under the anode or the cathode), the applied currents have been shown 
to either increase or decrease neural excitability, respectively (20, 36). Thus, tDCS is 
commonly used in cognitive neuroscience studies as a neuromodulator that facilitates or 
impairs activity elicited by an experimental task (20). We applied this well-established 
approach and targeted the rDLPFC region that was activated in the study by Greene and 
Paxton (19) when participants successfully resisted the temptation to lie (see their Figure S1B 
and Table S2). We applied either anodal tDCS to enhance this activity, cathodal tDCS to 
weaken this activity, or sham tDCS to control for unspecific stimulation effects. These 
stimulation protocols were applied in a between subject-design (i.e., three separate groups), 
as tDCS has long-lasting after-effects (20, 37) that make it difficult to interleave different 
stimulation protocols within a given session. Moreover, the between-subject design prevented 
memory or order effects on responding. Each session involved all three tDCS conditions, 
which were assigned randomly and double-blind to participants, to control for confounds 
such as effects of task order, experimenter, or time of day. 
114 
 
tDCS was applied by pairs of standard sponge electrodes soaked in saline solution. One of 
these electrodes (5cm x 7cm) was placed over the rDLPFC region of interest. The other 
electrode (10cm x 10cm) was placed over the vertex, based on successful stimulation 
achieved with this electrode montage in previous studies (38, 39). The vertex electrode was 
chosen to be considerably larger so as to minimize current density and thereby neural 
stimulation under this electrode (40). tDCS was applied at an intensity of 1.5 mA for 30 
minutes (in the anodal and cathodal group) or 60 seconds (in the sham group). The latter 
condition mimics the tingling sensations at the start of the stimulation but does not provide 
neurally effective stimulation effects (20). To minimize the sensations at stimulation onset, 
the current was linearly ramped up (at the start) and down (at the end) over periods of 20 
seconds.  
To identify the correct scalp sites for electrode placement, we first recruited 43 participants 
for whom we had already acquired an anatomical MR image (using a Philips Achieva 3T 
Scanner and a T1-weighted MP-Rage sequence). We then localized in these brain images the 
site corresponding to the normalized MNI coordinate x,y,z = -26,-53,18 as found in Greene 
and Paxton (19), as well as the vertex identified by the dorsal confluence of the two principal 
sulci. For each participant, we determined the scalp coordinates overlying these cortical 
targets by means of Brainsight 2.0 frameless stereotaxy (Rogue research, Montreal, Canada). 
We marked for each participant the precise location of these scalp locations in the space of 
standard EEG 128 surface electrodes caps (Waveguard-Duke cap system, Cephalon A/S, 
Noerresundby, Denmark, provided by Advanced Neuro Technology, ANT: www.ant-
neuro.com). This measurement revealed that the stimulation point on all participants’ skulls 
was localized in an area of 6 cm
2
 (see Fig. S1), delimited on the cap by the electrodes RR4-33 
(Top-Left), RR3-67 (Top-Right), RA1-63 (Bottom-Left), and RB1-38 (Bottom-Right), 
superimposing the rDLPFC. For all remaining participants without a T1-weighted structural 
MRI scan, we therefore localized the center point of the tDCS electrode to lie in the center of 
these 4 standardized EEG electrode positions as determined by the Waveguard-Duke cap 
system. 
 
1.3 Experimental tasks and procedures 
Pre-stimulation phase 
After a brief welcome instruction, participants were allocated to seats in the lab by handing 
out randomly shuffled cards with seat numbers. While waiting to be called one-by-one to a 
separate room for stimulation site localization, participants filled out a questionnaire 
comprising some basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, and income) and the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (41). The latter is a simple measure of cognitive skills that 
takes only a few minutes and is highly correlated with more elaborate measures of cognitive 
skills, such as the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT). 
Once all subjects were connected to the tDCS electrodes, we assessed their current state of 
mood, alertness, and calmness using the multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF) (42). 
Stimulation phase 
The main experiment started with the tDCS stimulation (see section “1.1.2. Transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS)”). Because the neurophysiological effects of tDCS may take 
some time to reach stable equilibrium (36), the main experimental tasks (see below) began 3 
minutes after the start of the tDCS stimulation. During this time, subjects first answered some 
questions about their subjective well-being and life satisfaction. Thereafter, subjects were 
informed via computerized instructions that they would perform four independent tasks for 
which they could earn money. They were also informed that only one task, selected at 
random by the computer at the end of the experiment, would be paid out for real. Paying for 
115 
 
one randomly selected task eliminated the possibility for subjects to hedge their income risks 
across tasks. We randomized the order of the tasks to control for potential spill-over effects. 
Moreover, as each session involved all three tDCS conditions, the stimulation was fully 
orthogonal to the order of the tasks. The subjects performed the tasks in full privacy as the 
research assistants had left the experimental room. If subjects had questions or needed help, 
they could press a computer key that sent an alarm signal to the research assistants in an 
adjacent room. 
During the tDCS stimulation, subjects performed a total of four experimental tasks: 
 
1) a die-rolling task to measure cheating, 
2) a dictator game to measure self-interested behavior, 
3) an investment task to measure preferences for risky and ambiguous outcomes, and 
4) a delay discounting task to measure impulsivity. 
 
Our task of main interest is the die-rolling task. The other three tasks are auxiliary tasks that 
allow us to control for general conflict-related choice behavior that has been associated with 
rDLPFC activity (26, 28, 29, 38) Moreover, we disguised the main purpose of the experiment 
by embedding the die-rolling task in a larger test battery. 
 
Die-rolling task: The rules of this task required subjects to roll a six-sided die ten times and 
to report the outcomes of the die rolls. In each round, half of the rolled numbers resulted in a 
payoff of 9 Swiss francs whereas the remaining numbers yielded no payoff. Prior to each roll, 
a computer screen displayed which numbers would yield the monetary payoff in that round; 
the winning numbers changed from round to round. In this task participants faced a real 
financial incentive to break the rules by misreporting the outcomes of unsuccessful die rolls. 
Subjects used a cup to roll the die and check the outcomes. They had to report both the 
outcomes of the die rolls as well as the associated payoffs in order to make sure that everyone 
understood the consequences of their actions. Because subjects were fully shielded from 
sight, there was no way anyone (including the experimenters) could detect whether individual 
subjects misreported the outcomes of their die rolls. However, it is possible to detect cheating 
at the group level by comparing the mean percentage of successful die rolls reported by the 
subjects with the 50% benchmark if everyone reported honestly. If we assume that none of 
the subjects cheated for his or her disadvantage (i.e., by reporting that an outcome is not 
successful when in fact it is), we are able to calculate cheating rates at the group level (43). 
Let m be the percentage of misreported rolls. The percentage of outcomes reported as 
successful p is thus determined by:  
 
𝑝 = 𝑚 + (1 − 𝑚) ∙ 0.5 = 0.5 (1 + 𝑚). 
 
If subjects cheat in a given round, they report a successful die roll outcome with probability 
1. However, if they report honestly, they report a successful outcome only with probability 
0.5. We can thus characterize the percentage of misreported die rolls by: 
 
𝑚 = 2 ∙ 𝑝 − 1. 
 
If the random computer draw at the end of the experiment determined that the die-rolling task 
was selected for payment, we paid out the earnings from all 10 rounds.  
 
Dictator game: In this task subjects could donate money to three well-known charities: the 
Swiss Red Cross (SRC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Médecins Sans 
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Frontières (MSF). For each charity, subjects were endowed with 60 Swiss francs and decided 
how much of this sum to donate to the respective charity. We use the average amount kept as 
a measure of the subjects’ selfishness. The use of three charities reduces the influence of 
mismatch between what subjects consider a good cause and the charities’ missions. If the 
dictator game was selected for payment, we paid out one of the three donation decisions, as 
randomly determined by the computer at the end of the experiment. The main results are 
robust if we use the decision for each charity separately (see section “3.3. Robustness checks 
III: Disaggregated behavioral measures”). 
 
Investment task: In this task, subjects made two investment decisions (44, 45). In both cases, 
subjects were endowed with 45 Swiss francs and decided how much to invest in a risky 
lottery. They could keep the remaining amount for sure. For the first investment choice (the 
“ambiguity task”), subjects had imperfect information about the success probability of the 
lottery. They were shown a picture of a plastic box filled with blue, red, and yellow balls in 
unknown proportion and were told that the computer will draw one ball at random. If the 
drawn ball was yellow, they won two and a half times their invested amount; for the two 
other colors, they lost their invested amount. We set the share of yellow, winning balls to 50 
percent (unbeknownst to the subjects). For the second investment choice (the “risk task”), the 
success probability was again 50 percent, but this time subjects knew the success probability. 
They were told that the computer would draw a random number between 1 and 100; if the 
chosen number was between 51 and 100, subjects won two and a half times their invested 
amount, for all other numbers, they lost their investment. The investment amount in the 
ambiguity task provides us with a measure of subjects’ willingness to take risks under 
ambiguity, which is an inherent feature in most real-life situations that involve risk. By 
contrast, the investment amount in the risk task measures subjects’ risk aversion in the 
absence of ambiguity. The ambiguity task preceded the risk task in order to prevent that 
subjects would use the success probability in the risk task as a benchmark for estimating the 
success probability in the ambiguity task. If the investment task was chosen for payment, one 
of the two investment decisions became relevant for the payoff, which was randomly 
determined by the computer at the end of the experiment. 
 
Delay discounting task: In this task, subjects made a series of binary choices between 
receiving 60 Swiss francs at a later date and obtaining an equal or smaller amounts of money 
at an earlier date (46). We implemented three scenarios: (i) “today vs. in 3 months”, (ii) 
“today vs. in 6 months”, and (iii) “in 3 months vs. in 6 months.” For each scenario, subjects 
were given a list with 20 choice situations between the delayed payment and some earlier 
payment. In the first row, the amount of the earlier payment was equal to the amount of the 
delayed payment (i.e., 60 Swiss francs). For every subsequent row, the amount of the earlier 
payment decreased by 3 Swiss francs. Thus, the sooner subjects switch to the later payment 
when going through the list, the more patient they are. We used the subjects’ average 
switching point from the earlier to the delayed payment in all three scenarios as a measure of 
their impulsivity; but note that the results remain robust if we use the switching points of the 
individual scenarios or a measure of present bias instead (see section “3.3. Robustness checks 
III: Disaggregated behavioral measures”). If the delay discounting task was chosen for 
payment, the computer randomly selected one row within a scenario. If subjects chose a 
payment that was due “today” in that row, they received the money immediately after the 
testing. If subjects chose the delayed payment (i.e., in 3 months or in 6 months) instead, they 
could choose between receiving the amount by mail or they could pick it up in person.   
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Following the four experimental tasks, we again assessed subjects’ current state of mood, 
alertness, and calmness using the MDBF mood questionnaire. This allows us to capture 
potential changes in mood over the course of the experiment. The mood questionnaire has 
two versions. We counterbalanced across subjects which version was completed before and 
after the tDCS stimulation.  
 
Post-stimulation phase 
 
After switching off tDCS, the experiment continued with a final questionnaire. tDCS 
produces long-lasting physiological after-effects (20, 37), so participants completed the 
questionnaire while they were still under the influence of tDCS. We first asked participants 
whether they believed tDCS had an influence on their behavior. We further asked subjects to 
rate the comprehensibility of the instructions for each of the four experimental tasks. We also 
assessed subjects’ moral valuation of honesty in the context of the die-rolling task, by asking 
them to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement “Cheating in the die-rolling 
task is morally inappropriate” on a 7-point scale ranging from “I do not agree at all” (= 0) to 
“I totally agree” (= 6). Subjects subsequently answered five questions related to civic honesty 
as used in the World Values Survey (47). More specifically, the participants had to indicate 
the extent to which they find certain forms of dishonest behavior in everyday life situations 
justifiable, such as “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled to” or 
“Avoiding a fare on the public transport”, on a 7-point scale ranging from “Never justifiable” 
(= 0) to “Always justifiable” (= 6). The last part of the survey included a Machiavellianism 
scale (Mach-IV) (48), which serves as a personality measure of opportunism, status seeking, 
and lack of morality.  
 
At the end of the experiment the computer randomly selected one of the four experimental 
tasks for each subject to be paid out. Payoffs were calculated accordingly and paid to the 
subjects before they left the lab.  
 
Table S1 reports descriptive statistics of the participants from the main experiment. The three 
experimental groups (i.e., anodal, cathodal, and sham) are well balanced with regard to 
participants’ socio-economic background, cognitive ability, and personality. None of the 
variables we collected differ statistically between groups at the 5-percent significance level, 
which demonstrates that the randomization was successful. We nevertheless control for these 
variables in the regression analysis. 
 
2. Pro-social cheating experiment 
We additionally conducted a pro-social cheating experiment in which subjects could not earn 
any money for themselves in the die-rolling task; instead their earnings from the die rolls 
were credited to another anonymous participant. All other aspects of the die-rolling task were 
identical to the main experiment.  
The goal of the pro-social cheating experiment was to test whether anodal tDCS over the 
rDLPFC increases honesty when the financial gains from dishonesty do not serve individuals’ 
self-interest. This allows us to examine whether the stimulated neural process has a specific 
function to resolve conflicts between honesty and self-interest or whether it is involved in 
regulating cheating per se (i.e., independent of the underlying motives). This test also 
addresses potential concerns that anodal tDCS may reduce cheating by biasing participants to 
opt for a response strategy that is less effortful and complex, as reporting the true or default 
outcome may be easier than generating false responses to earn money (15). In our design, 
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self-interested and pro-social cheating are matched for cognitive complexity, as both require 
participants to generate fake responses.  
A total of 156 new subjects were recruited for this experiment and were randomly assigned to 
anodal and sham tDCS (n = 78 in anodal and n = 78 in sham). All administered procedures 
and other experimental tasks (including the questionnaires) were identical with those used for 
the main experiment.  
Table S2 provides an overview of the sample characteristics from the pro-social cheating 
experiment. The two experimental groups (i.e., anodal and sham) are well-balanced in terms 
of participants’ socio-economic background, cognitive ability, and personality. None of the 
acquired variables differ statistically between groups at the 5-percent significance level, 
suggesting that the randomization was successful. We nevertheless control for these variables 
in the regression analysis. 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
All reported p-values in the manuscript and supplementary materials are from two-sided tests. 
 
3.1 Regression analysis of the main experiment 
Table S3 presents Probit regression results from the main experiment. We estimate the 
following regression model:  
Pr(successful outcomeik = 1) = Φ(α + β ∗ Anodali + γ ∗ Cathodali + δ ∗ 𝐗i + ϵik). 
The decision of individual 𝑖 to report a successful outcome for die roll 𝑘 is regressed on 
indicators for the anodal and cathodal tDCS condition, and a set of control variables 𝐗i. The 
estimation results remain qualitatively the same if we alternatively estimate a linear 
probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
  
Column (a) of Table S3 reports the regression results without the control variables. In 
comparison with treatment sham, anodal tDCS significantly reduced the probability of 
reporting a successful die roll by 10.6 percentage points (p = 0.007, Wald test). By contrast, 
the coefficient for cathodal tDCS is close to zero and statistically insignificant (p = 0.737, 
Wald test). The test results reported at the bottom of column (a) in Table S3 highlights that 
the coefficient estimates for anodal and cathodal tDCS are significantly different from each 
other (p = 0.021, Wald test). In column (b), we additionally include a rich set of control 
variables: age, gender, relationship status, Swiss nationality, monthly amount of cash 
available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of studies, and baseline mood, wakefulness, 
and calmness. The results remain practically unchanged in comparison to the unconditional 
regression model. 
 
In column (c) we extend the unconditional model by including a measure of selfishness (i.e., 
the average amount kept in the three dictator decisions). The results reveal that selfishness is 
indeed positively correlated with the probability of reporting a successful die roll (p = 0.000, 
Wald test). However, the coefficient estimate for anodal tDCS remains largely unchanged, 
suggesting that anodal tDCS did not increase honesty by weakening material self-interest. 
 
Column (d) includes control variables for participants’ task-specific valuation of honesty and 
their perception of civic honesty norms (i.e., their beliefs about the inappropriateness of 
various forms of dishonest behavior in everyday life situations) (47). While participants who 
consider misreporting in the die-rolling task to be morally inappropriate were significantly 
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less likely to report a successful outcome (p = 0.000, Wald test), controlling for their beliefs 
about the inappropriateness of dishonesty in everyday life did not have any additional 
explanatory power (p = 0.618, Wald test). The stimulation-induced increase in honest 
behavior is independent of moral beliefs, as indicated by the relatively stable coefficient of 
anodal tDCS. 
 
We further estimated a model where we control for measures of general conflict-related 
behavioral control (i.e., investments in the ambiguity and risk task as well as impulsivity in 
the delay discounting task). Column (e) shows that none of the three measures are 
significantly related to subjects’ behavior in the die-rolling task (p = 0.614, p = 0.841, 
respectively p = 0.905, Wald tests) and the inclusion of these measures as control variables in 
the regression model leaves the impact of anodal tDCS unchanged. Finally, column (f) shows 
that the effect of anodal tDCS does not change if we include the full set of control variables 
simultaneously. 
 
3.2 Regression analysis: Comparing selfish and pro-social cheating  
In column (a) of Table S4, we perform a difference-in-differences regression analysis to 
compare the effect of anodal tDCS in the main (selfish cheating) experiment (n = 145) and 
the pro-social cheating experiment (n = 156). We pool the data from the two experiments and 
estimate a Probit model in which we include an interaction term between the anodal tDCS 
condition and a dummy for the main experiment measuring self-interested cheating. The 
coefficient of anodal tDCS thus captures the treatment effect in the pro-social cheating 
experiment, while the interaction term shows whether and to what extent the treatment effect 
differs in the self-interested cheating experiment. We include the same set of control 
variables used in column (b) of Table S3. 
 
The coefficient of anodal tDCS is close to zero and statistically insignificant (p = 0.757, Wald 
test), meaning that anodal tDCS did not influence the responses in the pro-social cheating 
task. This finding contrasts with the treatment effect found in the self-interested cheating 
experiment, as confirmed by the significant negative interaction effect in columns (a) and (b) 
of Table S4 (p = 0.022, respectively p = 0.017, Wald tests). Thus, the stimulated neural 
process is specifically involved in the resolution of conflicts between honesty and self-
interest rather than in an inhibition of cheating per se. Moreover, due to the fact that the self-
interested and pro-social cheating experiments were equivalent in terms of choice formats 
and cognitive complexity, these results also establish that the tDCS-induced enhancement of 
honesty in the self-interested cheating experiment cannot be explained by changes in 
cognitive effort cost or demands imposed by the cognitive complexity of cheating. 
 
 
 
4. Robustness checks 
4.1 Robustness checks I: Perception of tDCS and affective state 
We examined whether the three tDCS conditions were perceived in a similar fashion by the 
subjects. Towards the end of the experiment, subjects were asked whether they thought the 
brain stimulation with tDCS influenced their behavior. Responses to this question did not 
significantly differ between treatments (χ2 = 2.225, p = 0.329, χ2 test), confirming the double-
blind nature of the stimulation. Moreover, the regression results reported in columns (a) and 
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(b) of Table S5 show that including how subjects perceived the stimulation does not alter the 
effect of anodal tDCS on behavior in the die-rolling task. 
 
To rule out that tDCS may have changed behavior indirectly, by means of altering 
participants’ general affective state, we additionally tested for nonspecific effects of tDCS on 
subjects’ mood, wakefulness, and calmness, by administering a validated questionnaire 
(MDBF) (42) shortly before and towards the end of the stimulation. tDCS did not influence 
any of the three mood variables (wakefulness: χ2 = 1.963, p = 0.375; calmness: χ2 = 3.092, p 
= 0.213; mood: χ2 = 0.150, p = 0.928; Kruskal-Wallis tests). In our regression analysis, we 
additionally controlled for changes in mood, wakefulness, and calmness and found that the 
main treatment effect remains robust (see columns c and d of Table S5). 
 
4.2 Robustness checks II: Cognitive complexity 
Anodal tDCS could have reduced cheating by biasing subjects to opt for a cognitively less 
complex response strategy (as reporting the true or default outcome may be easier than 
generating a false response). However, as we argue in the main text, the selfish and the pro-
social cheating experiments are fully matched in terms of cognitive complexity because both 
required similarly strategic generation of fake responses. If cognitive complexity was 
responsible for our results, then we should have observed similar effects of anodal tDCS in 
both experiments. This is clearly refuted by the data. 
 
We nevertheless conducted two further robustness checks to address the issue of cognitive 
complexity. First, we assessed whether tDCS influenced subjects’ understanding of the die-
rolling task. At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to indicate how much they 
agreed with the statement “the instructions of the die-rolling task were comprehensible” on a 
scale from “I do not agree at all” (= 0) to “I totally agree” (= 6). The average score was above 
5.7 in all three treatments and did not differ between the tDCS conditions (χ2 = 1.114, p = 
0.573; Kruskal-Wallis tests). Moreover, the regression analysis in column (b) of Table S6 
shows that comprehension of the instructions neither correlates with response behavior in the 
die-rolling task (p = 0.764, Wald test) nor changes the impact of anodal tDCS on cheating. 
Second, we tested whether cognitive skills are related to behavior in the die-rolling task. The 
questionnaire from the pre-stimulation phase included the Cognitive Reflection Test (41), a 
validated measure of cognitive skills. The results reported in column (c) of Table S6 highlight 
that cognitive skills do not significantly predict behavior in the die-rolling task (p = 0.132, 
Wald test). Additional regression results (not reported in detail) indicate that the interaction 
effects between cognitive skills and the anodal (or cathodal) tDCS conditions are 
insignificant (p = 0.216, respectively p = 0.439, Wald test). In sum, we find no indication that 
cognitive complexity underlies the effect of anodal tDCS on honest reporting. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks III: Disaggregated behavioral measures 
In our main analysis, we used the average amount kept from three dictator decisions as a 
measure of selfish behavior. The Cronbach’s alpha for the three decisions is 0.926, 
suggesting high internal consistency. In Table S7, we show that tDCS did not have any 
influence on each of the dictator decisions separately. 
  
Furthermore, in the main analysis we use the average of the switching points elicited in the 
three delay discounting scenarios (i.e., “today vs. in 3 months”, “today vs. in 6 months” and 
“in 3 months vs. in 6 months”) as a measure of impulsivity. Table S8 shows that there is no 
significant tDCS influence for any of three measures. Moreover, we also constructed a 
measure of present bias, by taking the difference in switching points between “today vs. in 3 
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months” and “in 3 months vs. in 6 months”. tDCS did not significantly affect this alternative 
measure of impulsivity either, as shown in the last column of Table S8. 
5. Experimental instructions 
 
5.1 Instructions for the main experiment 
Below are the instructions for the four experimental tasks from the main experiment. We 
randomized the order of the tasks at the session level. Subjects were informed that only one of 
the four tasks was paid out which was randomly determined by the computer at the end of the 
experiment. We used the term “tokens” to refer to the experimental currency (exchange rate: 
100 tokens = 30 Swiss francs).   
Task A: Die-rolling task 
 
This part consists of 10 rounds. In each round you can earn up to 30 tokens. The profits from 
each round will be added up.  
 
In each round, you will be asked to roll a die and report the outcome of the die roll. Use the 
die and cup in front of you. The die number you report determines your payoff in that round. 
You can check how much you earn in the payoff table at the bottom of the screen.  
 
Example for the table below: If you roll a 3, your income increases by 0 tokens. If you roll a 
4, your income increases by 30 tokens etc. 
 
Payment:   
 
If task A is selected for payment, you will receive the total profit from all 10 rounds.  
 
Please click the OK button to start the task. 
 
 
Number rolled 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Payoff +0 +30 +0 +30 +30 +0 
 
This screen was shown for all 10 die rolls. 
 
Please complete this task now using the cup at your table. 
 
You can roll the die several rounds to check that it is a fair die. Always remember the first 
outcome because this is the one that counts.  
 
 
Number rolled 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Payoff +30 +0 +0 +30 +0 +30 
 
 
Click the OK button once you have rolled the die. 
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Please enter now the outcome of the die roll (the first die number you have rolled) and the 
corresponding payoff.  
 
Number rolled  
Payoff  
 
 
 
 
Task B: Donation task 
 
In this task you have the opportunity to donate money to three charitable organizations (Swiss 
Red Cross, UNICEF Switzerland, and Médecins sans Frontières).   
 
For each charity, you get an endowment of 200 tokens. You will have to decide how many 
tokens you want to donate to each of the three charities. You can keep the remaining amount, 
i.e., the 200 tokens minus the donation. 
 
If task B is selected for payment, one of your three donations decisions (B1, B2, or B3) will 
be chosen at random for payment. You can request a copy of the receipts for the overall 
donation amounts.  
 
Click the continue button if you are ready. 
This screen was shown for all three donation decisions. 
 
 
Your endowment is 200 tokens. You now have to decide what share of your endowment you 
want to donate to the charity below. You can keep the remaining amount. 
[Swiss Red Cross] 
[UNICEF Switzerland] 
[Médecins sans Frontières] 
 
 
Your payoff is calculated as follows: 
 
Your payoff = 200 tokens ‒ donation 
 
 
Please indicate how many tokens you want to donate to [Swiss Red Cross/UNICEF 
Switzerland/Médecins sans Frontières]: _________ (0-200 tokens) 
 
 
 
Task C: Investment task 
 
In this task you will make two investment decisions (C1 and C2) for which you can earn money. 
 
If task C is selected for payment, one of your two investment decisions (C1 or C2) will be 
chosen at random for payment.  
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Click the continue button if you are ready. 
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Your endowment is 150 tokens. You now have to decide what share of your endowment you 
want to invest in a lottery. You can keep the remaining amount that you do not invest. 
 
The investment task works as follows: 
 
The computer will randomly draw one ball out of a box filled with many red, blue, and yellow 
balls in unknown ratio (see picture below). 
 
 If a red or blue ball is drawn, you will lose your investment and you will not get any 
money back. 
 If a yellow ball is drawn, you win 2.5 times the amount you have invested.  
 
Please note that the proportion of red, blue, and yellow balls is identical to the picture below. 
 
 
 
 
Your payoff is calculated as follows: 
 
 If you lose (a red or blue ball is drawn): Your payoff = 150 tokens ‒ investment  
 If you win (yellow ball is drawn): Your payoff = 150 tokens ‒ investment + (2.5x 
investment)  
 
 
Please indicate how many tokens you want to invest in this lottery: _________ (0-150 tokens) 
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The second investment decision works similar as the previous one. Your endowment is again 
150 tokens. You now have to decide what share of your endowment you want to invest in a 
lottery. You can keep the remaining amount that you do not invest. 
 
The investment decision works as follows: 
 
This lottery is different than the previous one. The computer will randomly draw a number 
between 1 and 100 (each number has the same probability of being drawn). 
 
 If the random number is between 1 and 50, you will lose your investment and you will 
not get any money back. 
 If the random number is between 51 and 100, you win 2.5 times the amount you have 
invested.  
 
 
Your payoff is calculated as follows: 
 
 If you lose (random number is between 1 and 50): Your payoff = 150 tokens ‒ 
investment  
 If you win (random number is between 51 and 100): Your payoff = 150 tokens ‒ 
investment + (2.5x investment)  
 
 
Please indicate how many tokens you want to invest in this lottery: _________ (0-150 tokens)  
Task D: “Sooner vs. later” task 
 
In this task you will have to choose whether to receive a certain amount at an earlier point in 
time, or whether you prefer to wait in order to get a larger amount at a later time. You will see 
different decision situations on the screen. For example, “Do you prefer 100 tokens today or 200 
tokens in 3 months?” You will have to decide which option you like better.  
 
You will make your decisions based on a total of three choice tables (D1, D2, and D3). In each 
row, you will see two options, A and B. You can choose between   
 
 option B, a fixed amount of 200 tokens you will get at a later point in time (for 
example, “in 3 months”),  
 or option A, a smaller amount of tokens that will be paid out at an earlier point in time 
(for example, “today”).  
 
If task D is selected for payment, one row from one of the three choice tables will be chosen 
at random for payment. If you chose the sooner option in that row, you will be paid the 
according amount at the sooner date. If you chose the later option, you will receive the 
equivalent of 200 tokens at the later date. If the payment date is “today,” you will receive the 
amount immediately after finishing the study. If the payment date is “in 3 months” or “in 6 
months” we will send you the money per mail or you can pick it up at the lab. 
 
Click the continue button if you are ready. 
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This screen was shown for all three each delay discounting scenarios. We imposed a unique 
switching point for each scenario. Thus, once participants switched to the delayed payment 
(i.e., option B), the computer automatically selected the delayed payment for the remaining 
rows. 
 
Please start with row 1 and then proceed to the next row until you have made a choice in each 
row. In each row, you have to decide between 200 tokens (option B: “in 3 months”) and a 
smaller amount of tokens (option A: “today”). The amount at the right end of the table 
(option B) is always the same. Only the amounts on the left side (option A) change from row 
to row. Make sure to consider the different dates for options A and B. Click the submit button 
below once you have filled out every row. 
 
Row Option A Your choice Option B 
1 200 tokens today □ □ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 tokens in 3 months 
2 190 tokens today □ □ 
3 180 tokens today □ □ 
4 170 tokens today □ □ 
5 160 tokens today □ □ 
6 150 tokens today □ □ 
7 140 tokens today □ □ 
8 130 tokens today □ □ 
9 120 tokens today □ □ 
10 110 tokens today □ □ 
11 100 tokens today □ □ 
12 90 tokens today □ □ 
13 80 tokens today □ □ 
14 70 tokens today □ □ 
15 60 tokens today □ □ 
16 50 tokens today □ □ 
17 40 tokens today □ □ 
18 30 tokens today □ □ 
19 20 tokens today □ □ 
20 10 tokens today □ □ 
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5.2 Instructions for the pro-social cheating experiment 
In the pro-social cheating experiment subjects could not earn money for themselves in the 
die-rolling task; instead they could earn money for another participant.   
 
Task A: Die-rolling task  
 
In this part you will be randomly assigned to another participant who is here today.   
 
This part consists of 10 rounds. In each round you can earn up to 30 tokens for the other 
participant. The profits from each round will be added up.  
 
In each round, you will be asked to roll a die and report the outcome of the die roll. Use the 
die and cup in front of you. The die number you report in a round determines the payoff of 
the other participant in that round. You can check how much you earn for the other 
participant in the payoff table at the bottom of the screen.  
 
Example for the table below: If you roll a 3, the other participant’s income increases by 0 
tokens. If you roll a 4, the other participant’s income increases by 30 tokens etc. 
 
Payment:   
 
If task A is selected for payment of the other participant, he or she will receive the total profit 
from all 10 rounds.  
 
The other participants will also perform the die-rolling task and you will be randomly 
assigned to another participant as well. If this task will be selected for your payment, you will 
receive the total profit generated by the other participant.  
 
Please click the OK button to start the task. 
 
 
Number rolled 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Payoff for other 
participant 
+0 +30 +0 +30 +30 +0 
 
This screen was shown for all 10 die rolls. 
 
Please complete this task now using the cup at your table. 
 
You can roll the die several rounds to check that it is a fair die. Always remember the first 
outcome because this is the one that counts.  
 
 
Number rolled 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Payoff for the 
other participant 
+30 +0 +0 +30 +0 +30 
 
 
Click the OK button once you have rolled the die. 
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Please enter now the outcome of the die roll (the first die number you have rolled) and the 
corresponding payoff.  
 
Number rolled  
Payoff for the 
other 
participant 
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6. Human Subjects Approval 
The experiments were approved by the Ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich (KEK 
2010-0326/3). 
 
 
Fig. S1. Schematic Display of the tDCS electrode localization procedure 
For the 43 participants with a T1-weighted anatomical MR image, we localized the scalp 
position overlying the DLPFC coordinate reported in Greene and Paxton (19) to be activated 
when participants successfully resisted lying. Each red dot represents one such location; the 
size of the dot represents the number of cases where this location was identified. This 
illustrates that for all participants, these locations lay in close proximity in an area 
demarcated by 4 standardized electrode positions in the Waveguard-Duke cap system. We 
therefore used this cap system in all remaining participants without an MR image to position 
the tDCS electrode (drawn to real size as red rectangle) so as to cover all possible locations of 
the DLPFC coordinate. 
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Fig. S2. Timeline of the experiment. 
In the pre-stimulation phase subjects completed a socio-economic questionnaire, the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (41), and a mood questionnaire (MDBF) (42). Thereafter, 
anodal, cathodal or sham tDCS was applied over subjects’ rDLPFC. During the stimulation 
phase, subjects first filled out a life satisfaction questionnaire and then performed four 
independent tasks (die-rolling task, dictator game, investment task, delay discounting task) in 
randomized order. In the post-stimulation phase subjects completed another mood 
questionnaire (MDBF) followed by a final questionnaire. 
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Table S1. Descriptive statistics of the individual background variables for the main 
experiment (n = 145). 
The variable ‘age’ is measured in years; ‘single’, ‘Swiss’, and major of study (i.e., ‘math’, 
‘medicine’, ‘law’, ‘economics’, ‘social sciences’ and ‘non student’) are binary variables; 
‘monthly income’ is the amount of Swiss francs available to cover living expenses each 
month; ‘cognitive skills (CRT)’ is subjects’ score (0 to 3) from the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) (41); ‘machiavellism’ is the subjects’ score (-3 to +3) on the machiavellism scale 
(MACH IV) (48); ‘positive Mood (t = 0)’, ‘wakefulness (t = 0)’, and ‘calmness (t = 0)’ are 
sub-scales (4 to 20) of the multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF) (42) administered 
in the pre-stimulation phase. The last column presents p-values for the null hypothesis of 
perfect randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis tests in case of 
interval variables). 
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Table S2. Descriptive statistics of the individual background variables for the pro-social 
cheating experiment (n = 156). 
The variable ‘age’ is measured in years; ‘single’, ‘Swiss’, and major of study (i.e., ‘math’, 
‘medicine’, ‘law’, ‘economics’, ‘social sciences’ and ‘non student’) are binary variables; 
‘monthly income’ is the monthly available amount of cash in Swiss francs; ‘cognitive skills 
(CRT)’ is subjects’ score (0 to 3) from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (41); 
‘machiavellism’ is the subjects’ score (-3 to +3) on the machiavellism scale (MACH IV) 
(48); ‘positive Mood (t = 0)’, ‘wakefulness (t = 0)’, and ‘calmness (t = 0)’ are sub-scales (4 to 
20) of the multidimensional mood questionnaire (MDBF) (42) administered in the pre-
stimulation phase. The last column presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect 
randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests in case of interval 
variables). 
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Table S3. Effect of anodal and cathodal tDCS on cheating. 
Probit estimates. Reported results are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the individual level, are displayed in parenthesis. (a) The 
decision to report a successful die roll is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal 
and cathodal tDCS treatment in the main experiment (n = 145). (b) The second model 
includes additional controls for age, gender, relationship status, Swiss nationality, 
monthly amount of cash available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of studies, and 
baseline mood. (c) The third model includes the average percentage kept in the dictator 
game as a measure of self-interested behavior. (d) The fourth model includes subjects’ 
task-specific valuation of honesty and their beliefs about the inappropriateness of 
dishonesty in everyday life. (e) The fifth model includes subjects’ investments in the 
ambiguity and risk task as well as their average impulsivity measured in the delay 
discounting task. (f) The last model includes all controls simultaneously. The second row 
from the bottom displays the p-values from Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for anodal and cathodal tDCS are equal. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table S4. Effect of anodal tDCS on self-interested and pro-social cheating. 
Probit estimates. Reported results are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the individual level, are displayed in parenthesis. (a) The decision 
to report a successful die roll is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal and cathodal 
tDCS treatment in the main experiment (self-interested cheating) and the pro-social cheating 
experiment (n = 301). We include a dummy for the self-interested cheating experiment and 
an interaction term between this dummy and the anodal tDCS treatment dummy. (b) The 
second model includes additional controls for age, gender, relationship status, Swiss 
nationality, monthly amount of cash available, cognitive skills, machiavellism, major of 
studies, and baseline mood, wakefulness and calmness. Because one subject failed to respond 
to some questions, the number of observations drops when adding covariates (n = 300). 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  
135 
 
 
Table S5. Perception of tDCS, affective state, and cheating. 
Probit estimates. Reported results are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the individual level, are displayed in parenthesis. (a) The decision 
to report a successful die roll is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal and cathodal 
tDCS treatment in the main experiment (n = 145). (b) The second model includes a dummy 
for whether subjects believed tDCS influenced their behavior. (c) The third model includes 
changes in mood, calmness, and wakefulness between the pre- and post-stimulation phase as 
control variables. (d) The last model includes all controls simultaneously. The second row 
from the bottom displays the p-values from Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for anodal and cathodal tDCS are equal. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table S6. Understanding, cognitive skills and cheating. 
Probit estimates. Reported results are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the individual level, are displayed in parenthesis. (a) The decision 
to report a successful die roll is regressed on dummy variables for the anodal and cathodal 
tDCS treatment in the main experiment (n=145). (b) The second model includes subjects’ 
understanding of the instructions. (c) The third model includes subjects’ score in the 
Cognitive Reflection Test as a measure of cognitive skills. (d) The last model includes all 
controls simultaneously. The second row from the bottom displays the p-values from Wald 
tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for anodal and cathodal tDCS are equal. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table S7. Effect of tDCS on self-interested behavior 
Self-interest I, II, and III is the percentage of the endowment that is kept in the dictator game 
with the Red Cross, UNICEF and Médecins Sans Frontières. The Kruskal-Wallis test in the 
last row demonstrates that tDCS did not have any significant influence on any of these 
behavioral measures. SEM = standard error of the mean. 
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Table S8. Effect of tDCS on impulsive behavior 
Impulsivity I, II, and III is the average number of impatient choices (0 to 20) in the delay 
discounting task when subjects had to choose between “today vs. in 3 months,” “today vs. in 
6 months,” and “in 3 months vs. in 6 months.” Present bias is the difference in the number of 
impatient choices between “today vs. in 3 months” and “in 3 months vs. in 6 months.” The 
Kruskal-Wallis test in the last row demonstrates that tDCS did not have any significant 
influence on any of these behavioral measures. SEM = standard error of the mean. 
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Abstract 
Recent brain stimulation studies have suggested that the right lateral prefrontal cortex 
(rLPFC) plays a key role in sanction-induced norm compliance (Ruff et al., 2013; Strang et 
al., 2015); however, the precise neural mechanisms by which stimulation of rLPFC affects 
norm-compliant behavior remain unknown. Here we investigated this issue by applying 
anodal-, cathodal- or sham-tDCS over rLPFC during concurrent fMRI of a task measuring 
norm-compliance triggered by sanction threats (punishment condition) or purely 
endogenously (no punishment condition). In line with previous results (Ruff et al., 2013), 
modulating rLPFC activity increased (anodal-tDCS) or decreased (cathodal-tDCS) sanction-
induced norm compliance. Importantly, our results indicate that these tDCS-mediated 
changes in the behavioral response to sanction threats are accompanied by corresponding 
changes in neural responses to sanction threats in two distinct brain networks: Cathodal-tDCS 
(which led to weaker sanction-induced compliance) weakened the neural response to 
punishment threats in several regions within an executive neural network (anterior cingulate 
cortex [ACC], bilateral LPFC and left parietal cortex). Interestingly, anodal-tDCS (that led to 
increased sanction-induced norm compliance) did not affect neural responsiveness of this 
executive network, but rather resulted in stronger amygdala responses to punishment threats 
as well as augmented punishment-induced functional connectivity between stimulated rLPFC 
and OFC, and between amygdala and OFC. Thus, our results suggest that the behavioral 
impact of rLPFC-tDCS on sanction-induced norm compliance may reflect modulations of 
neural processes involved in both strategy-related and emotional responses to the punishment 
threat. 
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Significance Statement 
Recent studies suggests that the human brain has developed distinct neural mechanisms that 
mediate norm-compliant social behavior in the presence of punishment threats. For example, 
it was shown that lateral prefrontal cortex plays a key role for social sanction-induced norm 
compliance. Here we combine transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) with functional 
imaging to identify the neural mechanisms that accompany modulation of norm-compliant 
behavior triggered by anodal-/cathodal-tDCS over lateral prefrontal cortex. We show that 
decreased norm compliance due to cathodal-tDCS triggers punishment-related activity 
changes in brain areas implementing strategic thought, while increased norm compliance due 
to anodal-tDCS is accompanied by increased punishment-related neural responses in brain 
structures devoted to affective processing. More generally, we show that combined tDCS and 
functional imaging can identify the causal interplay between behavior, the stimulated site and 
different neural networks in the service of decision-making. 
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Introduction 
Humans are unique in the extent to which they regulate social life through compliance with 
social norms (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Glimcher et al., 2005). Prosocial behavior and 
widespread cooperation between individuals is made possible by the ability to establish social 
norms (Hsu et al., 2005). Despite the universal acceptance of such norms, there are always 
some individuals whose self-interest tempts them to violate the norms. Thus punishments are 
decisive for norm enforcement and for the maintenance of social order. Since punishment by 
peers has played an important role in evolution of human society (Smuts, 1999), it is thought 
that the human brain has developed distinct neural mechanisms that mediate norm-compliant 
behavior in the presence of punishment (Raine and Yang, 2006; Montague and Lohrenz, 
2007; Spitzer et al., 2007; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). For example, a previous fMRI study 
(Spitzer et al., 2007) measured brain activity in an economic paradigm specifically designed 
to test the effect of punishment threats on people’s compliance with the fairness norm. The 
results showed that a fronto-striatal network, including right lateral prefrontal cortex 
(rLPFC), was activated by the punishment threat. Using the same experimental paradigm, 
Ruff and colleagues (Ruff et al., 2013) revealed a causal role of rLPFC for social norm 
compliance by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Nitsche et al., 2008; 
Polania et al., 2018). The norm-compliant behavior was increased/decreased when anodal-
/cathodal-tDCS was applied over rLPFC. Similar to the cathodal-tDCS effect, a second brain 
stimulation study also revealed that disrupting the same rLPFC activity by means of 
transcranial magnetic stimulation decreases the norm complaint behavior (Strang et al., 
2015). 
However, the existing studies leave it unclear by which neural mechanisms rLPFC-tDCS can 
affect norm compliance. That is, the behavioral brain stimulation results leave it unclear 
whether the rLPFC implements only local neural processes which generate the appropriate 
decisions or whether rLPFC is coordinating the activity in other interconnected brain 
networks, which in the end are jointly responsible for the change of the norm-compliant 
behavior. In support for the latter assumption comes the well-established role of the LPFC to 
coordinate activity in other interconnected brain areas to instantiate behavioral control and 
action selection of complex processes (Cummings, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Levine, 
2009; Duncan, 2010). Furthermore, it has been proposed that LPFC has an integration-and-
selection role in the service of norm complaint behavior and that LPFC integrates and 
coordinates information from several regions such as amygdala, mPFC or parietal cortex 
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(Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015). Thus, our hypothesis is that the 
modulation of the sanction-induced norm-compliant behavior by rLPFC-tDCS is also 
reflected in sanction-induced activity changes in one out of two distinct networks. On one 
hand, rLPFC-tDCS might trigger changes in strategic responses to the punishment threat, and 
thus activity modulation changes in regions within executive network such as parietal cortex, 
ACC or LPFC are expected. On the other hand rLPFC-tDCS might impact on the affective 
component of the punishment threat. Thus it might be that the modulation of social norm- 
compliant behavior by means of rLPFC-tDCS is also drawing on activity modulation of the 
affective network, namely in regions such as amygdala or orbital frontal cortex. 
To test which one of the two hypothesized networks exhibit activity changes with the tDCS 
modulation of norm complaint behavior, we used tDCS over rLPFC while monitoring the 
stimulation’s impact on both social norm-compliant behavior and on brain activity at the 
network level by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Antal et al., 2011; 
Moisa et al., 2016). We employed a well-established task (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff et al., 
2013; Strang et al., 2015), where the participants decide on monetary transfers in an 
ultimatum game (where the opponent has the possibility to punish if she considers the 
monetary transfer unfair; punishment condition). As a control, the participants were also 
performing monetary transfers similar to a dictator game (where punishment is not possible; 
control condition). Similar to our previous behavioral study (Ruff et al., 2013), we 
hypothesize that the anodal-/cathodal-tDCS is increasing/decreasing the social norm 
compliance, as measured in terms of transfer difference between the punishment and the 
control condition, where no punishment is possible. We also hypothesize that anodal-/ 
cathodal-tDCS over rLPFC is modulating the punishment-related activity in opposite ways 
(anodal-tDCS increases and cathodal-tDCS decreases the neural activity), in either regions 
within executive network or within affective network. 
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Material and Methods 
 
Subjects 
Seventy-nine healthy female volunteers (mean age, 21.56 years; SD, 5.05 years) participated 
in the experiment. Each participant was assigned to one of the three stimulation groups: 
anodal-, cathodal- or sham-tDCS. All volunteers provided informed consent to participate 
and none of them had a history of neurological or psychiatric diseases or used medication 
regularly. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Canton of 
Zurich. 
 
Experimental task 
In the current study we aimed to investigate by which neural mechanisms rLPFC-tDCS can 
affect social norm compliance. Thus here, we employed a modified version of a well-
established experimental paradigm (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff et al., 2013) (see Figure 1A). In 
every round, player A (“the proposer”, inside the scanner) was randomly paired with player B 
(“the responder”, outside the scanner) and they interacted anonymously with each other. 
Player A was endowed with 100 money units (MUs) and proposed a division of these points 
between both players. Both A and B received 25 MUs extra on every trial, for reasons of 
fairness and to make social punishment possible. Player A could immediately decide how to 
distribute the 100 MUs between himself and player B. In the control condition (no 
punishment condition), the transfer took place immediately. In contrast, in the punishment 
condition, player B could spend a part or all of the extra 25 MUs to punish player A if she 
deemed the split to be unfair. Every MU spent by player B for punishment lead to a reduction 
of player A’s gain by 5 MUs. This means, for example, that if player A transferred nothing to 
player B, such that after the transfer decision A had 125 MUs and B had 25 MUs, player B 
could reduce player A’s earnings to zero by investing the whole initial endowment for 
punishing A. Both players were cued whether the current trial was in a control or in a 
punishment condition. This meant that B was always aware whether she could or could not 
punish player A if she considered A’s choice as violating the fairness norm, and A was 
always aware of this social punishment threat. All the scanned subjects took the role of “the 
proposer” (player A) so we could investigate the effect of threat of punishment on their 
decisions.  
Every trial consisted of three phases and the fMRI contrast sensitivity was optimized by 
simulating optimal task inter trial intervals (Figure 1A). In the first phase (DECIDE block in 
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Figure 1A) a visual cue instructed player A about the current task (control or punishment 
condition). Once the visual cue was displayed, player A had maximum 4 seconds to decide 
on the transferred amount. Consecutively player A had to wait for 4.5 +/- a jitter of 2.5 
seconds (WAIT block in Figure 1A). In the last phase of the trial player A was informed by 
player B's punishment decision and the associated final payoff (FEEDBACK block in Figure 
1A). The length of the feedback phase was fixed to 3 seconds. At the beginning of each trial a 
fixation cross was presented for a random period between 2 to 7 seconds. Thus, the average 
duration of a trial summed up to 16 seconds (see Figure 1A). In total player A underwent 90 
trials, half of which were in the control condition and half with the possibility of being 
punished. All players A faced the decisions of a randomly selected player B and thus 
interacted with a real human opponent. All decisions were fully incentive compatible, as the 
MUs gained by the participants were transformed to Swiss Francs after the experiment 
according to a predefined conversion rate (1 MU = 0.008 CHF). These earnings were paid out 
on top of the base pay of 60 CHF.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the aim of this experiment was to investigate which neuronal mechanisms sub-
serve the tDCS impact on player A’s norm compliance, players B were not physically present 
during the fMRI-tDCS sessions but gave their responses in a pilot session recorded 
beforehand. However, all players B agreed that their responses could be reused in other 
sessions (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff et al., 2013).  
 
TDCS stimulation 
Figure 1 A. Behavioral task. Similar to Spitzer and colleagues (Spitzer et al., 2007), on every 
trial, player A (inside the scanner) proposed a division of 100 monetary units (MUs) between 
himself and player B. Both A and B also received 25 MUs extra. In the no-punishment condition 
(control), the transfer took place immediately, whereas in the punishment condition, player B 
could spend a part of the extra 25 MUs to punish player A. Every MU spent by player B for 
punishment led to a reduction of player A’s gain by 5 MUs. B. TDCS setup. One electrode was 
placed over rLPFC while the reference electrode was placed over vertex. C. TDCS impact on 
behavior. In line with previous beahvioural findings (Ruff et al., 2013), anodal-tDCS increased 
the sanction-induced transfer difference. In contrast, cathodal-tDCS decr ased the anction-
induced transfer difference. 
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For the conccurent combination of tDCS with fMRI we used a previously validated setup 
(Moisa et al., 2016). For the tDCS stimulation, we used a bipolar MR-compatible current 
stimulator (DC-Stimulator MC, neuroConn, Ilmenau, Germany) positioned outside the MR-
scanner room. TDCS was applied concurrently with fMRI, while the participants were 
performing the two tasks. For the two active groups (anodal- and cathodal-tDCS) the 
stimulation lasted for 30 minutes and at the beginning and at the end of the stimulation, the 
current was ramped up and down over the first and last 30 seconds, respectively. The 
amplitude of the stimulation was set to 1 mA. For the sham stimulation the current was 
ramped up to 1 mA over 30 seconds before immediately ramping it down over the next 30 
seconds. 
 
Experimental design 
Before each participant went into the MR-scanner, the stimulation site over the rLPFC was 
identified (Figure 1B). We used the exact stimulation montage as in our previous study (Ruff 
et al., 2013). Thus, the rLPFC was defined using the following MNI coordinates: x=52, y=28, 
z=14. This standard coordinate was transformed to the individual head-space of each 
participant using T1-weighted MR scans of participant’s neuroanatomy (T1-weighted 3D 
turbo field echo, 320 sagittal slices, matrix size: 240 x 240, voxel size = 1*1*1 mm, 8-
channel MR head coil). The scalp coordinate overlying this brain area was employed as the 
center point for the active electrode and was determined for each participant prior to the 
experiment using Brainsight 2.0 frameless stereotaxy (Rogue Research, Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada). A second reference electrode, (cathode for anodal-tDCS and anode for cathodal-
tDCS) was positioned over the vertex, defined in the MR images as the scalp position 
overlying the confluence of each individual participant’s right and left central sulcus. We 
fixated MR-compatible tDCS electrodes (5 x 7 cm area = 35 cm
2
) using a conductive paste 
(Ten20 EEG Conductive Paste, Weaver and Company, Colorado, USA) over rLPFC and over 
vertex. Both electrodes were kept in place by means of fixation bandages (DermaPlast CoFix, 
Hartmann AG, Neuhausen, Switzerland).  
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the three stimulation groups (anodal-, 
cathodal- or sham-tDCS) and participated in one conccurent tDCS/fMRI experimental 
session. The acquisition of functional time series started approximately 3 minutes after the 
start of stimulation, in order to account for possible delays in the onset of stable tDCS effects 
(Nitsche and Paulus, 2000). Inside the scanner, each participant played the role of player A 
and underwent 3 experimental runs and a total of 90 trials, half of which were in the control 
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condition and half with the possibility of being punished (see Experimental task). The order 
of the trials was pseudo-randomized such that one experimental condition was repeated at 
most twice in a raw. In total, the task lasted 25 minutes and 30 seconds. 
Before the actual start of the stimulation and of the fMRI acquisition, the participants 
practiced the tasks for 1-2 minutes while lying on the MR-scanner bed. During the practice 
participants did not get any punishment related feedback in order to avoid possible learning 
effects. 
 
FMRI acquisition 
Functional imaging was performed on a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body MR-scanner 
equipped with an eight-channel MR head coil. In total we conducted 3 experimental runs, 
where each contained 250 volumes (voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm
3
, 0.5 mm gap, matrix size = 
80 × 80, TR/TE = 2100/35 ms, flip angle = 79, parallel imaging factor =1.5, 35 slices 
acquired in ascending order for full coverage of the brain). We also acquired T1-weighted 
multi slice fast-field echo B0 scans that were used for correction of possible static distortion 
produced by the presence of the active electrode (voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm
3
, 0.5 mm gap, 
matrix size = 80 × 80, TR/TE1/TE2 = 481/4.3/7.4 ms, flip angle = 44, no parallel imaging, 37 
slices). Additionally, we acquired a high-resolution T1-weighted 3D fast-field echo structural 
scan used for image registration during post-processing (181 sagittal slices, matrix 
size = 256 × 256, voxel size = 1 mm
3
, TR/TE/TI = 8.0/3.7/181 ms). 
Statistical Analyses 
Three participants had to be excluded from further analyses. One participant was excluded 
since she did not understand the task (based on debriefing at the end of the experimental 
session). Two other participants were excluded since they transferred in all trials (in 
punishment trials as well as in control trials) 50 MUs. Thus, all the analyses and the results 
reported here are based on data from 76 participants (24 participants received anodal-tDCS, 
26 cathodal-tDCS and 26 received sham-tDCS). 
Behavioral analysis 
To assess the effects of anodal and cathodal rLPFC-tDCS on the monetary transfer 
(punishment-induced compared to voluntary norm compliance) we employed a similar 
analysis as in our previous behavioral study (Ruff et al., 2013). Thus, comprehensive linear 
mixed-effects (LME) regression analysis was conducted using Matlab. This analysis 
predicted for each individual i the observed choice Ti,t in round t with the following equation: 
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Ti,t = 0 + 1(anodal) + 2(cathodal) +3(punishment) + 4(punishment)*anodal + 
5(punishment)*cathodal + i,t  (eq. 1) 
Where anodal and cathodal are dummy-coded variables that are set to 1 if individual i 
received anodal-, cathodal- or sham-tDCS, respectively, or to 0 in all other cases. Punishment 
is dummy-coded variable that is set to 1 if in the current trial i the player B has the option to 
punish player A, and 0 during the control trials. The model furthermore contained a constant 
0, which measures the average transfer during the control trials during sham-tDCS, as well 
as the interaction between anodal-tDCS and punishment and the interaction between 
cathodal-tDCS and punishment. As random effects, the model contained random intercepts 
for trials and subjects. For completeness, a similar model without random intercepts for 
subjects and trials revealed a similar statistical result. 
FMRI data analysis 
Pre-processing of fMRI and GLM design matrix 
The fMRI data were analysed with Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, 
Massachusetts, U.S.A). Pre-processing of the functional time series included motion 
correction, slice time correction, normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space, spatial resampling to 3 mm isotropic voxels, temporal high-pass filtering and spatial 
smoothing (Gaussian with 8 mm full-width at half-maximum). 
Statistical analysis followed a two-stage procedure. First, we computed a single-subject 
fixed-effects model for each participant by multiple regression of the voxelwise time series 
onto a composite model containing the covariates of interest. The GLM design matrix 
included six main regressors, three per each experimental condition (i.e., DECIDE, WAIT 
and FEEDBACK for punishment and control condition, respectively). The DECIDE phases 
were modelled as epochs of duration corresponding to the reaction time of the decision. The 
WAIT phase and the FEEDBACK phase were modelled as epochs of corresponding lengths 
(between 2 and 7 seconds for the WAIT block and a fixed duration of 3 seconds for the 
FEEDBACK block; see Experimental task and Figure 1A). Experimental trials where the 
participants did not respond were modelled as regressors of no interest. 
All regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). 
The corresponding temporal and dispersion derivatives of the 6 main regressors were also 
included in the model. In addition, we also modelled participant-specific head movement 
parameters to account for BOLD signal changes that correlated with head movements. We 
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removed possible geometric distortions using the “unwarp” toolbox implemented in SPM8, 
by means of subject-specific fieldmaps. To allow for group and between-group inferences, 
we fed the individual contrast images into second-level random-effects analyses. First we 
investigated which brain regions respond to punishment threats as compared to control (the 
network that subserves the norm-compliant behavior; for sham group) with a particular focus 
on regions within the executive and affective network.  Consecutively, we focused on 
identifying regions that exhibit changes in neural responses to punishment threats brought 
about tDCS (quantified by the interaction between task and type of stimulation, e.g. 
[Punishment - Control]Sham - [Punishment - Control]Cathodal or [Punishment - Control]Anodal - 
[Punishment - Control]Sham; two-sample T tests). As hypothesized, we restricted our search 
for regions that revealed punishment-related activity modulation brought about tDCS to 
regions within the executive network or within affective network (see Correction for multiple 
comparisons section). 
We also employed region of interest (ROI) analysis to investigate for possible tDCS 
modulated activity changes in the stimulated rLPFC. We generated a stimulation site ROI as 
a 12 mm box cantered on the stimulated rLPFC (MNI coordinates: x=52, y=28, z=14). We 
extracted parameter estimates (proportional to BOLD signal changes) of the DECISION 
phase for punishment condition relative to control condition (Punishment - Control). 
Subsequently we averaged the parameter estimates across all the voxels in the stimulated-
rLPFC ROI. We assessed possible stimulation induced modulations of activity in the rLPFC 
by means of two-sample T-tests (to compare anodal- or cathodal-tDCS groups to sham-tDCS 
group). 
Psychophysiological analysis (PPI) 
We also conducted psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston et al., 1997), to 
further investigate if any brain regions are showing differential punishment-related functional 
coupling with the stimulated rLPFC (the contrasts of interest were modelled similarly to the 
main interactions conducted during the main GLM analysis; e.g. [Punishment - Control]Sham - 
[Punishment - Control]Cathodal or [Punishment - Control]Anodal - [Punishment - Control]Sham; 
two-sample T tests). In this respect, we added to our initial design matrix (1) the BOLD time-
series extracted from a 5 mm radius sphere centered around the stimulated rLPFC (MNI 
coordinates: x=52, y=28, z=14), and (2) the interaction term resulting from the extracted 
BOLD time-course and all main regressors defined in the initial GLM design matrix (see 
above), in order to account for the unique effect of the interaction of interest. 
152 
 
The standard GLM analysis revealed punishment-related specific neural modulations brought 
about anodal-tDCS in a region within the affective network, namely amygdala (see Results 
section). Thus we conducted a similar PPI analysis, with the seed region in amygdala, in 
order to investigate if any brain regions exhibit differential punishment-related functional 
coupling with the amygdala triggered by anodal-tDCS. The seed region was defined as the 
overlap between the cluster revealed by the main interaction contrast (Punishment - 
Control]Anodal - [Punishment - Control]Sham) and the amygdala ROI within the standard 
affective network (see Correction for multiple comparisons section).  
Correction for multiple comparisons  
Our hypothesis was that the two active stimulation conditions will exhibit opposite 
punishment-related neural changes within executive or affective networks. In this respect we 
generated the map of the standard executive network by a meta-analysis of 588 studies. 
Similarly the map of the standard affective network was generated by a meta-analysis of 790 
studies (Neurosynth database dated 1st of March 2017, http://neurosynth.org/). The two 
standard activation maps were corrected for multiple comparisons using an expected false 
discovery rate of 0.01 and spatially smoothed (Gaussian with 4 mm full-width at half-
maximum). 
We restricted our analyses to these standard activation maps and we implemented these 
analyses as non-parametric tests (cluster-level threshold of p < 0.05, cluster-forming 
threshold T = 2.6, corrected for multiple comparisons across the emotion or executive 
network; 5000 permutation, no t-map smoothing) in the software package SnPM (Open 
source code available at http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm) to optimally correct for type-1 error rates 
(Eklund et al., 2016). For completeness, we also performed standard SPM whole-brain 
analyses at a statistical threshold of p<0.05 FWE corrected for multiple comparisons at the 
cluster-level, with cluster-forming threshold T = 2.6. 
 
Link between punishment-related neural activity modulation in the stimulated rLPFC 
and remote brain regions 
The fMRI analyses revealed that anodal-/cathodal-tDCS modulates the punishment-related 
activity in several remote regions both within executive and affective network (see Results 
sections). Thus, we further investigated the link between the tDCS-related modulation 
activity in the stimulated site and the punishment-related changes brought about tDCS in 
these remote brain areas. We performed separate analyses in which we regressed the neural 
activity in these remote regions affected by tDCS (parameter estimates [PE_remoteRegion], 
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proportional to BOLD signal changes, for [Punishment – Control] contrast) on both the tDCS 
intervention (anodal- or cathodal-tDCS) and on parameter estimates of the stimulated rLPFC 
(for the same contrast, [Punishment – Control]). The models further included the 
corresponding interactions between the stimulation types (anodal- or cathodal-tDCS) and the 
parameter estimates in the stimulated rLPFC (PE_rLPFC): 
PE_remoteRegion = 0 + 1(anodal) + 2(cathodal) +3(PE_rLPFC) + 4(PE_rLPFC)*anodal 
+ 5(PE_rLPFC)*cathodal (eq. 2) 
where anodal and cathodal were dummy-coded variables that are set to 1 if the current 
participant received anodal- or cathodal-tDCS, respectively, or to 0 in all other cases. These 
analyses were performed using the linear mixed effects (LME) function implemented in 
Matlab.  
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Results 
rLPFC-tDCS effects on social-norm complaint behavior  
In line with previous results (Ruff et al., 2013), the behavioral analysis revealed that rLPFC-
tDCS changed the social norm compliance, as measured in terms of transfer difference 
between punishment and control condition, where no punishment is possible. Similar to Ruff 
and colleagues (Ruff et al., 2013), anodal- and cathodal-tDCS changed sanction-induced 
norm compliance in opposite ways relative to sham-tDCS. Specifically anodal-tDCS 
increased the monetary transfer difference (LME analysis, p < 0.001; see Figure 1C), whereas 
cathodal-tDCS decreased the monetary transfer difference (LME analysis, p = 0.001; see 
Figure 1C). Thus, we successfully replicated previous findings of rLPFC-tDCS impact on 
norm-complaint behavior. 
Neural network for social norm compliance: increased punishment-related activity in 
executive network 
Having successfully replicated previous behavioral effects of the stimulation on sanction-
induced social norm compliant behavior (Ruff et al., 2013), we proceeded to analyze the 
fMRI data. The first analysis focused on disclosing the neural network that subserves social 
norm complaint behavior, computed as the contrast between the brain activations during 
decision-making epochs under the social punishment threat and activations during decisions 
in the control condition. Specifically we tested for punishment-related activity changes in 
executive or affective network for sham-tDCS group. Indeed we observed punishment-related 
activity increases in regions within executive network such as bilateral dorsal LPFC, left 
ventral LPFC, bilateral parietal and ACC (Figure 2). No region within the affective network 
exhibited punishment related increases as compared with control. For completeness, whole 
brain analysis also revealed increased punishment-related activity in precuneous. No regions 
exhibited decreased punishment-related activity as compared with control task. Thus, our 
results revealed punishment-related activations in executive network and no activity 
modulation of affective network. 
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unishment-related brain activity modulations brought about rLPFC-tDCS 
Our results successfully confirmed previous rLPFC-tDCS effects on norm complaint 
behavior (Ruff et al., 2013). Furthermore we observed sanction-induced norm-compliant 
related activity increases in the executive network. We now turn to the crucial goal of this 
study, namely to disclose which brain networks exhibit punishment-related dynamic changes 
brought about rLPFC-tDCS. Is the rLPFC-tDCS modulating the punishment-related activity 
in the executive network or in the affective network? To this end, we analyzed the individual 
contrasts between DECISION epochs in trials were punishment was possible versus 
DECISION epochs in trials were punishment was not available, in second-level analyses 
Figure 2 Neural network for social norm compliance. We observed increased brain 
activity in response to punishment threats compared with control in regions within the 
executive network, such as bilateral dorsal LPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), left 
ventral LPFC (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex), bilateral caudate nucleus bilateral IPL 
(inferior parietal lobe) and ACC (anterior cingulate cortex). The left brain views display 
standard ROIs within the executive network, while the right brain views display the 
regions that revealed punishment-related activity increases as compared with control 
(standard whole brain SPM analysis; p<0.05 FWE cluster corrected, cluster-forming 
threshold T > 2.6). The middle brain views display the overlap between the standard 
executive network and social norm compliance. 
156 
 
(two-sample t-tests) for different types of stimulation (e.g. cathodal- versus sham-tDCS or 
anodal- versus sham-tDCS). 
During sham-tDCS, these regions strongly responded to punishment threat as compared with 
control (Figure 3B; post-hoc paired t-test on PEs, p < 0.05), whereas during cathodal-tDCS 
the punishment-related activity blunted out (Figure 3D). Surprisingly, anodal-tDCS did not 
modulate (increased or decreased) the punishment-related activity in any regions within 
executive network. Thus, our results hint towards a decrease in strategic response to the 
punishment threat, effect specific to cathodal-tDCS. 
Next, we investigated if rLPFC-tDCS triggers changes in functional connective between the 
stimulated rLPFC and remote brain regions within executive network. No brain region within 
the executive network exhibit punishment-related changes (increases or decreases) in 
functional connectivity with the stimulated rLPFC, neither brought about cathodal- nor by 
anodal-tDCS. 
 
Anodal-tDCS modulates the punishment-related activity in amygdala (affective 
network) 
Next, we tested for punishment-related modulations in regions within the affective network. 
Interestingly increased sanction-induced monetary transfer difference by anodal-tDCS was 
also reflected in punishment-related increased brain activity in amygdala, region within the 
affective network (Figure 3C & 3D; post-hoc paired t-test on PEs, p < 0.05). In contrast, for 
the sham-tDCS group, the activity in the same amygdala is decreased during the punishment 
threat compared with control (Figure 3C & 3D; post-hoc paired t-test on PEs, p < 0.05). No 
regions within the affective network revealed any punishment related modulations (increases 
or decreases) with the cathodal-tDCS. These results suggest that anodal-tDCS brings about an 
increased emotional response to the punishment threat. Thus, our analyses did not revealed 
the hypothesized opposite punishment-related activity modulation of regions within the same 
brain network (for anodal- compared to cathodal-tDCS), but rather a selective modulation of 
the executive network (due to cathodal-tDCS) and of the affective network (due to anodal-
tDCS), respectively. 
Cathodal-tDCS modulates the punishment-related activity in the executive network 
First we tested for punishment-related modulations brought about rLPFC-tDCS in regions 
within the executive network. Indeed, decreased sanction-induced monetary transfer 
difference by cathodal-tDCS compared to sham-tDCS was also accompanied by activity 
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shifts in regions within executive network (e.g. ACC, bilateral LPFC, left parietal cortex; 
Figure 3A & 3B).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anodal-tDCS changes the punishment-related functionally connectivity between the 
stimulated rLPFC and OFC/vmPFC  
Next, we investigated if rLPFC-tDCS triggers changes in functional connective between the 
stimulated rLPFC and remote brain regions within affective network. Indeed, a PPI analysis 
revealed an increased functional connectivity between the stimulated rLPFC and 
OFC/vmPFC due to anodal-tDCS (Figure 4A & 4B; post-hoc paired t-test, p < 0.05).  
 
Figure 3 Brain activity changes brought about anodal-tDCS (A and B) and cathodal-tDCS (C 
and D). A. The increased sanction-induced monetary transfer difference due to anodal-tDCS was 
accompanied by increased brain activity in amygdala (region within the affective network) during 
punishment threats in the amygdala (standard whole brain SPM analysis; p<0.05 FWE cluster 
corrected, cluster-forming threshold T > 2.6). B. Anodal-tDCS effects with parameter estimates 
(PE; proportional to BOLD signal changes) in amygdala (# denotes significant interaction 
computed with SPM8; * denotes post-hoc paired t-test, p < 0.05). C. The decreased sanction-
induced norm compliance due to cathodal rLPFC-tDCS was accompanied by neural activity blunts 
during punishment threats compared with control in executive network regions: ACC, bilateral 
dorsal LPFC and left parietal cortex (standard whole brain SPM analysis; p<0.05 FWE cluster 
corrected, cluster-forming threshold T > 2.6). D. Cathodal tDCS effects with parameter estimates 
(PE; proportional to BOLD signal changes) in two representative regions, i.e. the left LPFC and 
ACC ( # denotes significant interaction computed with SPM8; * denotes post-hoc paired t-test, p < 
0.05). 
158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, during sham-tDCS, the functional connectivity between rLPFC and OFC/vmPFC 
decreased during punishment threat compared with control (Figure 4A and B; post-hoc paired 
t-test, p < 0.05). There were no regions within the affective network showing changes 
(increases or decreases) in punishment-related functional connectivity with the stimulated 
rLPFC due to cathodal-tDCS. Thus anodal-tDCS also modulates the connectivity between the 
stimulated rLPFC and OFC/vmPFC, region within the affective network. 
 
Figure 4 A. Psychophysiological interactions analysis with the seed in the stimulated rLPFC. Anodal-tDCS 
increased punished-related connectivity between the stimulated rLPFC and OFC/vmPFC (region within the 
affective network; standard whole brain SPM analysis; p<0.05 FWE cluster corrected, cluster-forming 
threshold T > 2.6). B. The anodal-tDCS effects on connectivity with stimulated rLPFC, with parameter 
estimates (PE; proportional to BOLD signal changes) in OFC/vmPFC (# denotes significant interaction 
computed with SPM8; * denotes post-hoc paired t-test, p < 0.05). C. PPI analysis with the seed in amygdala. 
Anodal-tDCS increased punished-related connectivity between the amygdala and OFC/vmPFC. D. The 
anodal- tDCS effects on connectivity with amygdala, with parameter estimates (PE; proportional to BOLD 
signal changes) in OFC/vmPFC (# denotes significant interaction computed with SPM8; * denotes post-hoc 
paired t-test, p < 0.05). 
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Anodal-tDCS changes the punishment-related functionally connectivity between 
amygdala and OFC/vmPFC  
Our analyses identified two main aspects at the neural level that were affected by anodal-
tDCS: first anodal-tDCS increase on social norm-complaint behavior was also accompanied 
by punishment-related activity increase in amygdala; second anodal-tDCS also increased the 
punishment-related functional connectivity between the stimulated rLPFC and OFC/vmPFC. 
To further investigate if anodal-tDCS also modulates the link between these two regions of 
the affective network (amygdala and OFC/vmPFC) we performed a functional connectivity 
analysis with the seed region in amygdala. Indeed, this PPI analysis revealed an increased 
punishment-related functional connectivity between amygdala and OFC during anodal-tDCS 
(Figure 4C & D; post-hoc paired t-test, p < 0.05). In contrast, for sham-tDCS, the functional 
connectivity between amygdala and OFC decreased during punishment threat compared with 
control (Figure 4C and D; post-hoc paired t-test, p < 0.05). Thus anodal rLPFC-tDCS also 
modulates the connectivity between these two remote regions within the affective network. 
 
Cathodal stimulation decreases the norm complaint related activity in the stimulated 
rLPFC 
Up to now, the current study successfully confirmed previous rLPFC-tDCS effects on norm 
complaint behavior (Ruff et al., 2013). The results so far indicate that anodal- and cathodal-
tDCS over rLPFC modulation on norm-complaint behavior is also reflected in neural activity 
changes within two distinct networks, e.g. executive network (due to cathodal-tDCS) and 
affective network (due to anodal-tDCS). Next we investigated how theses distinct 
punishment-related effects are mechanistically brought about anodal- and cathodal-tDCS. 
First we investigated if tDCS over rLPFC induced modulations on punishment-related 
functional activity at the stimulation site. We compared the activity during the punishment 
condition relative to the control for anodal- or cathodal-tDCS versus sham-tDCS. Indeed, an 
ROI analysis (see Methods) of the stimulated area showed that, compared to the sham-tDCS, 
cathodal-tDCS significantly reduced the rLPFC neural activity associated with punishment-
induced norm compliant behavior (rLPFC ROI, two-sample T-test, P(51) = 0.017). There 
was no significant difference in the punishment-induced related activity modulation at the 
stimulated site for anodal- versus sham-tDCS (rLPFC ROI, two-sample T-test, P(48) = 0.34). 
Thus, our results indicate that the cathodal-tDCS modulatory effects on remote regions within 
executive network are induced via direct modulation of punishment-related activity in the 
stimulated rLPFC. 
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Anodal tDCS increases the correlation between the activity in stimulated rLPFC and 
the activity in amygdala and OFC/vmPFC 
To further investigate the link between the impact of the tDCS on the stimulated rLPFC and 
the remote impact of the tDCS on regions within the executive or affective network, we 
performed several regression analyses. First, we regressed the activity change for punishment 
versus control in amygdala or in OFC/vmPFC, on the neural activity for the same contrast in 
the stimulated rLPFC and its interaction with the stimulation condition (see methods for 
details on the regressions). These analyses revealed that, compared to sham-tDCS, only 
during anodal-tDCS and not during cathodal-tDCS, a stronger punishment-related neural 
activity change (punishment versus control) in amygdala was associated with a stronger 
punishment-related neural activity change in the stimulated rLPFC (interaction between 
neural activity at the stimulation site [PE_rLPFC] and stimulation condition [anodal-tDCS], t 
(70) = 1.67, p = 0.049, one tailed; see also Methods section). Similarly, compared with sham-
tDCS, during anodal-tDCS a stronger punishment-related neural activity change (punishment 
versus control) in OFC/vmPFC was associated with a stronger punishment-related neural 
activity change in the stimulated rLPFC (interaction between neural activity at the stimulation 
site [PE_rLPFC] and stimulation condition [anodal-tDCS], t (70) = 2.36, p = 0.01, one tailed; 
see also Methods section). For completeness, no region within the executive network 
revealed any significant associations with the punishsment-control related activity in the 
stimulation site brought about cathodal tDCS. Thus, these results suggest that the pathway by 
which anodal-tDCS affects subsequent norm-complaint behavior is via a direct link between 
the stimulated rLPFC with amygdala and OFC/vMPFC (regions within affective network). 
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Discussion  
In this study, we combined concurrently tDCS and fMRI to reveal the brain networks that 
accompany tDCS-induced changes in social norm-compliant behavior. In line with previous 
results (Ruff et al., 2013), anodal-/ and cathodal-tDCS increased/decreased norm-compliant 
behavior, as measured in terms of transfer difference between the punishment and the control 
condition, where no punishment is possible. Our results indicate that anodal- and cathodal-
tDCS over rLPFC triggered punishment-related neural reconfigurations in two distinct brain 
networks: Cathodal-tDCS (which led to weaker sanction-induced compliance) weakened the 
neural response to punishment threats in regions within an executive neural network (ACC, 
bilateral LPFC and left parietal cortex). Interestingly, anodal-tDCS (that led to increased 
sanction-induced norm compliance) did not affect neural responsiveness of this executive 
network, but rather resulted in stronger amygdala responses to punishment threats as well as 
augmented punishment-induced functional connectivity between stimulated rLPFC and OFC, 
and between amygdala and OFC. Below we discuss all these results in details.  
The results obtained in the present study largely corroborated the existing evidence, at both 
behavioral and neural level. Behaviorally, we replicated the impact of rLPFC-tDCS, 
confirming that anodal-/cathodal-tDCS rendered participants more/less sensitive to the 
presence of sanction threats in reference to the control condition, where no punishment is 
possible, causing larger/smaller adjustments of behavior to the external incentives. At the 
neural level, we show punishment-related activations (the network that subserves norm-
compliant behavior) only in regions within the executive network while the affective network 
is not modulated by the punishment threat. The punishment-related network revealed here 
also broadly overlaps with the norm-complaint network described in a previous fMRI study 
(Spitzer et al., 2007). Thus here we replicate both previous behavioral (Ruff et al., 2013) and 
imaging results (Spitzer et al., 2007) that investigated the norm-based social behavior. 
 
When examining how tDCS affected the neural activity elicited by the stimulation-related 
modulation of norm-complaint behavior – the main aim of our study – we did not observed 
the expected opposite punishment-related activity modulation within a unique network of 
regions due to anodal- and cathodal-tDCS. Instead anodal- and cathodal-tDCS triggered 
neural activity reconfigurations in two distinct brain networks: affective network (due to 
anodal-tDCS) and executive network (due to cathodal-tDCS), respectively. One possible 
explanation could be that rLPFC is connected and communicates with different networks, 
such as executive and affective networks in different activity regimes. Previous work has 
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suggested the core role of the LPFC in coordinating the activity in other interconnected brain 
areas to instantiate behavioral control and action selection of complex processes (Cummings, 
1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Levine, 2009; Duncan, 2010). Specifically, it has been 
proposed that LPFC has an integration-and-selection role in the service of norm-complaint 
behavior and that LPFC integrates and coordinates information from several regions within 
both executive and affective network (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015). 
In our study cathodal-tDCS resulted in activity changes in regions within the executive brain 
network (e.g. ACC, bilateral LPFC, left parietal cortex). During sham stimulation, these 
regions strongly responded to punishment threat as compared to control (broadly overlap with 
the network that subserves norm complaint behavior; see Figure 2). However cathodal-tDCS 
blunted-out the punishment-related responses as compared with the control task. These 
activity shifts of the cathodal-tDCS on regions within the executive network suggest a 
diminished strategic thinking about the consequences of the punishment threats. 
Critically, anodal-tDCS over rLPFC lead to an increase in neural sensitivity to punishment 
threats in the amygdala, a brain area known to have an important role in processing fear and 
aversive responses to threats of various nature (Ohman, 2005) and in particular during social 
interactions (Bechara et al., 2003). Importantly, our results also showed that anodal-tDCS 
increases the punishment-related functional connectivity both between the stimulated rLPFC 
and OFC/vmPFC as well as between amygdala and OFC/vmPFC. It is well established that 
amygdala and the OFC are anatomically and reciprocally connected (McDonald, 1998; 
Hoover and Vertes, 2007). Also amygdala and the vmPFC are interconnected brain structures 
that mediate the extinction of conditioned fear both in rats (Milad and Quirk, 2002; Amano et 
al., 2010) and in humans (Phelps et al., 2004). Furthermore, a whole body of research 
indicates that neural connectivity between amygdala and OFC is important for updating cue 
values after changes in their associated outcome (Saddoris et al., 2005; Murray, 2007; 
Morrison et al., 2011). Here the increased norm-complaint behavior brought about anodal-
tDCS is also reflected in changes in the functional interplay between the stimulated rLPFC, 
amygdala and OFC/vmPFC. Thus, from a functional point of view, our results suggest that 
the anodal-tDCS may have induced increased affective responses to punishment threats. 
 
The modulation of punishment-related activity in different brain networks (affective network 
due to anodal-tDCS and executive network due to cathodal-tDCS) might also be accounted 
by the fact that anodal- and cathodal-tDCS affect different types of neuron populations that 
might have different connections with regions within different networks. This is only 
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speculative and future work should further investigate the anodal- and cathodal-tDCS 
modulatory effects on these two distinct networks. However, most combined tDCS and fMRI 
previous studies investigated the impact of only one type of stimulation (either anodal- versus 
sham-tDCS or cathodal- versus sham-tDCS). Here we directly compare the impact on 
behavior and on neural activity of both anodal- and cathodal-tDCS, stimulation protocols that 
are communally accepted to have opposite effects (e.g. to induce cortical facilitation [anodal-
tDCS] and inhibition [cathodal tDCS]) (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000, 2001). 
 
To summarize, we used concurrent tDCS with fMRI to reveal the dynamic changes in 
functional interplay between the stimulated rLPFC and interconnected brain networks 
underlying norm-based social behavior. We show that cathodal-tDCS resulted in punishment-
related activity blunts in regions within the executive network, consistent with the view that 
stimulation may have diminished strategic thinking about the consequences of the 
punishment threats. Importantly, anodal-tDCS increases different aspects of punishment-
related neural responses (e.g. neural activity or functional connectivity) in areas within 
affective network, suggesting increased affective responses to punishment threats. 
Furthermore, our results suggests that rLPFC is not simply implementing only local neural 
processes which generate the appropriate decisions, but rather that rLPFC is coordinating the 
activity in interconnected brain networks, such as executive and affective networks, which in 
the end are jointly responsible for the modulation of the norm-compliant behavior. More 
general, our present study not only that provide more insights into the brain mechanisms 
underlying sanction-induced social norm compliance, but also demonstrates how concurrent 
combination of tDCS with fMRI can underpin the causal interplay between behavior, the 
stimulated site and different neural networks in the service of decision-making. 
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